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CENTRAL EURASIA



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FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

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22 November 1994

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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Yeltsin Support Seen Evaporating

954F0317A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Svetlana Alekseyeva: "The President's Autumn: Continuation of a Topic—Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the previous article about Yeltsin I did not touch upon a certain essential question—the attitude of the nation and society to the president. This topic is so important that it requires separate discussion. Today it is even more pertinent than it was a month ago. Literally during the past few weeks much has changed in the public's attitude toward Yeltsin, his government, and the state of power in Russia in general.

This change can be felt everywhere. Yesterday's ministers have started talking about the insolvency of the government's economic policy. Certain democrats have been hinting that before the government is fired, the president himself ought to be. The State Duma in practically its complete makeup deems the activities of the Chernomyrdin cabinet to be unsatisfactory. Solzhenitsyn, who spoke in the Duma, makes a murderous accusation against the authorities. And even those mouthpieces who are the most devoted to the regime have suddenly allowed themselves to be critical of the president. No longer from the opposition camp, but from the opposite political shores one can hear the appeals to form a "government of national salvation." And one hears all kinds of discussions of various candidates as the new president. A year ago, last October, Russian society was clearly divided into two parts: those who were **FOR** Yeltsin, and those who were **AGAINST**. But today... This autumn, everything has changed. The ranks of the recent proponents and opponents have mixed and become entangled. Hanging over the autumn air is one common idea that brings closer together the most diverse social groups—the change of power. No one has announced the beginning of a presidential election campaign, but all the existing political forces have fallen into formation, as though on command, ready for of an inevitable election.

Suddenly there has been revealed with all obviousness the fact that Yeltsin has been left with practically no support in society. The headline in one newspaper was, "The President's Solo Flight..."

Properly speaking, what has happened?

October has happened. And there have been a series of unpleasant and tragic events. Maybe we cannot get accustomed to new things, but maybe those events had been like the straw that broke society's back...

I would like to take the risk of offering my own version.

So long as the persons who became the victims of the reforms were the lowest—as they are now called—segments of society, that is, the workers and the peasants, no one other than the leftist opposition sounded the alarm. Moreover, the attempt was made to convince us during the transitional period that this had to be, that it was an inevitable but temporary phenomenon. For a long time there has been no support for Yeltsin among the people, and, actually, there never had been any. As everyone knows, at the 1991 presidential election, only one-third of the population that had the right to vote voted for him. Nevertheless, Yeltsin has always been represented as being the person "elected by the entire nation," although it would be more accurate to say "elected as a result of a nationwide vote," or, as one reader expressed it, "one-third-elected"...

Well, good luck to him. What's past is past. Although it might, nevertheless, be worthwhile to mention one circumstance. In 1991 Yeltsin was elected president by what was still a Soviet nation, in a Soviet country, under a socialist system. He was elected as the leader of only one of the republics in the Union (albeit the largest one), and thus one should remember that other agencies of authority will exist and operate above him and parallel with him. In this system of state coordinates, Yeltsin's personal qualities that were already known to us in 1991—his persistence, decisiveness, and recalcitrance—could have played their positive role in defending the interests of the Russian republic in the face of the union center and the neighbors, and people could count on that.

But by the end of that same year of 1991, Yeltsin had factually occupied a completely different position, with different powers and functions. He had proven to be in Russia, essentially speaking, a one-man ruler, a supreme one who was reportable to no one else. And it was then that his personal qualities began to play a completely different, fatal role.

Even that third of the voters who had voted for him, without even mentioning the entire nation, had definitely not given him the powers to break up the Union, to liquidate the part and the Soviets, to change the Constitution, much less to begin to build capitalism in Russia. He did all of that against the will of the nation, without asking for its consent. And as the reforms began coming with furious speed, the social base of the support of the Russian president began melting and eroding like shagreen leather.

During those years I never met a person who would say, "What a fool I was, not to vote for Yeltsin in 1991! Just look at what a fine president he turned out to be!" But I did hear everywhere—in the capital and in the provinces—people saying, "What a fool I was, to vote for Yeltsin! He has ruined Russia!"

The nation actually did prove to be a fool. The workers and peasants who, under the previous, Soviet system, had been the main force, the nucleus of society, the most

respected and honored part of the nation, under Yeltsin were turned into nothing, into the "lower classes," the most undefended part of that nation. They wanted to become the owners of production (do you remember the brigade contract, cost accountability, the lease, the elections of directors and shop chiefs?), but they became unemployed, or, at best, hired workers for the private owners of the former state enterprises. They wanted to earn more (do you remember the fight against wage leveling, the introduction of coefficients, settlement record books, etc.?), but they became poor people from whom their lawful wages have been withheld for half a year, and that amount that is paid to them has already melted away and is completely remote from the real cost of living. They wanted to feed their families well, but then the cities experienced a shortage of food products, unlike the villages, especially those in the south of Russia, where people lived largely by relying on their own personal plots. Isn't that why the city dwellers voted more actively for Yeltsin than the villagers did? Because they hoped that, with his coming to power, he would correct the situation? After all, he had promised to close down all the "special distribution centers" and everything that the *nomenklatura* had hidden and consumed in secrecy, and had promised to give everything to the people. Under Yeltsin there was actually no shortage of food products, but it was not at the expense of opening up the *nomenklatura*'s secret caches, but at the expense of the intervention of foreign commodities. However, there did appear another shortage—a shortage of money—and it proved to be much more serious. When a person has money in his pocket but there is nothing to buy with it, he apparently feels more worthy and more confident than when he is surrounded by everything, but does not have any money with which to buy anything. That is really humiliating for him. Especially for a working man.

So now the working class has begun to realize that under socialism he still had rights and still had power, and that he lost that power very easily. But also the new power has lost the working class as its social base of support, and has lost it irrevocably.

Whereas the workers—or some part of them—can be reproached for having, themselves, elected a president who brought to the extreme degree of desperation, the peasants of Russia, for the most part, have proven to be "guilty without guilt." It is a rare one among them who voted in 1991 for Yeltsin, but they all, contrary to their will, became victims of the democratic reforms. It is not enough that the land is being squandered, the property that took years to be acquired at collective farms is being hauled away, and the harvest that has been grown with so much labor is proving to be unneeded by anyone, and the peasants themselves have found themselves in the category practically of "enemies of the people." They are called "parasites" and "loafers" who "do not know how to work" or who "do not want to work," and the only thing that they do is ask for subsidies and credit. That is what the official propaganda says. And anyone who feels

like it can take a kick today at the peasant who, together with the worker, has been brought down from the pedestal of honor that he occupied in past years.

So now not a single one of them will vote for Yeltsin and his regime, even if he is an individual farmer, because even the individual farmers were deceived by being promised mountains of gold and then being put on the brink of extinction. As for the rural inhabitants, they are, among other things, one-third of Russia's population.

Generally speaking, what determines the nation's attitude toward the leader of the state? In the final analysis it is whether, under him, people's lives are better or worse. Historians and political experts can evaluate in any way they want the personality of the leaders, but people sometimes do not remember at all the most important, epochal things that distinguish the administrative style of a particular leader, but what has personally affected them in their everyday life. The people's memory has had firmly implanted within it the impression that under Stalin the prices dropped every year, under Khrushchev there were breaks in shipments of bread, and concerning the Brezhnev era people today say almost seriously, "We were living under communism, but we didn't notice it." Yeltsin can be depicted as any kind of reformer that people want to depict him as, but for the nation he will always remain the person under whom prices rose a thousand-fold.

There is no need to talk about the attitude of military personnel to the president. Everything is very clear. So if you look for persons who are dissatisfied with the regime and with Yeltsin personally, you will find them in the army—which is torn apart, plundered, and demoralized. Needless to say, they will not vote for "reformers" again.

But what about the provincial intellectuals (the intellectuals in the capital are the subject for special discussion)—doctors, teachers, engineers, librarians?... Their life is not better in any way, or it may even be worse, than the life of the workers, peasants, and military personnel. In the provinces, theaters, libraries, club houses, and newspapers are closing down. The people are not interested in culture. And the state is incapable of supporting anything—culture, science, or education. According to information in the KTO YEST KTO newspaper, more than 60 percent of Russians partially or completely refuse to go to plays or movie theaters today; more than 40 percent refuse to buy newspapers; but what is even more terrifying is that the same number of people have been forced to refuse to buy themselves the clothing that they need, and more than 20 percent to buy food products. Also, in response to the question of exactly who is to blame for their economic problems, 65 percent answered, "The president personally," but simultaneously 75 percent said, "The Government of Russia."

At one time women played perhaps the decisive role in Yeltsin's victory at the election, since the number of voters among them was greater than the number of men. There is no concealing the fact that women liked him,

especially women of middle age or older. After the long line of ailing old men (let us remain silent about Gorbachev), it was pleasant to see as the leader of the state a tall, stately, dashing man. But the "love" passed quickly. The reforms struck women most painfully. They were forced to take the brunt of the unemployment, and they ceased having equal rights on the job and in society.

Paradoxically, during times of what was supposed to be democracy, no women began appearing either in the government or in the executive structures in the outlying areas in general. Now we have learned what discrimination is. The family budget, taking care of children, providing of medical care—all these everyday problems and thousands more like them have become considerably more complicated. In certain families a completely unnatural situation has currently developed, in which the husband is forced to stay at home (enterprises are closing down or cutting back), and the wife feeds the family by engaging in speculative trade. The birth rate is falling, but prostitution is increasing, with the prostitutes being younger and younger.

This humiliated, deceived, plundered nation will never believe reformers again. Never again will that nation vote for Yeltsin, for Gaydar, or any other one of them.

The miners are almost continuously on strike, and the workers in other branches are on strike periodically. Every autumn the peasants and trade unions organize mass protest demonstrations. Hundreds of thousands of people (no matter how television would like to underestimate their number) took part this year in a demonstration on 7 November, in order, essentially speaking, not to celebrate, but to protest. The Russian Communist Party has already collected two million signatures for an early presidential election no later than the spring of 1995.

Today it is clearer than ever before: Yeltsin does not have any support among the broad masses. If he ever did have it, it has ended, dried up. That indisputable fact, however, has always been ignored and continues to be ignored by the authorities.

But this is what is being revealed now, in the autumn of 1994. It turns out that there is already practically no support in narrow circles either—among the "new Russians" who sprang up and gathered strength under Yeltsin, or among those political groupings, primarily of democratic orientation, upon whose shoulders, properly speaking, he had come to power. The intellectuals in the capital who also, at one time, did quite a bit of work for this, split up long ago. And those who, quite recently, overstrained themselves in his defense, now prefer to remain silent, but one hears more and more frequently the voices of others who found within themselves the bravery (like S. Govorukhin) to admit their mistakes, to repent, and to speak out against Yeltsin. It would seem that the creative elite is also beginning finally to understand that being in opposition to the regime is more worthy than engaging, despite common sense, in an

apologia for it. And even the most frenzied people (like Ye. Bonner) say, in their perplexity, "We ought to speak out against Yeltsin, but we can't—he's our man."

Well, then, what actually occurred this autumn?

I repeat: so long as the lower classes of the nation were the victims of the reforms, no one paid any special attention to that. The ideology of the current regime consists specifically in disregarding, in order to please a narrow segment of the population, those having power and capital. But recently the government's incomprehensible policy began hitting also on major private capital. On the one hand there were excessive taxes, high customs charges, poor laws and, in general, financial chaos. And on the other hand there was rampant terrorism, almost legal racketeering, a series of arrests of major entrepreneurs (Mavrodi, Vaynberg), and deliberate discreditation by the authorities of individual economic and financial structures.

Having bypassed the stage of the initial accumulation of capital, the Russian business elite is self-interested today in a more stable, predictable, reliable state economic policy, and also in the state's ability to protect capital against terror, and to guarantee the civilized nature of market relations in the country. Yeltsin and his government cannot provide any of this.

The black events of the past October, the effects of which have not been completely interpreted, the helplessness of the authorities, and their feverish personnel reassignments, which only confirm that they feel some kind of blame for what is happening—with all of this occurring against the background of the continuing recession and, as though on purpose, the interminable terroristic acts and political assassinations—have made crystal clear the complete insolvency of the president and his entire team. They can make as many replacements as they want—Shokhin by Yasin or Lifshits, or Gerashchenko by Ivanova, Petrova, or Paramonova—but that will no longer have any effect, except perhaps to prolong the agony.

The entire year that has passed since the execution by firing squad of the main "saboteur" of the reforms—the Supreme Soviet—during the course of which Russia not only did not move forward, but got even more deeply mired in the crisis, confirmed that this makeup of reformers, headed by this leader of reforms, is in principle incapable of bringing the matter to an end.

Today their activities are putting under threat not only the survival of the old Russian nation, but also the survival of the "new Russians," and this is already serious. The class of major entrepreneurs no longer has any objection to replacing either the government or the president by more competent people, who are simply their own. That class has apparently also matured to the point of financing that good deed.

Isn't this the explanation for the unusual rate of activity among yesterday's unconditional allies of Yeltsin, who

today are loudly criticizing him and openly starting up their own election campaign? Practically speaking, there does not remain a single party that, in one way or another, would not manifest its interest in the forthcoming election, and even the Communists' idea of holding that election in the spring of 1995 apparently does not shock anyone, but, on the contrary, if it proves to be possible to carry that idea out by other people's hands, many will even be pleased.

The fact of the matter is that today in Russia not one party is in power. Only a certain group of people are ruling the country. Solzhenitsyn defined this as an "oligarchy, that is, the power of a limited, closed number of persons." We might add that they are persons with ideas and goals that are completely unclear, eroded, and mixed in a heap. Meanwhile the parties in Russia have also matured, and many of them are already completely ready to offer their programs for getting the country out of its crisis and for independently forming the government. It is simply that it is still beneficial for some people to keep Yeltsin as president, but for others to get rid of him as quickly as possible. Everything depends upon the degree of their own readiness to seize the power.

Thus, the circle of persons actually self-interested in Boris Nikolayevich is narrowing to the size of those immediately surrounding him. It is "dawning" on the officials in the administration and on the government that they will be retiring after Yeltsin. The new president, whoever that may be, will bring his own people with him. But today these officials still hold in their hands the levers of power, and they are doing, and will continue doing, to keep as far away as possible the prospects of a presidential election, and to do everything to discredit the potential rivals, without sparing anyone at such time—either their own people or others—and to develop public opinion in a new way to Yeltsin's advantage, although that possibility is practically impossible.

Nor should we forget the so-called executive vertical line—the president's deputies in the regions. Those who were elected by the local population are completely able to speak out at the election against Yeltsin, but in concert with their constituents. But those who were appointed by presidential edict are in the most complicated situation. On the one hand, by debt of service they are obliged to continue to support him, but, on the other hand, they cannot fail to realize that Yeltsin's rule is coming to an end, and what will happen to them? Most probably that is why they now will play a kind of double game, providing themselves with spare alternatives.

Other than the people who are directly linked by service with the president and who are at risk of finding themselves without a job after his retirement, it is probably only the representatives of the criminal structures who can be genuinely self-interested in not having that happen. Under no other "leader" has there been such freedom for criminal activity in Russia. But what will

happen later on, nobody knows. Any new leader will want to begin by subduing crime—the main scourge of our present-day life. What if, unlike Yeltsin, he suddenly manages to do that?

In the previous article I wrote that the political time allotted to Boris Nikolayevich himself has already been exhausted and used up. He has done everything that he could—he has destroyed and liquidated that which constituted the basis of the previous mighty state. This person is simply incapable of doing anything more, and one should not expect or demand anything more from him.

I might add now that, judging by recent events and moods, the reserve of expectation and patience on the part of Russian society itself has also been exhausted, and that pertains to all segments of it—both the lowest and the highest.

And that means that cosmetic "repair" in the upper levels is no longer to anyone's liking. What is needed is fundamental changes.

Yeltsin's Support for Grachev Criticized

954F0302A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET
in Russian 22 Oct 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by Aleksandr Minkin: "The President on Grachev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President! Boris Nikolayevich! You didn't you come to see the journalist Dmitriy Kholodov off on his final journey. Why?

He was irreproachable. Do you understand—irreproachable. You don't have people like him around you.

You are older. We are younger. But...

As it happened, you didn't fight. And we fought. We have had the scent of gunpowder in our nostrils, Boris Nikolayevich. And you—dust from the carpets at the CPSU Central Committee.

Why didn't you come?

A meeting with the King of Great Britain—that is a great thing. A funeral for a Russian journalist—is that a small thing?

In 1990, when you were a dissident, when you were working together with Sakharov,—then, you would have come.

For the sake of politics or to answer your heart—I don't know. But you would have come.

Today, you have different people around you. Not Sakharov, none of your fellow fighters from your time in disfavor. Some are already gone, and others are even further.

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Yesterday, we cried for Dima. Breathlessly, we listened to what his mama said about Dima.

If you had come—we would have been happy. In sorrow, we look for sympathy and support.

And not because you signify money (we haven't gotten a kopeck from the state in ages). And not because the president's presence means success. Our readers are not great admirers of yours.

No, it wasn't for success or advertisement that we needed you on the day of the funeral. We, the citizens of Russia, wanted to see that the head of the country was with us at that moment.

But you needed us much more.

We will leave emotion to the poor and naive.

You are the president. For you, the situation mandates not spiritual acts, but sober accounting.

Instead of coming to the funeral, you were praising the minister of defense.

And what have you won from that?

If you had come to the funeral of our comrade, to the funeral of a talented Russian journalist, to the funeral of a young man who died at the hands of scoundrels (whoever they were),—wouldn't you have gained some respect in the eyes of the people?

The eyes of the people. Not the democrats, not the extremists, not the leftists, not the rightists... Russians and Chechens, soldiers and civilians, young people and old all are respectful of Dima Kholodov. PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA speak about him with respect, although there will never be any love lost between those newspapers and MK. Most of the newspapers gave their first pages not to Korolev's visit, but to Dmitriy Kholodov's death.

This is a unique situation: no complaints about a journalist! And not because he was killed, and we either say good things about the dead, or nothing at all. No, even while he was alive, Dmitriy Kholodov evoked respect, with an approach to business and people that was wise beyond his years.

If you had come to the funeral of a bestially murdered journalist, you would have gained much in the eyes of the people. And it is they, the people, who will be voting sooner or later, respected Boris Nikolayevich.

Instead of this, you were busy praising Grachev to the skies. And this was on the very day when the article "Pasha-Mercedes" came out in MK, with the subtitle "A robber should be sitting in jail...not being minister of defense," with devastating quotes from the criminal case on corruption in the Army, in which the Grachev, the minister of defense, was directly concerned.

MK writes about how the commander of state troops [ZGV] [Western Group of Forces] sold 500 Ural trucks, at 4,500 notes apiece, and bought two luxurious Mercedes, at 160 thousand each. MK writes about how Grachev spends money on himself that is earmarked for the construction of homes for homeless officers, and you, Mr. President, on the same evening, pay homage to him! What—don't you read the most popular newspaper in Russia?

Maybe you're so busy that you don't have time for newspapers. But you probably have time to read your own memoirs.

The President's Notes

Summer, 1991. Not long before the putsch, I visited a model Tula division. Pavel Grachev, the paratroop commander, showed me the combat units.

And I, hesitating, decided to ask him a difficult question: "Pavel Sergeyevich, let's say a situation occurs where our legally elected government in Russia is threatened by danger—some kind of terrorist act, a conspiracy, people are trying to arrest... Can we count on the military, can we count on you?" He answered: "Yes, you can."

And then, on the 19th, I called him on the telephone. It was one of my very first calls from Arkhangelskiy. I reminded him of our long-ago conversation.

Grachev became embarrassed, there was a long pause, during which I could hear his stressed breathing on the other end of the line.

September 19, 1993. Grachev has begun attacking Barsukhov, saying that he just doesn't believe success is possible. And it just isn't a good idea to meddle in such a large problem where the mood is like that. Everyone is absolutely prepared for the president to take that step, and the Army just can't wait. And there is nothing to be afraid of here. The White House will be ours, and so will victory.

October 3, 1993. I called Grachev again. He announced that troops were already in Moscow, that they were moving along Leninskiy Prospekt, Yaroslavskiy, and other Moscow highways...right now, powerful army divisions will be approaching Ostankino. Very soon, the television center will be completely liberated.

I ask to be connected with the GAI [traffic police] duty officer, so he can tell me exactly how many kilometers away from Ostankino the combat units are located. In a few minutes, the Russian GAI chief, General Fedorov, calls. He says that there are no troops in Moscow at all.

Many of the people who appeared on screen were outraged that Yeltsin stayed silent, and demanded directly that the president speak his piece.

But at that moment, I was busy with a more substantial task. Unfortunately, I wasn't up to making a speech. I was trying to get my combat generals out of their stressful state, their paralysis. I saw that the Army, despite all the

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assurances given by the minister of defense, for some reason was incapable of immediate participation in Moscow's defense.

...by three in the morning, I had the following picture. The militia, which was not supposed to become involved in conflicts, took off after the first attack, leaving the city to be torn to pieces by armed bandits. And the Army, which numbers two and a half million people, couldn't even come up with a thousand soldiers, even one regiment that might find itself in Moscow and help to defend the city.

...The generals looked gloomy and guilty. They, too, evidently, sensed the awkwardness of the situation: the legal government is hanging from a thread, and the Army can't protect it—once you've sat on a potato, you don't want to fight anymore...

I saw how the generals brightened, how Chernomyrdin's spirits rose. When a real plan appeared...announcing that tanks could be in position at seven in the morning.

Chernomyrdin asked: "Does anyone have any significant objections, is the plan accepted?" Everyone nodded approvingly. Then Grachev asked to speak. He, pronouncing his words slowly, turned to me: "Boris Nikolayevich, do you sanction my use of tanks in Moscow?"

I looked at him. In silence. He answered with the same direct stare, then looked away. Chernomyrdin couldn't restrain himself, and said: "Pavel Sergeyevich, what's going on, you have been given command of the operations, why should the president decide which specific means are necessary for this?!" Grachev said something like, of course, he would make the decision independently, but it was important for him to make sure...

I rose, requested that the remaining details be discussed without me, and said to Grachev: "I'll send you the order in writing."

These are your words, Boris Nikolayevich, these are your own memoirs.

And here are the words that you spoke yesterday from television screens on all the channels:

—The Armed Forces, and the minister of defense, personally, played a major role in the October events of last year. This was the defense of democracy in Russia. And, of course, the opposition still cannot forgive Grachev for this. For this reason, there have been various insinuations; yes, a journalist, Dmitriy Kholodov, was killed, all of us are upset about this, it was a tragedy...but one simply cannot seriously connect Dmitriy Kholodov's death with the fact that the minister of defense was involved. This is an important state figure, this is the minister of defense, the current minister of defense, who is honored by the troops, who is honored by the president, who is respected in the government, who is respected by the legislative branch. This, perhaps, is one of the strongest ministers of defense in the last

decade. In the former country, and now, in Russia. So I have asked you, too, all the same, to somehow help end the muckraking that is going on around him, you understand, the lack of objectivity.

We were having a wake at the editorial offices. But at 1900, we left our tables so we could watch the news on TV. And we heard your words.

You cannot imagine how much you offended us.

We interrupted our farewell speeches again, as well, and again went to the television: NTV "Novosti," "Vesti," "Ostankino Novosti", again NTV, again "Vesti"... We were probably drunk—how else can one explain the mindless hope that you might say something different on the next edition of the television news.

Did you swear an oath to Grachev, is that it? Even if you did—Grachev has already betrayed that oath by effacing his honor as an officer.

Are you demonstrating your faith in the friendship? Nobody is hindering your continuing friendship with the retired General Grachev; you can even send him packages. Because one's friendship, you will agree, is with the person, not the position. Or exactly what is the accepted practice in the "higher echelons?"

We were with you in August '91, and in October '93. And it wasn't for the sake of former or future pittance from the budget, but because we considered it our duty.

And you could have come to us in that moment, to settle a debt, or from a feeling of duty, or because your soul was moved.

And now, even if you decide to give Dima or his family some kind of award (posthumously), we will have to think hard: should we accept it or not. We, ourselves, are also fairly solvent, and there is no lack of people wishing to help out.

[Signed] Aleksandr MINKIN

P.S. Boris Nikolayevich, would you like to be convinced that Grachev is not the minister of defense? Let "Pasha-Mercedes" give the order to attack MK to any of the divisions subordinate to him. We'll see what happens.

Yesterday, a woman called MK: "I was a defender of the White House in August, 1990. I was awarded a medal for it. On Thursday, I heard what the president said about Grachev. Because of it, I am returning my medal.

Latest Distribution of Functions in Government

Two New Vice Premiers Nominated

954F0337A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 10 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Leonid Brodskiy, under rubric "New Executive Branch Appointments": "President's November Convocation"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The appearance, starting yesterday, of two more vice premiers in the government gives reason to wonder whether the president plans to bring the number of deputy heads of government up to the maximum level attained by the executive branch in the post-perestroika period—for the greater portion of last year, the premier was supported by nine deputies. Now, there are seven of them: to the list for Boris Yeltsin's November convocation have been added the names Oleg Davydov and Aleksey Bolshakov.

For the second time, Boris Yeltsin has run back to a ploy he has already used in the appointment of a new member of government: he has appointed the hitherto little-known Aleksey Bolshakov vice premier. The Vysokoskorostnye Magistrali RAO [Highspeed Rail Rayon Joint Stock Company] chief's entry into the White House was even more headlong than Oleg Soskovets' year-and-a-half-long flight. It is true that in the case of the appointment of Oleg Davydov and Aleksey Bolshakov as vice premiers, the president was forced to violate his own resolutions—decrees published in January provided for a maximum of five deputies to the prime minister. However, there are formal grounds for such a decision by the head of state. The resignation of Aleksandr Shokhin left him lacking curators in three spheres of government operations.

First, curatorship over the "economic bloc" in the cabinet. This, as we know, will be the work of the first vice premier, Anatoliy Chubays. Second, foreign economic affairs. Yesterday, it was officially announced that Oleg Davydov would be responsible for this area of policy, retaining, incidentally, the post of minister of foreign economic ties. Here, both the president and the premier realize that Davydov's appointment as a government emissary on foreign debt may be perceived by creditors with a certain amount of caution. At the end of August, as a counterweight to Aleksandr Shokhin's official announcement that the Russian government did not intend to pose the question of annulling Russian debts, Oleg Davydov began to propagandize openly the idea that part of the USSR's debt could be settled by the Paris Club. Although the minister's opinion did not receive broad international resonance, now, when Davydov is directly responsible for the course of negotiations with international financial organizations, their management may recall that statement. The cautious attitude toward the new vice premier may also be due to the fact that Davydov is one of the supporters of preserving the institution of special exporters after 1994, as well, which does not correspond with the memorandum sent to the administration of the World Bank. And finally—inter-relations between CIS countries. Aleksey Bolshakov has become not only a vice premier, but the minister of affairs concerning cooperation with CIS countries. This post has remained unoccupied since the ministry was formed. Vladimir Mashchits, who was performing the duties of the minister earlier, was never confirmed in that post. The appearance of Bolshakov is logical because, besides his successful cooperation with

Anatoliy Chubays, the former Leningrad Ispolkom deputy chairman is close to Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the State Duma, who has repeatedly expressed the idea of recruiting personnel into the government more widely from the provinces.

But even if this is so, one can be sure that in the present case, the intentions of the heads of the lower chamber of parliament and of the government have coincided. Aleksey Bolshakov, well-known to Anatoliy Chubays because of his work on the Leningrad City Ispolkom, suits Chernomyrdin in his new position—mainly because of his clearly expressed manager's mentality, which renders him capable of finding a common language with the political and managerial elite of the contiguous states. Before, representatives of the president's administration used to speak regretfully of the fact that it was impossible—for political reasons—to appoint Arkadiy Volskiy to that post. Besides this, an element of personal gratitude will also play an important role in the relations between the premier and the new deputy—even in Russia, the head of a half-mythical RAO [All-Russian Joint-Stock Society] rarely becomes the seventh vice premier.

Livshits Appointed Aide to Yeltsin

954F0337B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 10 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Nika Stark: "Livshits Becomes Who He Was Before"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until the day before yesterday, Aleksandr Livshits was known as one of several pretenders to the post of minister of the economy. According to unofficial information, he, himself, commented upon the rumors as follows: "If they appoint me, hey'll appoint me." As we know, another person became the minister, however Livshits did not escape the president's attention: yesterday, Boris Yeltsin appointed him aide. Also yesterday, the president conducted a meeting of the Presidential Council, at which personnel changes in the government were discussed.

Conferring the title of aide upon Aleksandr Livshits, the head of a group of experts that advises the president, may be considered the least offensive of the latest personnel changes because, according to KOMMERSANT-DAILY information, it was not provoked by any kind of political games, but merely by the necessity of granting the president's economist the appropriate status. Before this appointment, Livshits held almost all the rights and duties of a presidential aide, but not the post itself. The composition and functions of Livshits' group will be as before—analysis of economic decisions made by parliament and the government, and participation in the development of new presidential ideas for pulling Russia out of crisis.

Obviously, it follows from this appointment that the president is satisfied with Livshits' work—as a well-known proponent of tough economic reforms. Yeltsin

announced this, as well, yesterday at a meeting in the Kremlin. Commenting on the appointments of Yasin and Livshits, he said: "They are deserving of their appointments, and I am sure that they will be accepted by the public." The president also promised to continue personnel changes in the government.

'Politics Desk' Comment

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in Russian 10 Nov 94 p 1

[Commentary by "Politics Desk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Russian Federation has indicated that the cabinet reorganization implies that we have "placed our stake on high-class professionals, not on politicians." It would have been better to talk about a higher class later—when the results of the reorganized cabinet's work are being evaluated, but for now it is more appropriate to cut the phrase in half: we have "placed our stake not on politicians." This kind of purely negative formula can be explained by the fact that one can only place a stake on politicians when politicians are available. However, the October consultations have demonstrated that politicians suitable for participation in a coalition, that is, persons capable of coming to an agreement on conditions for their entrance into government, and in the case that an agreement is reached, capable of guaranteeing the government the support of influential parties of which they are the leaders, are not in evidence. The pretenders to the title of politician are either unable to control their followers (Travkin of the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], Nazarchuk of the APR [Agrarian Party of Russia]), for which reason a coalition composed of such leaders is not worth much, or it is unclear whom they represent ("Women of Russia," "New Regional Policy"), or they are unable to control their own will for power (Yavlinskii, Fedorov), and, upholding the principle that "it is better to be first in the village than second in Rome," themselves reject any coalitions. Political combinations that distribute portfolios to parties lose all sense, because the portfolios are given out not out of the good of their hearts, but to settle accounts for reciprocal political payments. A contractor's notorious inability to pay makes the crediting through portfolios senseless.

In a situation where there are no politicians, the leader makes use of the services of people who possess, in his opinion, loyalty and certain practical skills. It was exactly this type of people, that is, "professionals" or "technocrats," in the person of first Panskov, Chubays and Yasin, and later Davydov and Bolshakov, that the president has called for government service. A return to a "government of technocrats," the formation of which was first attempted in late 1991, is the reason for the main political problem that arises in a non-political government: when a stake is made "not on politicians," it becomes acutely necessary to shield the "nonpoliticians" from those who consider themselves politicians.

In 1992-93, the president's regime did not particularly excel at this, but at a time when there is great disenchantment with politics and politicians, the experiment may be slightly more successful.

Presidential Administration Chief Filatov Profiled

954F0290A Moscow OBNK HAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 44, 4 Nov 94 p 8

[Article by Nikolay Troitskiy under the "Gallery" rubric: "Indelible Picture"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Filatov, chief of the administration of the president of Russia, belongs to that rare type of highly placed officials who are constantly "hanging on by a thread" but never fall. They have tried to retire him so many times that when he actually does go, on one will believe it.

Meanwhile, there were always some grounds for the rumors about the imminent dismissal of Filatov. Back in June of this year, the president had signed an edict on his release, "in connection with a move to other work" but it did not see the light of day. At the end of October, the June edict was suddenly reintroduced. Staraya Ploshchad got agitated, but again it was all for nothing. Filatov again stood firm. He was merely ordered to reduce his staff by one-third.

According to competent sources near the president, they have very much wanted to get rid of Filatov for a long time, but they just have not been able to do it. Whom is he inhibiting, and what is the secret of his irreplaceability or indispensability?

Origin

Sergey Filatov comes from the Supreme Soviet. There he was in the group "Democratic Russia," although they considered him "more of a bureaucrat than a democrat." Filatov did not speak eloquently from the platform, did not make any memorable statements, did not initiate any progressive anticommunist bills, and in general he stayed away from fights. He held the inconspicuous post of secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, he carried papers for the chairman, he set up the agenda, and he did office work.

When, in November 1991, he was co-opted "from the democrats" to the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, being elected vice speaker, it seemed that this was the culmination of the career of the quiet parliamentary official. Even at the moment of the final rupture between the president and parliament, Filatov was in no hurry to "make himself conspicuous." He, for example, did not leave with the angry Yeltsin in December 1992, when the president took all his loyal deputies from the congress to the Faceted Chamber. He rose from his seat several times, but he just could not make up his mind to leave. But within a month, in January 1993, he quietly moved

from the White House to the Kremlin, to the administration of the president, becoming one of its chiefs right away.

The Switch

Filatov occupied the place of Yuriy Petrov, former first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee. Interested observers presented this replacement as a sign of a "change of orientation" in the circle around the president, as the victory of "democratic forces" over the "nomenklatura underground." But of course this process may also be described in other terms.

The president was actually going on the warpath against legislators. As Hans Delbrueck, a renowned historian of the art of warfare, writes, there are only two kinds of military strategy—either "annihilate" the enemy or "starve him out." The president began with the latter. He had to weaken the adversary by seducing as many loyal deputies as possible to his own structures. And such a person was Filatov, a modest, assiduous, and punctual worker with an obvious bureaucratic streak but no reactionary. Why should such a person not lead the work to exhaust the adversary, whom he knew from joint work and from whom he had suffered much? Soon after Filatov, the Kremlin was assaulted by an entire detachment of deputies, activists in the democratic group. Everything went according to plan. Eyewitnesses assert that the appointment of Filatov was a tactical move, that he was appointed temporarily until the situation changes. And they are wrong. When the situation changed, it turned out that Sergey Aleksandrovich was no longer the same either.

Transformation

The modest gray-haired intellectual soon spread his wings. The administration had no legitimate status until Filatov achieved its mention in the new Constitution. The compact staff that was conceived only to serve the president took on a life of its own, got stronger, and expanded. There were just 200 officials serving under the "partocrat" Petrov and everything was located in one building of the Kremlin, whereas there are already 3,200 people laboring under the "democrat" Filatov, occupying the entire complex of buildings of the former CPSU Central Committee on Staraya Ploshchad. Hardly anyone recognized Petrov, but Filatov is always on television. No one knew Petrov's opinion, whereas Filatov regularly and boldly talks about everything under the sun. Whatever happens in the economy, in politics, in culture, or wherever, Filatov will have a comment without fail, will put the accent marks in place, and will draw the conclusions. They would never have trusted Petrov with heading an official state delegation abroad, but they do trust Filatov.

Filatov directs personnel policy, prepares candidacies for the Constitutional Court, and puts Aleksey Ilyushenko through as general procurator. No dismissal or appointment of the chiefs under the president (and this

is practically everyone other than the speakers of the houses) takes place without his participation. He introduced new agitation and propaganda on Staraya Ploshchad—an information directorate. He commands representatives of the president in the subjects of the Federation and supervises regional policy. According to one of the former staff members of the administration, Supreme Court Chairman Vyacheslav Lebedev once called Filatov and asked permission to go on a trip abroad. Filatov did not allow it, saying: "Now is not the time." It turns out that this is the person who manages the independent judicial authority!

Last summer Sergey Aleksandrovich suddenly dealt with the North Caucasus, first taking control of the conflict between North Ossetia and Ingushetia and then, brushing aside Shakhrai, he acted as the initiator and ideologist of the activation of Russian policy in Chechnya.

In short, the "chief of the presidential chancellery," as Khasbulatov spitefully called him, has become an influential statesman. He, of course, is not the strongest figure, but he is an important player capable of playing his own game.

Confusion

The strengthening of the role of the head of the administration was not planned by anyone but happened despite the expectations and workings of Kremlin strategists. They were distracted by the fight with the Supreme Soviet and missed the moment when Filatov was able to concentrate in his own hands somewhat more power than his colleagues and competitors wished. And when they destroyed Soviet power and looked around, they became irritated: A figure had grown up next to them who was too visible. Sergey Aleksandrovich and his people began to grab a piece of bread from the service of the president's helpers and, developing a taste for it, they also staked their claims to the role of a parallel "government."

Of course, Filatov is not the first official who has gone beyond the bounds reserved for him. Previously the same course was taken by Gennadiy Burbulis, but the president easily and simply got rid of the ambitious state secretary. The most amazing thing is that there was not any reason to fire Burbulis: He did not mess anything up, and his main national project, the transformation of Russia into a strong presidential republic, was crowned with indisputable success. But so many times there were reasons to dismiss Filatov!

One can count tens of staff failures—leaks of secret information, confused and lost presidential edicts, and unfinished documents that vanished who knows where. It is sufficient to recall the story about the mention of "Russian military bases" in the territory of Latvia in a presidential directive. The entire Baltic region was in an uproar. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to vindicate itself and they established an "investigatory commission" headed by Filatov's deputy Krasavchenko. At

that time Sergey Aleksandrovich was almost fired; an edict was signed, and the press was informed confidentially. But the matter was suppressed and the commission did not report anything to anyone.

The participation of the chief of the administration in affairs in the North Caucasus likewise did not lead to anything good. Filatov did not reconcile the Ingush with the Ossetians, and in Chechnya he practically ignited a civil war that no one now knows how to put out.

It is precisely Filatov who is the author of a project that shocked the democrats, a plan to build a new parliamentary building—"Palace of People's Power"—in the center of Moscow. When he was first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, he showed drawings and plans to a small group of trusted deputies. And at the beginning of 1994, Sergey Aleksandrovich's old dream was realized in a government decree, but it was buried by the Duma.

Filatov, together with a company of like-thinking individuals, also thought up and planned the monumental fabrication of a Treaty on Civic Accord. It seems that this project was not burned up but was implemented in the most pompous way. But what did it give the authorities? Not a single opposition party or group of the Duma joined the contract; the miners are striking anyway; the trade unions are organizing mass protests; Grigoriy Yavlinskiy has joined the communists, Zhirinovskiy, and Mavrodi in the campaign for early presidential elections; and only with difficulty did the government avoid a vote of no confidence in the Duma.

Finally, according to confidential sources in the Kremlin, it was by no means Shumeyko, but rather Filatov, who was the author of the large-scale plan to postpone the elections of 1995-96. Shumeyko was empowered to "prepare the morale" of those elected by the people, and Filatov "took charge" of the head of state. And here is where he blundered. The only ones to take the bait were heads of administrations, whereas the political beau monde in Moscow became disconcerted: "Democracy in danger!" Even the Public Chamber [Obshchestvennaya Palata] under the president—an alternative pseudoparliament that again is supervised by Filatov—came out with a categorical protest.

Thus, just about everything that the head of the presidential administration takes on falls apart.

Ultimatum

Why is he not removed? Is he bewitched or something? There is a version circulating among political scientists, according to which Sergey Aleksandrovich is the only reliable channel or cable linking Yeltsin with those who once brought him to power. As usual, the authors of this version also have a negative hero—the president's top

assistant, Viktor Ilyushin, a person with an oblast committee past who does everything he can to separate Boris Nikolayevich from the democrats and who regularly imposes his friend Skokov on him.

But, in the first place, no democratic organization considers Filatov to be empowered by it. Secondly, the difficult struggle for the "president-democrat" is being waged, besides by Filatov, by the president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov. And Yegor Gaydar continues to be quite influential in the circle around Yeltsin. Thirdly, Filatov, according to his work colleagues, has not really become close to Yeltsin. Boris Nikolayevich himself has acknowledged this in his memoirs.

As the president writes, Filatov did not find out about Edict No. 1400 in preparation until 18 September, three days before the well-known events. They did not consider it necessary to inform the manager of the administration in time! Yeltsin relates how Filatov became frightened and began to advise against the dangerous undertaking and warn against possible bloodshed. In contrast, the "underground member of the nomenklatura" Ilyushin was absolutely calm. He had long known about the coming dispersal of parliament and had participated in the working out of the details of the fateful measure since as early as the spring of 1993. Here is trust in democrats for you!

Of course Filatov did not go anywhere, and he did submit. In general, he always stresses his complete dependence on the will of the president and has never contradicted him. Well, what of it? As if officials were fired only for disobedience! Poltoranin was quite a supporter of Yeltsin, but they did not spare him. But they are sparing Filatov even though it is said that he once spoke very disapprovingly of the drinking traditions established at the "top."

It is not that they cannot get along without Filatov. There are many officials in Russia who are more diligent and more experienced. But Sergey Aleksandrovich knows the secret of survival. According to those same Kremlin sources, Filatov is not always so meek and mild. He is sometimes brutal and insistent. He issued a kind of ultimatum to the closest collaborators with Yeltsin: If they fire me, then the deputies and heads of directorates will go with me and I will inform the public of the persecution of democrats in the president's staff. As strange as it may seem, the threat is working. Either they are afraid of losing their last social support or they simply do not want a scandal and publicity about the Kremlin's secrets, into which Filatov has been too thoroughly initiated.

Filatov's chair is wobbly, and it will remain so in the future. But he will probably remain at his post for as much time as has been given to President Yeltsin by the Constitution. Or by nature.

October's Political Events, Significance Summed Up
954F0235A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
29 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by Pavel Anokhin, Feliks Babitskiy, Nikita Vaynonen, Vladislav Krukovskiy, and Yuriy Popov: "Autumn Marathon: What Has It Brought to the Finish Line?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] October 1994 also could probably have become "the Great," if you consider the coming anniversary of the "socialist revolution." Or it could have become fateful, if you think of the fact that during the Soviet years the CPSU carried out its biggest upheavals at its October plenums. In October 30 years ago it put a final end to the "Khrushchev" thaw, sending Nikita Sergeyevich into retirement for reasons of health. At the Central Committee's October 1987 plenum Boris Yeltsin spoke out against the "party line," for which an attempt was made to politically destroy him.

Last 3-4 October the communist patriots wanted to show their strength and "ties with the popular masses" one more time by seizing power. They failed. All Russians marked this grievous anniversary in mourning, appealing to one another for reconciliation.

The communists and other opposition members were planning to pull off something "revolutionary" on 27 October, too, by attempting to send Viktor Chernomyrdin's government into retirement and thereby change the reform course to their advantage. An attempt was made to use the "collapse" of the ruble on "Black Tuesday" and the All-Russian Protest Action to this end.

But the government, beating back the opposition's attack, held on, and, by proposing a plan of further action to get out of the crisis, strengthened its position. And that was probably the chief political result of the past month. As IMF experts have noted in assessing Viktor Chernomyrdin's report defending a strict budget for 1995, for the first time the Russian government is seriously and knowledgeably talking about real financial stabilization instead of simply slowing the rate of inflation.

It is also noteworthy that the prime minister has used his victory to arrange constructive cooperation with the deputies, stating in his concluding remarks that the "government is open for cooperation with all political forces that are ready to work with us on a program of action for 1995-1997 for the solution of all problems and the deepening of reforms." Judging from the split that occurred in the opposition camp in the voting on the expression of no-confidence in the cabinet of ministers, Viktor Chernomyrdin's appeal will find a response in many legislators. From this, one may draw the conclusion that the Pact on Social Accord, despite some politicians' ostentatious declarations concerning the retraction of their signatures, is becoming an underlying theme of our political life.

The voting on the expression of no-confidence in the government showed a clear stratification of many deputy

factions, which reflects a trend toward a regrouping of political forces in Russian society. In October the greatest activeness was shown by the social democrats, who have been holding almost weekly plenums and various semisecret talks on strengthening their ranks. As a result, two tendencies have emerged: Some social democrats (the leftists) are inclined toward unification around Aleksandr Rutskoy, Vasilii Lipitskiy, and Oleg Rummyantsev; the others (the rightists) are trying to create a united social democratic party, the core of which could be the Social Democratic Party of Russia under the chairmanship of Deputy Anatoliy Golov. State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, Ostankino head Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov have all openly declared their desire to become organized social democrats.

A certain breakthrough was also achieved in the development of the institutions of civil society and of a state based on the rule of law. The Duma finally passed the Civil Code, which fundamentally changes the measures of liability of natural and juridical persons for their actions and affirms the priority of the right of private ownership. The failure again to elect Aleksey Ilyushenko to the office of procurator general confirmed the existence of fundamental differences between the president and the upper chamber of parliament on personnel policy. Nonetheless, the exchange of views brought out the sides' intentions to solve the problem in a civilized fashion.

The Constitutional Court was also strengthened with the addition of prominent Russian jurists Vladimir Tumanov and Olga Khokhryakova, both doctors of legal sciences, and Vladimir Yaroslavl'tsev, a practicing judge from St. Petersburg. The deputies of the Federation Council took the path of placing politically independent professionals on the supreme body of constitutional justice.

The event of the month, which shook the whole country, was "Black Tuesday." The only point on which there are no disagreements among commentators is that this was a confirmation of the fact that "nothing in our country happens by itself."

The theories continue to multiply like rabbits. It appears that no one wants simply to believe that the chief guilty party was in plain view of everyone and has already been punished.

Judge for yourself: Until now the present government's indisputable accomplishment has been considered to be the stabilization of the value of the ruble (it was proclaimed as the principal goal back at the time of the Gaydar cabinet). However, the fact that with the attainment of this goal the practice of obtaining bank loans was drastically curtailed could not be concealed from attentive observers. After all, in an inflationary climate the debtor feels calm: No matter how great his debt, he will be paying it back with devalued money. Only those loans, strictly speaking, made possible the mutual settlement of accounts between enterprises and the payment of taxes. As soon as enterprises refused to take them out, gaping holes formed in the federal budget. That is why it was the Ministry of Finance that had the greatest stake in "Black Tuesday," for which its chief was punished with dismissal.

And one more replacement in the government. A representative of the Agrarian Party of Russia has been placed in the cabinet and given the portfolio of minister of agriculture. Other factions have also been invited to nominate their candidates for ministerial positions.

The country's most powerful trade union association, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, also evidently decided at the last minute to come under our "Results of the Month" rubric by staging a noisy protest action on 27 October. So far no official reaction on the part of the Russian leadership has been noted. The private commentary by people's spokesman Viktor Anpilov was laconic:

"Mr. Shmakov is trying to frighten the government by giving it the fig in his pocket."

As for ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, so far the action itself and its preliminary results fully accord with the forecast we made on its eve.

In October Dzhokhar Dudayev, whom our press and some of the most adroit politicians had already buried, once again appeared on the political horizon, successfully withstood the pressure of a united opposition, and even dealt his enemies a successful counterblow. Now the civil war in Chechnya has become positional, if not to say "sluggish," in nature.

The past October was literally saturated with important international events that in one way or another affected Russia's interests. Fresh in all Russians' memory is the visit of Great Britain's Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. For the first time since "time immemorial," a British monarch set foot on Russian soil. The mass media characterized the visit as historic. Russian-British relations entered a new stage.

The 16th meeting of CIS heads of state, which was held on 21 October, was also an important milestone. Its chief result, which met with the approval of all Russians, was that a real, practical step was taken along the path of creating an economic union. President Boris Yeltsin believes that the debate over whether integration is necessary is over. Everyone agreed that it is necessary, and not just in words but in deeds. The decision to establish an Interstate Economic Committee, an agency with supranational functions, indicates that the CIS countries have finally moved from words to deeds.

Our foreign policy department was busy trying to untangle the tightest international knots. They included the Mideast marathon of Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who held a series of talks in Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. This Russian political initiative produced great reverberations around the world. Indeed, for the first time in a long period Iraq expressed the willingness to recognize Kuwait and its border with it in accordance with the Security Council resolution. This made it possible to stabilize the situation in the region and turn it away from confrontation into a political channel.

"Black Tuesday" was followed by "Black Monday," when an explosion went off in the offices of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. The journalist Dmitriy Kholodov died. Our vocation is becoming increasingly dangerous. How remote must life be from civilized norms in order that there always be room in it for a heroic exploit! But it is even more absurd that, on this tragic occasion, many democratic publications for all practical purposes closed ranks with the opposition press in berating the same "regime," a regime that, albeit far from wonderful perfection, is so far the only means of guaranteeing at least relative stability. When will we learn, after all, the lessons of October?

The criminal ambience continually made itself felt with explosions, hostage seizures, and contract killings. The echo had hardly died down from the decision of a Stavropol court that handed down the death sentence to Chechen terrorists for plane hijacking and taking human lives when the dark relay baton was taken up by Makhachkala, followed by Moscow, where two plane hijackings were attempted. And whereas the capital city terrorist was immediately disarmed, in Dagestan the hijacker died—alone, thank God: The hostages had been freed. We sighed with relief, but chills run down our spines, and not, alas, from autumn cold; after all, it is due to someone's extreme inattentiveness that bandits manage to get on airplanes with explosives and hand grenades. How long will this go on?

It is as though the natural and societal elements were bound together by invisible threads. A devastating earthquake shook the Kuril Islands. The aftershocks continue to this day. There were human casualties and tremendous material damage. The question arises: Why were people unprepared and defenseless in the face of the elements? And it is clear that the factors here included both the poor quality of construction that failed to take seismic hazards into account and the weakness of our seismic forecasting services, which have recently been cut back because of lack of money. Now we are paying for our lack of foresight by allocating hundreds of billions of rubles for disaster recovery. The elements made themselves felt not only on the remote Far Eastern islands but also in our northern capital St. Petersburg, which experienced flooding. And once again, as in the past century, we proved unprepared for the elements' blow. How can one even speak of our readiness for emergencies, when we are not even prepared for ordinary autumn rain, which in October repeatedly stopped up Moscow highways, causing huge traffic jams.

But there is one consolation. In analyzing the dynamics of changes in public opinion, sociologists at the St. Petersburg Sociological Research Center draw the conclusion that in October the highest level of public optimism in the past two years regarding improvement of the situation in the country was recorded in the city on the Neva. Whereas in April only one in five respondents believed that life would get better in the next two or three years, in October almost one in three held that opinion.

The number of pessimists dropped correspondingly from 35 to 25 percent. And that may be the most encouraging result of October.

Duma Criticized for Inattention to Human Rights Abuses

954F0255A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Nov 94 p 6

[Article by Igor Korolkov, IZVESTIYA staff: "Alone With Deprivation of Rights: Parliamentary Commission Proves Incapable of Approaching the Problem of Torture in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the Editors: On 16 March IZVESTIYA carried I. Korolkov's article "There Was Torture in Russia and There Will Continue To Be." Among other examples, the article gave excerpts from a complaint to the Russian procurator general from prisoner V. Nikitchik alleging that, on the orders of Senior Investigator L. Fedorova, militia officers had treated him brutally, had not fed him in his cell, had not provided him with medical care, and so forth.

Senior Investigator L. Fedorova filed a suit with the Tverskoy Intermunicipal People's Court in Moscow to defend her honor and dignity, claiming that IZVESTIYA had disseminated information defaming her honor, dignity, and professional reputation, thereby causing her moral damage. Of herself, L.N. Fedorova says that she has worked as an investigator for 17 years, has never committed violations of legality, and has received numerous service commendations.

In accordance with a peaceful agreement reached by the parties in court, IZVESTIYA is publishing the following explanation. In using the excerpts from V. Nikitchik's letter, the editors wanted merely to illustrate the nature of the complaints that prisoners address to the procuracy. The editors had no intention of defaming the honor and dignity of Senior Investigator L. Fedorova and possessed no proof of any violations of legality other than the letter from prisoner Nikitchik.

The suit has been withdrawn.

But the Emergency Squad Was There!

In publishing this explanation, we proceed from the fact that as of today there is no official confirmation of the facts cited by suspect Nikitchik, former chief psychiatrist of the Kamchatka Oblast Corrective Labor Institution and former president of the KAMON private enterprise, in his complaint to the Russian procurator general. After checking on the complaint, the Nikulinskiy Interrayon Procuracy issued a ruling refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against the militia officers who the prisoner claims abused him.

The ruling exists, but nonetheless there is still no clarity in this dramatic story. I was able to study the materials from the procuracy's investigation. They include a report

by Lieutenant Colonel Fedorova addressed to the inter-rayon procurator in which she sets forth her own version of events and the militia officers' explanations, the principle of which can be summarized as: "Did you beat him?" "No, we did not." Not one of them had heard anything about the summoning of the emergency medical squad to the militia division. The duty officer for the 76th Division who was working the day that Nikitchik was arrested, 15 October, knows nothing about it, either. That is strange: An explanation was taken from the officer on duty on 15 October, while Nikitchik wrote in his complaint that the emergency squad was summoned on the 17th. For some reason, there is no explanation from the officer who was on duty on that date.

The materials from the investigation also include an inquiry to the preliminary detention center, from which a reply was obtained: Upon Nikitchik's entry, old (?) bruises to the soft tissue of both shoulders were found. There are no explanations from the brothers Chebonenko, who were arrested together with Nikitchik and who, according to his claim and the claim of their first attorney, were also beaten; and no testimony was taken from his cellmates. The materials even lack the most elementary item, which the editors managed to obtain. In response to IZVESTIYA's inquiry, the emergency squad archives turned over a copy of records of medical calls. According to them, on 17 October of last year the emergency squad was summoned to the 76th Militia Division to attend to Valeriy Petrovich Nikitchik. Physician Gustov noted: The patient complained that he had been beaten by militia officers and said that his kidney had been injured and there was blood in his urine. The physician wanted to take Nikitchik to Hospital No. 5 for observation, but the duty officer at the division assured him that they would take him themselves in a militia vehicle. In response to our inquiry, Hospital No. 5 indicated that from 17 October through 1 November no patient by the name of Nikitchik had come there.

The bad faith with which the investigation was conducted is so obvious that it makes matters awkward for Mr. Yunin, director of the Moscow City Procuracy's Administration for Oversight Over the Implementation of Laws in Internal Affairs Agencies, who sent the following reply to the editors: The investigation was conducted properly. Let me note that when he made that reply he had in his hands both a copy of the records of medical calls and the reply from Hospital No. 5, which the editors had passed on to him.

When People Are Not Beaten by the Militia, Their Kidneys Hurt Afterwards All the Same

IZVESTIYA has also received an official letter signed by Panin, director of the Ivanovo Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, in which he requests that the newspaper publish a rebuttal to a letter from suspect Alekseyev that the newspaper had cited. In his letter, Alekseyev reported being beaten by officers of the Frunzenskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department in the city of Ivanovo, who demanded that he confess to a homicide.

The Russian Federation Procuracy General's Administration for Oversight Over Investigations and the Ivanovo Oblast Procuracy enabled the newspaper to see two criminal cases: the case initiated by the oblast procuracy against the militia officers who, according to Alekseyev, had beaten him, and the case in which Alekseyev himself was charged with homicide.

After conscientiously studying the situation, Generalov, senior investigator with the oblast procuracy, terminated criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the actions of the militia officers. As a jurist he evidently made the correct decision: On the basis of the evidence gathered, the court would have handed down an acquittal anyway. Nonetheless, the material gathered indicates that there is something for the executives of the oblast internal affairs administration to ponder. Its employees (and after that, the procuracy's investigator as well) accused a person of homicide without collecting persuasive proof of his guilt. The only evidence was Alekseyev's own confession, which he retracted in court, telling why he had been forced to give it.

In his letter to IZVESTIYA, Mr. Panin writes: "In the course of investigation it was established that citizen N. Alekseyev had received a fracture of the jaw on 16 October 1993, that is, two weeks before he was arrested by militia officers. Citizen Alekseyev went to the oblast hospital on that same day."

All that is true. But the materials from the case contain details that prevent an unambiguous interpretation of the text of Mr. Panin's letter. At the hospital a splint was placed on Alekseyev's fractured jaw. Two weeks passed. He was already drinking and eating. But when he arrived in the preliminary detention center after being questioned by the militia he could barely open his mouth, had difficulty speaking, and could not eat. He complained to a dentist of excruciating pain and stated that he had been beaten by the militia. He is convinced that his jaw was broken a second time but admits the possibility that the old wound was merely reinjured. He may be right, since the case contains the testimony of physician Troitskaya, who told investigator Generalov: "...the fracture that was discovered on the X ray we took at the preliminary detention center was new; it was also on the lower jaw, but on the other side—the right side. ... It was impossible to put a splint on the new fracture, because it would not stay in place." For some reason, the X ray that physician Troitskaya speaks of was not preserved.

In his letter Mr. Panin writes nothing about other officially recorded bodily injuries to Alekseyev. Yet an expert review conducted on 3 November 1993 established that there were abrasions on Alekseyev's face that were only two or three days old. The medical chart at the preliminary detention center that Alekseyev entered on 5 November notes: He complained that on 1-2 November he had been beaten at the Frunzenskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department; on his body, swelling and abrasions were found around the ridge of the nose, hematomas

were found between the shoulder blades (Alekseyev claimed that this was where he had been beaten the most), and the patient experienced pain upon palpation of the left lumbar region (Alekseyev complained of pain in his kidney).

In direct confrontations with the militia officers whom Alekseyev accused of torturing him, he related in detail how and under what circumstances they had beaten him. None of the suspects admitted guilt.

The oblast court could not fail to note the senselessness of the Alekseyev case and returned it for consideration by a new panel of the Frunzenskiy Rayon Court. That court, in turn, sent the case for additional investigation. Alekseyev was ordered to be released on his own recognizance.

I think that if the court had as much evidence against the vagrant Alekseyev as had been gathered against the militia officers, Alekseyev would be incarcerated today with no hope of early release.

Was the Commission Created in Order To Scare Yerin?

Let us suppose that Nikitchik and Alekseyev wrote the pure truth. How could they prove this while themselves remaining in the depths of a system that knows how to keep secrets? There is not yet any answer to that question. In the black hole into which a person falls from the moment of arrest, it is possible to do with him anything one likes—he is defenseless and without rights. How can this be combated? How can it be countered? In analyzing reports received by the newspaper about violations of human rights, we have realized that one more denunciatory article (and there have been a good many of them in the mass media) will not solve this extremely acute problem for Russia. We have reached the conclusion that only the legislative branch is capable of radically changing the situation. It lies within its jurisdiction to conduct an investigation of the use of torture in the militia and of the conditions of arrest in preliminary detention centers. The purpose of the investigation should be not so much to find specific persons guilty of crimes as to trace tendencies in the practice of the law enforcement agencies. In investigating violations of prisoners' rights, analyzing their complaints, and studying the medical charts of suspects in preliminary detention centers, it would be important to establish whether torture is being practiced. Possessing broad powers, a parliamentary commission could break down the impenetrable wall behind which hide the secrets of interrogations and the grinders in which prisoners, on the orders of investigators, are worked over by criminals. Through tough, skilled work, with the enlistment of experts, the commission could show that the time of arbitrary and lawless actions has ended. After obtaining an objective picture of the state of human rights and discussing the information in parliamentary hearings, the State Duma could propose a solution of the problem on the state level.

Experience with the work of parliamentary commissions has long been established in the practice of democratic states. Cases of corruption among the country's top officials, abuses of power, and social problems are the object of close attention by such commissions. We believed that investigation of cases of torture in the MVD's system would create a precedent for Russia, as well.

That is why IZVESTIYA, while offering its pages to those who presented evidence of the inhumane treatment of prisoners, appealed to the State Duma both through the newspaper and in a special letter, strongly urging that a competent investigation of abuses of power in militia agencies be conducted.

It appeared that we had met with understanding in the State Duma: Late this April the Duma established a parliamentary commission to which it granted broad powers. It included 17 deputies and was headed by former investigator Viktor Mironov, deputy chairman of the Duma Committee on Security.

A half year has passed. Unfortunately, not a single case mentioned in the newspaper has yet been investigated. The suspects whose testimony we cited have stated their willingness to give testimony at any level. Alas, not one of them has been invited to the commission. The suspect Morozov, for example, told about the brutal conditions under which prisoners were detained in Moscow's Preliminary detention Center No. 4. His accusations against the detention center's management were so serious that they demanded an immediate investigation. Especially since it was learned that, after the article was published, prisoners were promptly moved out of the detention center and capital repairs were begun on it. It is entirely possible that this was a means of destroying evidence. Despite urgent requests to speed up an inspection of the preliminary detention center, commission chairman Mironov has gotten away with promises. Evidently no one will ever find out whether Morozov spoke the truth in his trial.

IZVESTIYA was prepared to extensively inform the public about the commission's work. But it turns out that there is nothing to inform it about. Only once was an attempt made to organize a visit to Sailor's Rest. Lengthy preparations were made for the visit: Phone calls were made and reminders were given about the date of the visit and the assembly place. But when it came down to it, neither Mr. Mironov nor the other deputies who were supposed to take part in the inspection were able to leave the Duma session. Father Gleb (Yakunin) alone was delegated to visit Sailor's Rest. Two journalists and one representative of a public organization were to go with him. If the visit had actually taken place, it would have more resembled an outing than serious work.

Alas, the commission's activities have come down mainly to registering complaints and sending them on to law enforcement agencies, and to rare and haphazard visits to preliminary detention centers by individual deputies.

One commission member shared these cheerless thoughts: It appears that Mr. Mironov has no particular desire to engage in any close investigation, just as the Duma itself evidently had no such intentions. In establishing the commission, the deputies wanted not so much to study the problem as simply to put a scare into the minister of internal affairs.

It may be that this person was right. During our meeting Mr. Mironov never could give an intelligible answer to the question: Why is it that he showed such strong determination when he gave an interview to IZVESTIYA after the commission had been established, whereas nothing has followed from this determination? He showed much greater interest in discussing intrafactional feuds.

The example of the commission's work indicates, unfortunately, that the State Duma today is still incapable of setting and accomplishing objectives of national significance. The deputies find political intrigues and jostling at the microphone far more pleasant and convenient. They do not even recognize the fact that the absence of real efforts to fight for the observance of human rights in preliminary detention centers and corrective labor colonies is one of the main reasons that Russia is being denied membership in the Council of Europe.

The precedent we had counted on has not been set.

And finally, here is some information for reflection. According to the figures of the Procuracy General, in the past year and a half criminal charges have been brought against 1,592 militia officers for crimes in office; of those, 270 were charged with crimes in the conduct of investigations, of whom 116 were charged with the use of illegal methods of investigation.

Electoral Commission Chairman Ryabov Calls for Election Laws

954E0151A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Nikolay Ryabov, by Valentin Maslennikov: "Behind the Deputy's Mandate With a Tightly Stuffed Purse: Tsentризbirkom [Central Electoral Commission] Chairman Nikolay Ryabov Concerning the New Stage in the Election Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The election of S. Mavrodi as deputy to the State Duma and the latest failure with the pre-election to the St. Petersburg city assembly have once again made election-related topics among the most pertinent ones on the pages of our many-voiced press.

[Maslennikov] Nikolay Timofeyevich, was it possible to foresee this turn of events and somehow to exert an active influence upon the course of the fight for the deputy's mandate in Mytishchi Precinct No. 109?

[Ryabov] I do not want to make any political evaluations of the individuals who took part in the fight for a place in

the State Duma. That is no business of mine. For me the events of recent days are once again very convincing testimony to the great need that we have for an entire package of legislative acts that pertain to the electoral system.

As for Precinct 109, we constantly monitored the state of affairs. Several times at our sessions we listened to reports given by Yu. Zhigulin, chairman of the precinct electoral commission. We expressed our recommendations. But we were unable to exert an active influence upon the course of events because of the lack of the corresponding laws, and particularly the law entitled "Financial Support of Elections."

Because at first only three of the twelve candidates opened their election accounts. The others disregarded that opportunity. True, later on six more joined up with them. But the same three persons took advantage of the funds allocated from the budget. Mavrodi ostentatiously rejected that "petty detail," recommending to the precinct commission that it use for its own purposes the 350,000 rubles allocated to him. Uncounted millions were set in motion. In Khimki, Dolgoprudnyy, and Mytishchi pre-election shows were put on and all kinds of handouts were given to people, as well as the most varied promises.

However, it is impossible to exclude a candidate from the pre-election fight simply on the basis of his failure to open an account. In addition, the existing law allows using the funds of public organizations, but does not have any mechanism for monitoring them. And the only entity that has the right to recognize an election as being invalid is the court, and definitely not the Central Electoral Commission. So a situation was created in which the fight for deputy's mandates was waged by moneybags.

For me it is also ridiculous that Mavrodi himself never once appeared, so to speak, "live" before his constituents. Only his authorized agents and his money operated. In any civilized country behavior like this would mean the death of the politician. No one would take him seriously. Because the reason why we have elections is so that people can take part in them, rather than tightly stuffed purses.

[Maslennikov] What, then, is being done to avoid situations like this in the future?

[Ryabov] Consistent and well thought-out work to prepare election legislation is being carried out. Recently the State Duma approved the Law entitled "Basic Guarantees of the Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation." It is the first normative act among the laws that are being prepared, that have been called upon to form a truly democratic electoral system.

[Maslennikov] But that legislative bill was prepared as long ago as last spring. How does one explain the delay in getting it through? In addition, the text of the enacted

law is practically indistinguishable from the version proposed by Tsentribirkom...

[Ryabov] Our highest legislative agency is very sharply structured according to party. Even though the people in it like to talk about independence, they sometimes interpret it in a very unusual way—only to the advantage of a particular party or faction that the person speaking is representing at the particular moment. Tsentribirkom, however (the basic developer of that law), is, by status, an independent, supraparty agency that is required to guarantee the organizing and conducting of elections outside of and apart from the influence of the power structures or individual political forces. It is possible by this alone to explain the difficulty of getting various proposals of ours through the Duma. The fact that no fundamental corrections have been made in the text of the law is something that I think attests to the quality of the draft that was prepared.

[Maslennikov] The basic discussion developed around the principles of forming the Central Electoral Commission itself...

[Ryabov] And that is completely reasonable. We proposed what I consider to be the optimal alternative. Out of the fifteen members of the commission, five people are proposed by each interested side—the State Duma (the interests of all factions and parties will be represented); the Council of the Federation (the interests of the subjects of the Federation); and the President (the interests of the executive agencies). That is, the makeup of the commission will completely reflect the cross section of the entire spectrum of society's political forces. In the final analysis, it turned out that the Duma, by a majority of the votes, accepted our proposal. So that means that the balance of interests will continue to be observed. Although individual politicians have undertaken everything possible to make the commission dependent upon their will.

[Maslennikov] So the beginning of the creation of an electoral system that completely corresponds to the nation's interests has been laid. What comes next?

[Ryabov] Two more laws are approaching us—"The Russian Federation Referendum": and "The Election of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation." Unlike the previous law, entitled "The Referendum in the RSFSR," it will be impossible to use it as a means of domestic-policy struggle. There has been a precise definition of the group of questions that can and cannot be put up for national discussion. There has also been a definition of the group of subjects that have the initiative for conducting a referendum. A new concept is being introduced—the so-called consultational referendum. This is also a nationwide public-opinion survey, but its results do not have a generally mandatory nature, although they are taken into consideration during the decision-making process.

It is more complicated with the second law. The developers got stuck on the advantages and shortcomings of the proportional and majority systems of election. Therefore they prepared two versions of the future law.

Inasmuch as both of the laws being prepared are extremely important, the developers, before sending their drafts to the State Duma, carried out a roundtable discussion within the walls of Tsentribirkom, with the participation of deputies from both houses of parliament, scientists in the field of law, and representatives of the President's state legal administration. The next day both drafts became the object of review by the council of the Social House under the President. That helped to prepare the texts of the future laws even more carefully.

[Maslennikov] What else is occurring in the package of electoral legislation?

[Ryabov] The Laws "Election of the President of the Russian Federation," "The Formation of the Council of the Federation," "The Formation of the Constitutional Conference," and, finally, "Financial Support of Elections," with a mention of which we began our discussion. When preparing them we think about using the same scheme of preliminary discussion with the participation of all the interested sides.

[Maslennikov] It turns out that we learn from our own mistakes, although this is not the optimal version. How, incidentally, does Tsentribirkom react to the other numerous mistakes, or one might even say disruptions, that accompanied the conducting of the election at the beginning of the electoral campaign and that no one has been able to get rid of to this day?

[Ryabov] We take them into consideration when developing the subsequent laws. We do not have the right, by any directive instructions "from above," to force the "replaying" of the results of an election or to punish anyone for what we consider to be an incorrectly conducted campaign. In general, with regard to individual facts, it is impossible to combat any possible deviations. At the current stage mistakes, I think, are inevitable, because there has been no appropriate practice in conducting democratic elections. Therefore we have included as a mandatory condition—both in the statute governing Tsentribirkom and the requirements made of employees of the precinct electoral commissions—the professionalism of the workers. On our part, we promote the raising of the level of the staff workers.

[Maslennikov] In more than half the subjects of the Federation, there were also elections to the agencies of local self-government. What is the role of the Central Electoral Commission in this process?

[Ryabov] A local election is the prerogative of local self-government. We can only give explanations and recommendations, and can render methodological assistance. Of course, we analyze the situation in the outlying areas, and attempt to feel out certain general approaches,

that is, we develop the work style for the entire system from top to bottom. We realize that our own work style will determine the situation in the outlying areas. Currently we are completing the development of the so-called model normative legislative drafts or acts for forming the agencies of local self-government. But they will be not of a mandatory nature, but only of a methodological one.

That is, Tsentribirkom retains the coordination of the actions of the low-level links in the system and the development of a single policy.

[Maslennikov] Political independence directly depends upon economic independence. Who pays for the labor performed by the staff workers in the commissions?

[Ryabov] The activity of Tsentribirkom and the commissions in the subjects of the Federation is financed according to a special article in the state budget. So, at this level our economic independence is guaranteed. At the low-level stages the situation is more complicated. We hope that, with the enactment of the law governing the principles of local self-government, everything will fall into place.

The formation of a single electoral system that is based on genuine democratism has begun. The first steps, which I consider to be completely confident, have already been taken.

Boris Fedorov Interviewed on Country's Problems

954Q0072A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 41,
1 Nov 94 [Signed to press 25 Oct 94] p 4

[Interview with Boris Fedorov, by Aleksandr Yevlakhov: "Boris Fedorov: We Have Not Yet Walked the Liberal Path"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yevlakhov] Boris Grigoryevich, at the present time it is only a lazy person who will not make a statement about the fact that the liberal path of reforms has led us down a blind alley. Was that really a liberal path?

[Fedorov] The most liberal thing that occurred was releasing the prices, and certain steps in the financial and monetary sphere. But so long as the President has the right to give instructions about expending something, there can be no normal financial policy. Therefore I feel that stating that the liberal course has led us down a blind alley is stupid.

[Yevlakhov] Well, then, what kind of course do we have—social-democratic, Communist?

[Fedorov] It is difficult to say, although, to put it crudely, there are fewer Communists in the current parliament than there are in the Government. Communists in the sense that they just cannot divorce themselves from a definite understanding of economic policy, or the role of the Government and the state. If this is a normal market economy and a normal Government, then it at least

should not engage in multiplying its own structures, as a result of which there is no longer any room in the White House.

I am not even speaking about the lack of elementary legality or the desire to remove the state from many spheres. So long as the state covers up many absolute bankrupts, what kind of reform can we talk about?

[Yevlakhov] Could it be that the Government simply is afraid of unemployment and a social explosion?

[Fedorov] I do not say that it is necessary to close enterprises. But it is completely clear that a director who has failed to cope for the past 20 years—either under the Soviet authority or without it—and yet remains in place is superfluous.

[Yevlakhov] But what are the most important steps that you were unable to take during the past four years? Inasmuch as you were still in Silayev's Government, you apparently had the opportunity for objective analysis.

[Fedorov] I think that it is impossible to pick out just one thing, inasmuch as, in the list of priorities, there are approximately 15 of these. First, wherever I began, and despite anything, it was with the purification of the state machine. Essentially speaking, it was still the same old Stalinist type—with "revolving doors," the need to get people's okays, with apparatuses. We have made it even worse, because we created the President's apparatus, which duplicates the Government's apparatus.

Secondly, it is elementary order in state finance, where there will be legality, where it is impossible to spend money that the budget does not have, or if the budget does have that money for some specific purpose, then that money should be spent for that purpose only. The Government should give 80 percent of the decisions that it is making today back to the ministries. And the ministries, in turn, should give them back to the territories.

Thirdly, it is specific measures of financial policy. Inflation was supposed to have been reduced to 3 or 10 percent a year by 1992, and now we are hearing about plans for 3-5 percent a month by the end of 1995. That is simply ridiculous. If we achieved that in 1992, we would already be eating some of the fruits of that now.

The next factor is privatization. Maybe I am not the best-qualified specialist in this area, but it is obvious that almost all the state property is disappearing no one knows where, and yet there has been no increase in the effectiveness of its use. The Communists keep shouting: they have stolen it... But just look at who has gotten his hands on that property. In most instances it was not the "new Russians."

[Yevlakhov] Most probably the members of the *nomenklatura*.

[Fedorov] Yes, the officials and the director corps. They divided that property. I think that in our country there

are people even in state service who "weigh out" at hundreds of millions of dollars.

[Yevlakhov] I can give a specific example. Recently we visited Anatoliy Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg. Lying in front of him was a list of enterprise directors who received, while simultaneously heading various associations with limited responsibility, as profit alone more than 100 million last year. From selling raw materials, nonferrous metals, etc.

[Fedorov] But public opinion in the country thinks differently, and that it is all the fault of the new businessmen, the nouveau riches, and the greenhorns in their Rolls Royces. Of course, they also attempt to participate, but 90 percent of the property has fallen into the hands of those same Communists, those same people who have no self-interest in reforms. It is that danger that is leading us to a situation in which what we will have is half-state and half-dictatorship capitalism. In certain instances it would be more profitable to sell that property to foreigners, from the point of view of the interests of the workers, employees, and the population. It is they who, before they open anything, will pay their lawyers \$100,000 simply to find out how not to violate the law and how to pay all the taxes, so that the tax inspectors will not come around. What kind of liberalism can we be talking about if there is complete impotency in the country's authority, when it is a matter not of laws and edicts, but simply a lack of desire to fight crime? If anyone says that they do not know how to catch bribe-takers or to uncover corruption in the state apparatus, just give me the job! I'll organize it! We'll catch them. Either 100, or 1000, or even more by very simple methods that are well known throughout the world, including provocation. There is nothing frightening here if they approach large-scale officials, each of whom is carrying \$100,000 in his briefcase, and find out how much they can get.

[Yevlakhov] But what if crime has already grown to such an extent that it is necessary, as once happened in Turkey, to have a meeting of the gang leaders to come to an understanding?

[Fedorov] If anyone acts that way, then he himself is a member of the Mafia and a criminal. There is no country in the world that, if it wanted to, could not cope with crime. The state is the state, and it is useless to fight it. It is clear that it is very complicated to eradicate drug addiction or prostitution completely. There will always be certain people with "deep pockets." But all of this must be on a scale that does not threaten the fate of the state, when criminalization does not reach such a level that every individual in Moscow is attempting to install a steel door and to arm himself.

[Yevlakhov] It is completely obvious that a liberal policy has nothing in common with anarchy. But let us discuss another topic—our legislation. It used to be try to resolve everything, and it continues to do so. It touches upon everything—the registration of parties, the opening up of

a private business, absolutely everything... At one time I happened to get my hands on a draft of a treaty with South Korea. It contained a phrase that I laughed about for a long time: both sides support adherence to principles of liberalism. I was in South Korea—a typical police state. I understand why our *nomenklatura* likes its experience. Because an official there can do everything, but in order to open, say, in Moscow a SP [joint venture], it is necessary to attach practically a photograph of the place where it will be built.

[Fedorov] That is why it was always fashionable to cite China, South Korea, and Japan, and a lot of people really like that, beginning with Volskiy... The problem is that in our country all the officials—not only the highest ones, but also the lowest—have no political obligations to anyone except one person—their boss. Everyone owes something to the minister or personally to Boris Nikolayevich. When I hear Livshits—a liberal economist—say, "If I am fired, I still will be personally devoted to the President," I am speechless. What is this, the Middle Ages?

[Yevlakhov] There arose another question just after the edict about the freezing of wages appeared. Why do we need advisor Livshits at all, if he, commenting on the situation, says, "I wasn't informed"? Incidentally, I think that, when you were in the Government, you also proved quite frequently "not to be informed."

[Fedorov] I had gotten to a definite stage when I realized that I could not move ahead any farther because the environment in which I was living—the Government—was hostile. I could force a few things through. I could resolve a few things, but what sense did it make to be window-dressing? That pertains to Livshits, and to Chubays, and to certain others. They are window-dressing. They are shown to the West, and then anything you want can happen.

[Yevlakhov] If one talks about the State Duma, we have three economically oriented committees which, in one way or another, engage in economic problems. What is the current hierarchy of priorities for laws? What is supposed to be enacted first of all?

[Fedorov] The items with first priority are the Civil Code, the 1995 budget, taxes, joint-stock companies, securities, and the Central Bank. These are the key factors.

[Yevlakhov] I was slightly surprised that, even before the Duma resumed its work, both Rybkin and Shumeyko mentioned among the priorities political ones: ones dealing with the authority and the elections. Are these the most important things now? Do we really have to win the election tomorrow?

[Fedorov] The election is 15 months away. Because if the election is canceled, then, first, this is bad and not very pretty—it deceives the voters; and, secondly, democracy may not even occur at all. The election must take place at

any cost on 12 December 1995, and a presidential election no later than June 1996. At least in order to transfer the authority legally, without riots, without scandals, without executions by firing squad, etc. As of today the entire electoral system is based on the President's edicts, and this is not democracy.

[Yevlakhov] Boris Grigoryevich, we were proceeding toward an open society on the basis of three principles—the freedom to disseminate ideas, the freedom of people to move freely, and the freedom to shift capital. What happened? There are few people in the West who need our ideas or our people. Is it the same situation with the freedom to shift capital?

[Fedorov] Until there is stability in the country and the assurance that this Government will not carry out a monetary reform, no.

[Yevlakhov] But it still will be necessary to carry out a monetary reform.

[Fedorov] Not in the form that we always used to carry it out. It is necessary to "zeroize" currency, to carry out a revaluation. What is monetary reform in our country? Confiscation. So long as there is a chance for this, normal capital will be afraid to come here. There has been no liberalization of access to definite types of activity. As of the moment of privatization, a large number of projects—hotels, sanatoriums—remained in the hands of the state. Now a struggle is under way to have the departments seize up everything again. What minister of health in any country in the world has his own sanatoriums? There isn't one. You can give subsidies, and you can pay for the treatment of poor people.

[Yevlakhov] We had an article entitled "The Fight Against Privileges Ended With the Victory of Privileges," in which it was stated that at one time party and other property was turned over for the purpose of providing social security. Then, by the President's edict, it was taken away. Currently it has turned out that the deputy minister who gave us that information is no longer working. And all the projects have been quietly transferred to the President's Administration.

[Fedorov] Forty thousand people work in the President's Administration. Therefore the first point in my programs, if we should ever accidentally make our way to power, is, within the very first month, to set up a competition and sell all the summer cottages. So that the only things that the state will still have are the residences for the President and, perhaps, the premier, in order to receive foreign guests. There won't be any sanatoriums, any rest homes, any hunting preserves, any medical centers. Until that is done, the old system remains.

[Yevlakhov] But then the previous argument is expressed: you must hold onto your cadres somehow.

[Fedorov] The real cost of all that is much higher than doubling everyone's salary. It sucks people in, because it's so pleasant. You live in the woods almost free of

charge. I told Yavlinskiy, "Do you know that leaders of political factions are supposed to have summer cottages?" He said, "I just found that out myself." There really is such a piece of paper—the satisfying of requisitions for summer cottages for the Duma apparatus. Cars were also offered—two cars for each deputy. You pay 3 million now, and the rest within 10 years. People don't have any conscience. Who issued the instructions to purchase the most expensive furniture for the Duma?

[Yevlakhov] Did someone ask that question?

[Fedorov] In principle it was the President's Administration that did that. After all, it is the Administration's building. The Duma doesn't have its own building.

Disbanding the Supreme Soviet was to a considerable degree an economic act, when they seized what it did not have. But it was only the VS [Supreme Soviet] that disappeared. The expenses for management increased many times over.

[Yevlakhov] From your point of view, which of our "neighbors according to myth"—the East European countries—left socialism under the optimal conditions?

[Fedorov] The person who proved to be shrewdest was Klaus in Czechia. Of course, he had certain positive start-up factors. Czechia always was more stable, and it parted from Slovakia joyously. Also, it immediately stopped subsidizing it. Klaus managed to find a mild alternative similar to the one that we had during the "500 days." Also, although the privatization there is similar to our own, much more was given to ordinary people and nothing was given to managers. He was able to restrain the inflation, to make the koruna a stable currency, and to prevent the shocks that happened in our country. And apparently his biggest achievement is that he managed to tie the financial and economic part with politics. He created the party that is in power. Czechia has also been successful with its president. Not like in our country, when the President allegedly engages in the economy, putting his stamp on bundles of edicts.

[Biographical data] Born 13 February 1958 in Moscow. From 1975 through 1980 attended Moscow Finance Institute. Doctor of Economic Sciences.

In 1980-1987 economist, senior economist, Main Currency and Economics Administration, USSR Gosbank board.

In 1987-1989 worked as senior researcher, senior scientific associate, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

In 1989-1990 consultant, Socioeconomic Department, CPSU Central Committee.

From June through December 1990 RSFSR minister of finance.

In 1991-1992 headed the Investments Credit Administration in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Since 1991 financial advisor to the President of Russia.

From October through December 1992 director of the World Bank from the Russian Federation.

Since December 1992 deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation.

Since December 1933 deputy to the State Duma. One of the creators of the "12 December" Liberal-Democratic Union.

Opposition Strategy Scored

95410307A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 42, 21 Oct 94 p 7

[Article by Eduard Volodin, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Political Processes in the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 1993 autumn tragedy explained a great deal in the actions of the opposition and its leaders, revealed the relations between opposition organizations and society, and foreordained the future behavior of parties and organizations that prior to 4 October of last year had expressed a negative attitude toward the Yeltsin regime. Not a trace was left of opposition organizations' proclaimed commonality, and the reasons for the disagreements must be sought not so much in the purposeful destructive work of the special services and their agents—although that must also be taken into account—as in the quality of the organizations themselves and the potential of their leaders.

In assessing events or behavior, a fundamental role is played by the choice of criteria, on which the quality of the assessment itself depends. The perjurious content of Edict No. 1400 and the bloody reprisal against the demonstrators and defenders of the House of Soviets will be subject to legal and moral judgment, and the latter is far more important for Russia than the legal conclusions. In order to adequately define the actions of the opposition forces, it is necessary to utilize the same moral and legal characteristics, and then it will turn out that, in accordance with legal norms, the RF Constitution and the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, any form of action against the regime was lawful and did not violate the norms of state and international law. However, the opposition parties' reactions to the infamous edict and the bloody reprisal differed in quality, and therefore morality becomes the sole criterion of judgment. And just what comes to light in that case?

The majority of the opposition parties delivered a sharply negative assessment of the content of Edict No. 1400, following the RF Constitutional Court in defining it as the manifesto for a coup d'etat. Only the National Republican Party (leader, N. Lysenko), the Russian National Assembly (leader, A. Sterligov), and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (leader, V. Zhirinovskiy), that is, organizations that have constantly proclaimed their "Russianness", remained silent and withdrew into

the shadows in good time. One has to think that for these organizations there was no problem of morality, but the unity of the national jurist V. Zhirinovskiy and the national isolationists N. Lysenko and A. Sterligov in their indifference toward the legal and moral aspects of the political action is profoundly symbolic.

A genuine morality check occurred during the blockade and subsequent bloody slaughter. The aforementioned leaders' reflections on their unwillingness to participate in what they saw very well as a provocation, together with V. Zhirinovskiy's loud congratulation of the bloody executioners, make it possible to add to and deepen the moral assessment of these opposition figures. But now one can add to them RF Communist Party leader G. Zyuganov, who right before the very storm was calling for calm, that is, for inaction, at the moment when the regime had already assembled its executioners to cut down the unarmed people.

What has been said makes it possible to draw the conclusion that last year's October events defined a split in the opposition on the basis of the moral criterion, and that the split will just as inevitably continue to exist when alliances and new blocs are assessed precisely according to the standards of morality, rather than political calculation.

Immediately following the execution, the illegitimate regime looked to acquire legitimacy through elections and a constitutional referendum. The 40-day mourning period had not yet passed and the souls of the dead had not yet found rest, but the absolute majority of parties and organizations were already rushing to collect signatures enabling them to take part in the election race. As deplorable as it may be, the majority of opposition leaders failed the test of morality, which in its own way reveals the moral content of the fighters for the people's happiness and social justice, including those who made their way into the illegitimate legislative bodies known as the duma or assembly.

A split along moral lines occurred. It will predetermine the future actions of opposition parties and organizations, but strategic success will be with those who did not accept the coup, did not betray those who had perished, and did not take part in the fraudulent elections. Those organizations already possess moral capital that will affect their political image in the next stage of the political struggle. The cheap Western invention about politics as the art of the possible does not work in Russia: a traditional society—and that is the sort of society we continue to be—has its own scale of values, and on it morality occupies a leading place, immediately after spiritual values.

The moral break also determined further political differentiations. The appearance of political abracadabra known as the left-centrist opposition (a long-nurtured child of the RF Communist Party) and of a "right center" characterizes a real divergence of goals and

methods between "leftist" and "rightist" organizations on the problems of the methods, means and goals of the political struggle.

At the May "Accord in the Name of Russia" (!) and the September rites in Kaliningrad under the banner of "The Russian Frontier," the well-known slogans about the regime, a change of power, and partnership were once again heard. There is no end to this in sight; or more precisely, it will end only when the regime moves over and gives up places in the political gallery to the "left-right" pro-unity figures. If that is the case, and I am convinced that is the goal of their unity, we are faced with a continuation of political games that will never outgrow infancy to become the responsible politics of responsible opposition forces.

A question arises as to why blocs and alliances are created and broken up, and why a party leader enthusiastically hails the execution of the people and then six months later is already considered practically a hero of the opposition. Why is it that a perfectly open urge to join governmental structures, that is, to draw closer to power for power's sake, is not burdened with a sense of responsibility to those who, as constituents or members of a party or movement, do not wish to approve and support that sort of behavior?

An explanation can be found in the specific features of the character, level of morality and stereotypes of behavior of opposition "leaders." That must always be taken into account when analyzing political relations between the regime and the opposition, the relations of opposition organizations among themselves, and the interpersonal relations of the "leaders." But it would be politically naive and shortsighted to attribute everything that has been described above to that alone. It seems to me that it is much more important to pay attention to the quality of relations between the "leaders" and the "masses" or—which is one and the same thing—to the social base and political organizations that the "leaders" represent. One can state with confidence that the absolute majority of the opposition parties and movements lack their own social base, and therefore every organization appeals to everyone who does not accept or support the regime. Consequently, the question of responsibility for one's actions and declarations is not raised. The lack of feedback (accountability to one's supporters) predetermines the irresponsibility of opposition organizations and makes them top-heavy and organizationally amorphous. Wherever an organization exists and is capable of influencing the behavior of the leadership, the leadership strives to extinguish the "initiative of the masses." The case of the delaying of the congress of the RF Communist Party perfectly well illustrates the relationship between the party and its leadership bodies, but in other organizations matters are even more deplorable—the leaders have no accountability whatsoever to the organizations' members. And when the participants in rallies become party members (as V. Zhirinovskiy and A.

Rutskoy make them), the irresponsibility of the "leaders" is directly provoked by the facelessness and irresponsibility of the "rank-and-file party members."

There is yet another important explanation for such a situation with respect to the extent of the opposition's organization, and for the sudden reversals that occur in alliances. The psychology of the opposition leadership is not yet free of the "quick grab" syndrome. The myth continues to be sustained that the regime will all of a sudden crumble, that demonstrations or votes are sufficient to bring about a change of government and political and economic course. Yet in the past few years the regime has grown stronger and saddled the power-wielding structures, and it now has an infrastructure that enables it to keep political processes under control. For all its antipopular and antinational nature, it is a real force that can be gotten rid of only through painstaking ideological, organizational and propaganda work. Any organization that engages in broad-scale activity in this area will be a mass organization and a leading one, and that is the only way that a force capable of removing the regime and bringing a nationally oriented government to power will be created.

The present regime and its foreign policy and economic activities are historically doomed. However, one must understand that the word "doomed" is inseparably linked to the term "historically." Consequently, what is needed is painstaking work by opposition forces to reduce the time that is required, not mere euphoric expectation that the doomed end will come of its own accord. And therefore, one may also believe that power will not go to those who presently—as they did a year, or two, or three earlier—see no means and methods of taking power other than microphones and street marches of deceived and insulted people. Power will be taken by other people and other organizations, which will do so legally, deliberately, and relying on the will of the people and the capability of their supporters.

Opposition Group Rejects New Union

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in Russian No 42, 21 Oct 94 pp 2-3

[Article by Kseniya Myalo and Natalya Narochinskaya of the All-Russian National Legal Center: "On the Ways To Restore Historical Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been three years now since the unprecedented national disaster befell the Russian people. Twenty-five million Russians are scattered beyond the Russian Federation's present borders, often in a disadvantaged and degraded situation, and in a number of cases directly and flagrantly deprived of civil and political rights.

Every day the losses in the areas of diplomacy, economics, security and culture multiply; the results of several generations' hard work are being squandered or already have been squandered. Russia's centuries-long

efforts as a state in the West and the South, in Europe and Asia, are being wiped out. It is being crowded off the seas, and the "Berlin Wall" is being rapidly moved to the borders of Muskovy. A little further, and our country's slippage onto the roadside of world history and loss of its potential for development will become irreversible, and the death of great Russian civilization will become an accomplished fact.

The rapidly developing demographic catastrophe in Russia has already become such a fact. According to specialists' forecasts, in just a few more decades—an insignificant period by historical standards—its population will be reduced by half; the mobilization contingent will shrink to virtually zero, and the migration of alien ethnic groups—in particular, Chinese—into Russia's territory will drastically increase. For all practical purposes, we are approaching the threshold of historical death, and the Eurasian space that has been occupied for centuries by the state called "Russia" is becoming the object of partition and reorganization that leaves no room for Russia.

And the most disastrous prospects are facing the Russians, who for centuries have been the main builders and governors of the state to which they gave their name and which was subsequently joined by numerous peoples, nationalities, cultures and confessions, forming a unified state. However, at all stages of the Russian state's full-fledged existence, the Russians remained its cornerstone, the central pillar that supported the entire whole and assumed the principal burden of that whole. That is the way it was in the USSR, where, for all the ambiguity of the Russians' position, they were openly and tacitly acknowledged to play the role of the state's governing ethnic group.

Today the Russians' position has drastically changed. Having become a forcibly dismembered people on the territory that was established and defended by generations of their forebears in Great Russia (the Russian Empire/USSR), they are already more and more obviously becoming a people without a state in the present Russian Federation, where they make up more than 80 percent of the population. Even their very name "Russians" (*russkiye*) is coming to be forbidden, ludicrously—but also perfidiously—replaced with "Russophones" (*russkoyazychnyye*) or "inhabitants of Russia" (*rossiyane*; this noun is normally also translated as "Russians," but that translation loses the distinction being emphasized here between "*rossiyane*," which is derived from the name of the country, "*Rossiya*," and "*russkiye*," which normally refers, specifically, to ethnic Russians, although "*ross*" and "*russ*" are actually just variations on the same historical root—Trans.), as though the root of the latter did not contain the word "*ross*," which is to say "Russian" (*russkiy*). Such substitutions could be considered a manifestation of profound ignorance, if the plain and clear goal of such manipulations were not perfectly obvious: the complete destruction of the Russian historical identity and, as a consequence, the final liquidation of Russia as such. For

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history incontrovertibly attests to the fact that with the weakening, not to mention destruction, of the principal state ethnic group, the state itself inevitably collapses.

Therefore the combination of the slogans about the "revival of Russia" that have been adopted by the present regime with the displacement of the very concept of "Russian" [russkiy] betrays a perfectly deliberate strategy in which the hackneyed phrase "revival of Russia" merely camouflages the goals of Russia's complete and final destruction. Unquestionably, all citizens of Russia, regardless of their nationality, are "inhabitants of Russia" [rossiyane]; and it is in precisely the same sense that they all used to be called "Russians" [russkiye]. However, there are no bans on the use of the ethnic names "Tatars," "Chuvash," "Bashkirs" etc., and there are even components of the Federation that are named for them, components which are increasingly asserting themselves precisely as national states.

In this context the ban, albeit not yet formal, on the ethnic name "Russians," the fact that public discussions of the question, "do Russians exist at all?," have even become possible, and the intensity of Russophobia in the mass media should be regarded from the legal standpoint as a form of national discrimination bordering on cultural genocide. However, the experience of the 1920s in our country, which were filled with the intensive struggle against "Great Russian chauvinism," like the experience of other eras and peoples, persuasively demonstrates that the line separating cultural and ideological genocide, i.e., the total criminalization and even demonization of an entire people, from actual physical ethnocide is an extremely fine one.

In a number of former union republics that line is already close to being crossed, and therefore the continuation of such "games" directly raises the question of the accountability—including legal accountability—of its leading ideologists and politicians.

However, the situation of Russians that exists today—that of a dismembered people that has been deprived of its state and is actively discriminated against—also obligates the opposition that calls itself patriotic to take a clear stand on this issue. Because mere emotions and mere imprecations directed at those who dismembered and betrayed the country are even more inadequate now than they have ever been. And the peoples' nostalgia for the destroyed unified country is already being successfully harnessed by the very forces that a few years ago were the leaders of its destruction. The Sakharov project for a Eurasian Union has once again been pulled out and placed on the agenda; the very intention of that project consists in not the restoration but the final destruction of historical Russia, a process that was begun in 1917 but was halted by the mighty will of Russia's peoples—and, first and foremost, the Russians—to preserve their historical existence.

Sakharov's precedence is respectfully acknowledged by N. Nazarbayev, who voiced this favorite idea of the

"world behind-the-scenes operators" (I. Ilyin) with regard to the specific situation of the present day. It is no accident, of course, that even Bill Clinton has stated that the West would not object to the restoration of the Union—of course, if it took place on the basis of "democratic principles" and "universal human values."

Translated from mondalist language into Russian, this means that everything is acceptable but one thing: Great Russia's genuine self-restoration, with a solid Russian (russkiy) nucleus organizing an assembly of peoples around itself, as opposed to the union of oligarchies at the head of pseudostates that is the basis of the Nazarbayev project. It is no accident, of course, that the needs of those oligarchies is viewed with understanding by Gorbachev, who accompanied his unqualified support for Nazarbayev's idea of a "union of states," as though it were a new idea (as though he himself had not, at Novo-Ogarevo, already replaced the USSR with the USS [Union of Sovereign States]), with the touching commentary: "...the national elites' taste for sovereign statehood has already been awakened—they will not give that up" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7 July 1994). And it is no accident, of course, that Yegor Yakovlev, that fighter against the empire whose contribution to the destruction of the state that actually existed should not be underestimated, has turned up among the mourners for the Soviet Union and active supporters of a Eurasian Union. But we see with alarm that this destructive scheme that would complete the Russian tragedy is finding a good many supporters and defenders in the ranks of the patriots, who are prepared for sake of the magic of the word "union" itself to sacrifice Russian [russkaya] Russia. Because the situation of Russians on the territory of Kazakhstan itself, where they are shut out of political power, drastically degraded in social status, and forced to see even the very traces of Russian history being erased on Russian lands, already shows us the future that would await Russians in a Eurasian Union: the total loss of their historical statehood, the codification of their condition of dismemberment, cultural degradation, the loss of their name, and national death.

And there is no need to doubt that it would be Russia—more precisely, Russian Russia—that would shoulder the main burden of the costs of maintaining a cumbersome transnational government apparatus, as well as the costs of maintaining the living standard of the "sovereign states" within limits that would guarantee the security of the ethnic political elites. Today Russian subsidies and subventions are already protecting them from the wrath of their own peoples and consolidating their power. And enabling them, like Nazarbayev himself, who is considering the option of military cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkey, to use Russian subsidies to build anti-Russian blocs.

Yet the Russian demographic potential is exhausted, and any imposition of excessive strain on it for a new "development of the outlying regions"—or for facilitating our neighbors' "integration into the world community," as Mr Nazarbayev, with disarming candor,

defines the goals of the Eurasian Union, would be fatal for it. The proposed union of oligarchies, or union of nomenklaturas, joining the "world community" would be built on Russian bones in the literal sense of the word.

On the basis of what has been said, we consider it necessary to state that:

While deeply mourning the destruction of the USSR and considering its abolition in December 1991 to have been illegal, we consider the abolition of the Russian state in 1917 and its arbitrary division into national territories, which was carried out under the ideology of national self-determination, to have been equally illegal. The unified state of the Soviet Union that actually existed is dear to us and was acknowledged by us to be legitimate to the extent that it was able to overcome Lenin's criminal idea of it as a union of states that abolished historical Russia, and was able to become the continuation and heir of that same persecuted historical Russia. In practice, what happened was a return to the Stalinist plan, which had been rejected by Lenin in 1992, of creating autonomous national entities, a plan that attempted to preserve the Russian continuity of the new Soviet state. Only this practical continuity and only the unconditionality of its state unity were the source of its strength, including, above all, its victory in the 1941-1945 war.

And it is precisely at that time—following the restoration of the USSR-Russia succession—that mondialism's bitter war with it began. It is typical that the pronouncement that it was the "evil empire" was made not when the indigenous Russian classes were being physically annihilated in the name of combating chauvinism, but when (given the bare minimum degree of objectivity, it is impossible not to acknowledge this) the regime, while remaining totalitarian, could no longer in any way be called terrorist.

By the end of the 1950s the concept of the total rejection of the USSR itself as, precisely, the successor to Russian history took final shape. The law on the dismemberment of our state passed by the U.S. Congress in 1959—the Captive Nations Act, which named all the peoples of the USSR, except the Russian nation (!), as such nations—quite openly shifted the emphasis from combating Bolshevism to combating "Russian imperialism." "Russian imperialism," moreover, on the territory of the Russian state itself, a territory which had not been subject to dispute before the revolution, and the legitimacy of whose belonging to Russia had not been questioned even by our toughest rivals in the international arena.

The draft of the new Union Treaty proposed by Sakharov and Gorbachev, the return to the "Leninist principles of nationalities policy" proclaimed by the ideologists of perestroika—all that marked a break with the national-state policy followed in the 1930s through 1970s and a return to the anti-Russian internationalism of early Bolshevism. That same return also forms the

basis of the Eurasian Union project and the integration projects designed by the Gorbachev Foundation.

However, acceptance of the idea of the Eurasian Union and of other plans modeled in various foundations and centers for some sort of newly established federation will have serious and even tragic legal consequences. What it signifies is by no means overcoming the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements (as many of those who mourn the USSR may sincerely believe), but on the contrary, the legitimization of them. For the new "integration" requires our ultimate acceptance of the present situation as a point of departure. And the future of Russia and the dismembered Russian people is thereby made dependent on the "goodwill" of the national elites that must be "pacified" by sacrificing Russian interests, as well as by agreeing to the betrayal of the peoples that are drawn to Russia. That is already happening in the Transdnier, the Crimea, Ossetia and Abkhazia.

That is why we state that, while grieving for the Union, we are by no means prepared to welcome every plan for reviving it. Moreover, we see that today the very idea of a Union may, under some circumstances, become, as it was back in the 1920s, a tool for destroying Russia.

The state for whose restoration and development we strive is precisely Russia, and we will never agree to a new rejection of its name, which is precious to us. For, as P. A. Florenskiy wrote, "the name is that which is named," and its loss once cost Russian people too dearly. Any union can be built only with due regard for this immutable reality, as well as for the inconclusiveness of the Russian Federation's present outlines. We stress that we are not raising the question of violently revising borders in the post-Soviet space, but we consider a lengthy and extensive negotiating process to be essential. The grounds for such a process is both the double (in 1917 and 1991) illegitimacy of the abolition of our historical statehood, and the already-declared will of the peoples of our unified Fatherland for reunification. We are referring primarily to the dismembered Russian people, but not only to them. Historically, Russia united a much greater number of peoples and nationalities than the number of national state formations created during the Soviet period. In this recarving of historical Russia, many peoples found themselves included, arbitrarily and against their own will, in internal national states of the USSR, which in actuality meant the violation of treaties that they had once independently concluded with Russia. Such was the case with Ossetia and Abkhazia; the forced Ukrainization of the Ruthenians and dismemberment of the Lezghian people were flagrant examples of the violation of the right to national identity; and finally, one need not even speak of the situation of the Crimea and the Transdnier, the legitimacy of whose belonging to the unified Russian community cannot be denied by a single international body. Their right to reunification with that community is equally indisputable.

Finally, where peoples do not declare a desire to reunite with Russia but are inclined toward a close union with it,

we propose the realization of that union in the form of a Russian Commonwealth. In short, we are prepared to accept any form of closeness or union, **except for one: any that is based on a repudiation of historical Russia, the demonization of it as the "prison of peoples," the abolition of its name, and the severing of the unbreakable historical bond between Russians and Russia.**

For us, the phrase "Russia without Russians" is unacceptably absurd, and the contours of precisely that sort of Russia are already being drawn for the not-so-distant future. In that assertion, there is no challenge to other peoples; Russians will survive, and so will they, in recreating our common unified Fatherland, Russia. But with the disappearance of Russians, "Eurasia" itself would cease to exist as a special, unique means of existence—symphonic and dialogic—of peoples and civilizations. There is no other "Eurasia," but there is a Europe and an Asia that are already beginning to divide up the Russian legacy between them. Such a division will hardly occur without global upheavals, and there is hardly any chance that the peoples of the former unified state will get through it unscathed. But even independently of the will and desires of the other peoples, Russians have the **unconditional right** to defend their national existence, and the duty of any political force that calls itself patriotic is to provide for that defense. That is why we resolutely reject the strategy and tactics of pursuing equal partnership with the national leaders of the CIS states, components of the Federation, and diverse national movements within the CIS and Russia, regardless of their stand on the Russian question. It is impermissible, in the name of an abstract "union," to place the Transdniester on the same footing with Moldova, where for Russian children and teenagers in the near future there will remain only one "green light"—to the vocations of plumber and unskilled manual laborer. It is impermissible to conduct negotiations on a union with D. Dudayev, when about 200,000 robbed and humiliated Russians have left Chechnya and the general himself raises the question of holding an international trial of Russia's policies dating back to the 17th century.

We state that we consider the **emerging practice of economic and cultural cooperation between Russia and the CIS countries, regardless of Russians' situation in them, to be a policy of national betrayal.** We see with alarm that this tendency is spreading even among the patriotic opposition, while broad segments of the population are profoundly indifferent to everything that is happening. But the loss of national solidarity is the death of the nation, and today there is no task more important than arousing this feeling of national solidarity that has nearly died out in Russian people.

We categorically reject the Russian leadership's announced official policy of "promoting the voluntary integration" of our compatriots into the societies of the newly independent states, something which means the encouragement by **Russia itself (!!!)** of the forced assimilation of 25 million of our compatriots, and the consolidation of the Russian people's losses. On the contrary,

the primary task of patriots should be to do their utmost to promote the preservation of pan-Russian [obshcherusskaya] and pan-Russia [obshcherossiyskaya] identity by our compatriots who have been deprived of their rights; it is impermissible to sacrifice that identity to any transient political circumstances and to erect any sort of pseudo-union on the basis of that sacrifice.

Any negotiations on associations and "unions" with other nations that previously belonged to a single state, or more precisely, negotiations with their elites, may be conducted only on the basis of their recognizing the inconclusiveness of the Russian Federation's present boundaries by accepting nonviolent alteration of borders within the framework of the territory of the USSR—the last historical form of a unified Russian state. The legitimacy and integrity of that territory were confirmed under international law not only in Yalta and Potsdam, but also in 1975 in the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act.

And so:

- the preservation and strengthening of the Russian nucleus as the basis of the commonwealth of peoples forming Russia;
- the restoration of the legal continuity of the Russian state—dating not from 1991 and not from 1922, but from 1917, and the purging of the name "Russia" itself of ideological pollution and slander;
- the development of the whole potential of cooperation and community among Russia's peoples, with the ultimate goal of restoring Russia's state unity;
- the formation around it of a Russian Commonwealth as a form of union of lands and peoples that restores historical continuity—that is the course we see for restoring our country that has been twice destroyed during the 20th century.

Despite all the losses of the years that have passed since fateful August, such a course is still feasible. But only on the condition that we do not allow ourselves to be lured into the traps of pseudo-integration that have been set today with one purpose only: to prevent the country's genuine reunification.

The success of this mission of patriotic forces will become a reality if we do not reduce Russia's state catastrophe solely to 1991 and Belovezhskaya Pushcha. If we, finally, recognize that at the end of the 20th century Russia and Russians confront the grandiose task of restoring the national historical identity that was torn down at the century's beginning.

ZAVTRA Appeals to Businessmen

954F0307C Tver ZAVTRA in Russian No 41, Oct 94 p 1

[Appeal by the Newspaper ZAVTRA: "To Patriotic Businessmen and Bankers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For four years we, the small collective of ZAVTRA, continuing to resist the Yeltsinists' closing of the newspaper DEN, have been waging an

unequal battle against the usurpers of power in Russia and defending the honor and dignity of our insulted and humiliated people and the desecrated and dismembered Homeland. We do not have the palaces and mansions that have been given to the progovernment newspapers. During the whole time, the government has not given us one kopeck in subsidies. We have been put on trial, worn down and ravaged with lawsuits. We have been hounded by hundreds of "democratic" publications, which have made us out to be the devil incarnate. We have been refused printing facilities, and we have expended our last effort searching the country for courageous printers. We continue the struggle, believing that in texts written by Russia's best writers and in articles written by the most honest politicians of our times one can hear the words of truth and love that are so essential to people.

Under these conditions we appeal for support to patriotically minded businessmen who have not lost their sense of moral perspective, who are not deaf to the suffering of their compatriots, and who want to see moral and responsible politicians at the head of the state.

We appeal to military personnel who have left the army and entered into commerce, earning money through trade, banking and production activity. We, ZAVTRA, are acting in your stead, sitting in the trench you dug, fighting for the honor of the army desecrated by Shaposhnikov and Grachev, and not allowing its soldiers and officers to fall into despair. You should help the newspaper that is defending Russia's defense interests!

We appeal to employees in state security and the Main Intelligence Administration who have left their agencies and put their economic and political knowledge to the use of their commercial enterprises, skillfully taking advantage of Russian and world market conditions and accumulating a wealth of millions in a short time. We, ZAVTRA, are acting in your stead, defending Russia's national interests and forming a concept of the Homeland's economic, military, geopolitical and cultural security, which has been destroyed by the traitors and dilettantes. You should help the newspaper that stands guard over the state's fundamental values.

We appeal to the recent party members, preachers of a collective ethic, creators of and participants in Soviet organizational projects, whether space, the virgin lands, or the creation of the maritime fleet. You who have left the party and drawn on your organizational and intellectual experience to establish commercial banks and companies should help ZAVTRA, which in your stead is continuing to preach brotherhood, mutual assistance, and heroism in the name of the Homeland, uniting patriotic politicians and advancing them toward a power that will help overcome the destruction and return morality and greatness to Russia.

We appeal to the plant directors whom the "democrats" are systematically either killing or buying off in hopes of corrupting and destroying the segment of society that created the great industry and science that surpassed the

world's leading countries and outlined the contours of the future earthly civilization. We, ZAVTRA, stand in defense of the plants and laboratories, engineers and working class, defending their dignity and rights as best we can, and continuing to assert: Soviet industry, which developed the wild lands of the North and Siberia, outer space and the seabed, accomplished a historical exploit unparalleled in history. Plant directors, help the newspaper ZAVTRA!

We address this appeal not to the impoverished people who have never abandoned us or ceased to regard us as their own, even with their modest donations, but to those strong and fresh people who, recognizing the tragedy of today's Russia, are prepared to support the voice of a patriotic newspaper!

Our address: Moscow, Komsomolskiy prospekt, 13
Tel: 247-13-37

Our basic information: Editorial Staff of the Newspaper DEN Limited-Liability Company, current account 13345449 in the Moscow Biznes AKB, MFO 44583478, correspondent account No. 478161600 in the RKTs GU of the RF Central Bank MFO 201791 (uch. 74).

Head of New Political Party Interviewed

954F0310A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK
in Russian 9 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Viktor Kozodoy, leader of the Novosibirsk organization of the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party, by Vladimir Kisulin; place and date not given: "Social-Democrats—for a 'Third Path': New Political Organization Emerges in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A founding congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Union was held on 30 October in Moscow in the Izmailovo hotel complex. The congress was created by the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party [RSDNP], the Social-Democratic Party of Russia, the Russian Social-Democratic Center, the Labor Party, and the Greens Party of the movements "Young Social-Democrats of Russia" and "New Names." Vasily Lipitskiy, a deputy of the State Duma, became cochairman of the new organization. Novosibirsk residents also took part in the work of the congress. The details are recounted by Viktor Kozodoy, leader of the Novosibirsk organization of the RSDNP.

[Kisulin] So, one more political organization has appeared in Russia. And, apparently, a rather powerful one...

[Kozodoy] The idea matured a long time ago: Unite groups and organizations that profess the social-democratic idea. Work on the establishment of a union took about a year, and it is only now that we have arrived at a level of specific organizational tasks. I, incidentally, do not think that a lot of parties are represented in the RSDS [Russian Social-Democratic Union]. Rather, to the contrary, there are some that are absent here. Thus,

until now, unfortunately, we have not succeeded in coming to an agreement with the Socialist Workers Party. But here there is more talk not about ideological differences, but about personal aspects. After all, the unity of approaches and appraisals is sensed at the level of regional organizations.

[Kisulin] Was the measure representative?

[Kozodoy] There were 150 delegates present, representing 71 regional organizations. The names were impressive: Lipitskiy, Obolenskiy, and Rummyantsev. There were quite a few guests, including guests from abroad.

[Kisulin] I heard that Mikhail Gorbachev was also there.

[Kozodoy] Yes, he gave an important speech. He explained to us that the process has started and that it is impossible for it to stop...

Gorbachev commented very sharply on the attempt to create yet another social-democratic organization headed by Yakovlev, Shaposhnikov, and Popov. The ex-president of the USSR declared that he will have nothing in common with "political Gaponovshchina." But Mikhail Sergeyevich came to the congress, because the socialist idea has always impressed him. According to Gorbachev, he and the CPSU tried to see to it that out of 18 million members in the party, the 5-6 million convinced socialists who remained were for development along an evolutionary path.

Gorbachev did not join any structures, but his very presence at the RSDS Congress was very important, for public opinion abroad knows only two people in Russia: Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Now, for example, Gorbachev is going to Paris to an international congress of socialists, where he will talk about our congress.

[Kisulin] However, speeches are one thing, but policy at the congress was obviously made by other people. What results did you achieve?

[Kozodoy] The main thing is that we established ourselves, and we will further unite. The development of the social-democratic movement in modern Russia took different paths; for example, the SDPR (Rummyantsev's party) dates back to the dissident movement, and it even had an anticommunist orientation at one time. Our party (the RSDNP), on the contrary, consists of people who at one time were members of the CPSU. For a long time, the main reason for controversy was membership in the CPSU: Were you, or were you not? This has now been overcome, and it is finally understood that ideas are more important.

[Kisulin] It is not entirely clear what union means.

[Kozodoy] For the time being, we have created a union in which all the organizations preserve their independence, but the outlook is clear—to form a strong political party. How, for example, does the social-democratic union differ from the Civic Union, about which so much

has been said? Well, in the fact that the latter was a purely leadership formation, but for the RSDS, the main thing is reliance on the regions. And our party plays the leading role in the union, as the most organized force.

[Kisulin] What role at the congress was played by "our man in Moscow?"

[Kozodoy] Lipitskiy played the leading role. The very idea of the creation of a social-democratic union belongs to Vasily Semenov. He headed all the work for the preparations, and it was even felt during the course of the congress that representatives of the various organizations recognized him as the leader. The result is logical: Lipitskiy became the leader of the RSDS.

[Kisulin] Nevertheless, where are the socialists calling us?

[Kozodoy] Lipitskiy talked precisely about this in his opening speech. We are for the so-called "third path," about which many are talking and writing today. The "third path" is the doctrine of the social-democrats. While Russia's Choice speaks for a purely liberal path, and the Communists are for a continuation of the previous course, which they followed for seven decades. The Social-Democrats see their place in the middle of the political spectrum, between the polarized political forces. We think that the economy of Russia should be socially oriented, and that our state itself should be socially oriented as well.

[Kisulin] And just how does the RSDS plan to achieve these results?

[Kozodoy] Through reforms. And there is only one path to them—to come to power through general elections. In the first place, we have in mind the forthcoming presidential elections and the parliamentary elections. We will get ready.

Social Democratic Congresses Reviewed

954F0332A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 45, 11 Nov 94 p 8

[Article by Andrey Fadin, under rubric "Party Club": "The Social Democrats Didn't Go Into the Pocket: Minerva's Owl Takes Off In the Twilight"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last autumn, for the second time this year, there occurred a burst of activity by the varied Russian Social Democrats, to which the popular journalist Maksim Sokolov, in an unusually scathing and just as inaccurate way, applied the label "S.D. [Social Democratic] psychosis."

Fortunately, not a single part of the Russian political spectrum gives off the smell of psychosis. On the contrary, our politics, it would seem, are returning to the bucolic times of a small pass on the narrow arena of institutions of power and administrative feeding troughs. Whatever people say, it is rather a long way to the election, and the "hot autumn" that was promised by

the trade unions and the opposition did not occur, so that it will also be necessary to wait with the revolutions.

Nevertheless, it would be completely incorrect to say that nothing is happening.

In all parts of the political spectrum, relatively unnoticed heavy work is in progress in the search for "their own word," an adequate ideology, a new image of their own, or that which in political Newspeak is given the intimidating name "identity."

This work is all the more agonizing in that the differences in the social base for most of the political parties are either microscopic, or are completely nonexistent (frequently together with the base itself), and the basic planks in the platform and the basic slogans have been copied from one another or from Western colleagues who are the "classic authors in the genre." Meanwhile, it is necessary—for Yavlinskiy, for Rutskoy, for Zyuganov, and for "everyone, everyone, everyone," including Yeltsin personally and the "collective Yeltsin"—to become "something" or "someone" ideologically defined.

For the latter—in the instance of the complete ideological vacuum of power and electoral shakeup that is inevitable sometime—the need to "become someone" is becoming simply critical. It was precisely in the search for a "fulcrum" deep within the president's administration that, at one time, the Foundation for Supporting the President (chairman, Nikolay Medvedev, former chief of the Administration For Work With the Territories) and the Department For Ties With Public Organizations, headed by Comrade Loginov, were created, for the purpose of engaging in breaking up the soil for the future "presidential party." But what kind of party was that supposed to be, other than "presidential"? (Even Juan Domingo Peron's party was officially not the "Peronista" party, but the "justicialista" one, that is, the party of justice.)

The presidential party based on the "idea of Yeltsinism" (because of the lack of an idea itself) never occurred. That, probably, is how another project was born—the presidential social-democratic party.

Beginning in the summer, the president's representatives and the regional administrations began receiving from Moscow official letters with the proposal to help creating new party organizations.

The representative of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] of Chuvashia said, "The republic's State Council has received a letter from the administration of the President of Russia: A. N. Yakovlev is creating a social democratic movement, and we ask that you render assistance in creating an organization in Chuvashia. The State Council was surprised and invited us. We sent an immediate telegram to Yakovlev, saying 'The organization has been created. Send members.'"

The receipt of similar letters from the Kremlin was reported by Social Democrats in Perm, Krasnoyarsk, Arkhangelsk, and Nizhniy Novgorod.

In this context one begins to understand Gorbachev's philippics, which have been broadly circulated by the mass media and which are addressed to "the people who contracted to carry out this work—to create a pocket Social Democracy."

Fuss Around the Sofa

The niche of Russian Social Democracy, despite the mocking jabs by popular journalists, actually is, in many senses, the commanding position in the post-perestroika political space. In it one sees the focusing of the succession of the socialist and etatist traditions of Russian political culture—and at the same time a break with the dilapidated coercive Communism, the attempt to hold onto the social achievements of Soviet civilization—and to overcome its limitations, to find a balance between the values of freedom for the strong and justice for the weak, and possibly the more complete equality of opportunities, and the inevitable inequality of the result.

"The central nature" of the Social Democratic political niche make inevitable protracted exhausting fights (and haggings) for it. It is precisely for that reason that so many people have rushed to enter the Social Democrats as though it is a big collecting tank—practically everyone who either had not joined "the Democrats," or "the Liberals," or "the Patriots," or who felt that it was necessary to change horses. Here, actually, it is possible to find "every creature, two by two"—the highest *nomenklatura* of the former CPSU, the formal "informals," the former dissidents, industrialists, trade-union bosses and trade-union activists, scientists, generals, ex-vice-presidents, and even the ex-president...

Following Maksim Sokolov's logic, all of them—on the basis of their election failures—should be considered political failures, oddballs who cannot run their own life and who chronically bet on what is known to be the wrong horse. However, a person who knows slightly even these people, and also a few people from their own kitchen, will say that, for the most part, they are not among those who will carry the spoon past their mouth (although they do include different kinds of people, just as, incidentally, the liberals do—see the figure of political failure K. Borovoy, which is remarkable for its completeness).

Of course, the election potential of any ideology today is limited. People still beat you up, as the well-known anecdote goes, not on the basis of your internal passport, but on the basis of your mug shot, that is, they do not look at the party platforms, but at the fuehrer. But political space becomes structured quickly, and tomorrow, in the market of ideological symbols, a person who has secured the appropriate "label" for himself may have the advantage.

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Two Congresses

The position of the Social Democratic idea in Russian political-ideological space is such that, to one degree or another, it cannot be overlooked by any of the organized forces of our political market. However, the irreversibility (and commonality) of the idea in no way (or to a minus degree) relates to its real existence in that space.

Everything in that existence is a vast area for caricatures and jabs. The Social Democratic party is eking out a truly meager existence (but, incidentally, what parties are eking out any other?).

Nevertheless, what is occurring in these political parties, which are microscopic when one considers the scope of Russia, is of certain interest from the point of view of the relations that the various factions in the political class that is forming have with the regime.

On 30 October seven different-caliber Social Democratic "parties" held the Constituent Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Union (RSDS), at which 71 regions were represented. The congress came out openly against the "authoritarian-oligarchical regime," and, among other things, made an obvious demand for converting the Social Democratic union into a kind of Labourite party, by including in its leadership people from the trade-union elite of the FNPR [Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions] and the VKP [All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party].

Shortly before that, there had been the congress of the "historic" SDPR [Russian Social Democratic Party]—the first one, that had been born as early as the informal reshufflings of the perestroyka days and that has real primary organizations in 40 regions. Both events showed that strong oppositional shifts have occurred in this part of the political spectrum.

The largest of the Social Democratic parties, the RSDNP [Russian Social-Democratic People's Party] ("Rutskoy and Lipitskiy's party"), entered the RSDS (and, moreover, paid for the constituent congress) largely despite the will of its now formal chairman.

The congress of the "historic" SDPR, which also was conducted despite the will of the party leadership, on the initiative of the auditing commission (perhaps the first instance in the history of the Russian multiparty system), meant, essentially speaking, the splitting of that party. That split occurred along an old seam—the criterion of the relationship with the regime, and, consequently, to the Yakovlev Social Democratic project. Whereas the previous leadership (A. Golov) had been oriented toward participation in it, the new leadership has a rather anti-regime mood. The person who currently heads the independent SDPR is Aleksandr Obolenskiy, who is famous for having "fought" with Gorbachev for the position of Chairman of the USSR VS [Supreme Soviet]. (Naturally, the legality of the congress has been disputed by Golov, whose supporters are planning to hold their own counter-congress.)

Thus, if the Yakovlev project for "presidential Social Democracy" does occur, it obviously will not be a "roof" for all (or even most of) the Social Democratic organizations, and that is why, in all probability, it can be considered to be doomed.

Something that is interesting in this regard is [M. S.] Gorbachev's reaction. It was obviously not by chance that M. S. dropped into the Constituent Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Union. If he is planning a return to active politics, his only possible "epistle" is precisely the Social Democratic idea (the other one—the rebirth of the USSR—has been taken away by the bridle by the patriots). And that is the one that Yakovlev and Shaposhnikov were attempting to take away to the Yeltsin stables. That was something to get enraged about...

Aksyuchits on Provocations, Communists

954F0308A Tver ZAVTRA in Russian No 42, Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Viktor Aksyuchits: "Rescue on the Brink of Ruin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Everything has gotten mixed up in our Russian home, and past confrontations have given rise to the most ingenious combinations. On one side of the barricades today are the former communist leaders of the USSR (who call themselves democrats), allied with the Western financial and political oligarchy, and on the other side is the patriots' camp, which unites both communists and anticommunists. In this strange situation, it is very dangerous to succumb to fighting passions; rather, it is necessary to make a sober analysis and to try to find a spiritual basis for national revival. We must begin with an assessment of the period of partocratic totalitarianism, about which much has already been said; but its intrinsic task is fully revealed only now.

It is impossible to agree with the view widely held by Orthodox people that the "revolutionary destroyers, now feeling the full burden of responsibility for the country after having destroyed the Russian state, are being forced, albeit in a distorted and perverted form, to return to the centuries-old principles of conciliarism." A perverted and distorted conciliarism is something directly opposed to conciliarism as such, just as the perverted and distorted—i.e., false—image of Christ is none other than the Antichrist. The internationalist Marxist idea was the force most hostile to Russia. In order to fully understand it, we must recall how Russia was.

First and foremost, we must recognize the obvious fact that Russia was created by the Russian people. It encompasses today nearly 85 percent of all Russians, who are oppressed, degraded, and downtrodden in their own home, which is being destroyed before their very eyes. The Russian question cries out in Russia today. It is equally suicidal both to morbidly magnify this problem and to pretend that it does not exist.

The main hallmarks of the existence of the people as a conciliar national organism are historical memory and national self-identity. Historical memory refers to the percepts of old, the traditions of our fathers, the sense of common roots, which is to say a sense of our being part of the spiritual mission of our clan, people, and Motherland. A person who has a historical memory has an awareness of himself in the spiritual marathon of generations, and he is distinguished from the barbarian by his "love for his hearth, his love for his fathers' graves." This love is not simply the poetic reveries of the genius Pushkin, but also the real foundation of self-knowledge: We can understand who we are only by remembering who we were. Historical memory is materialized in traditions and ways of life: religious, cultural, economic, national.

National self-identity is the ability of a people to conceptualize themselves and their historic mission and fate. This is expressed above all in their religious self-identity, and as concerns the Russian people, in their Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy is a religion of salvation through love, suffering, reconciliation, sacrifice, conciliar unity, and shared responsibility. For in Orthodoxy the Lord emerges above all as compassionate, loving, and pardoning, and not only as a punishing and not so much as an awesome ruler and judge. The path of salvation for the Orthodox person lies above all in love—love of God and his fellow man, and not just in obedience to the church hierarchy (which is characteristic of Catholicism), and not so much in scatological terror and fear of Judgment Day (as in Lutheranism). Salvation is not reduced to earthly self-perfection and prosperity, as in Calvinism, in which man is molded as bourgeois-like calculating and cold-bloodedly single-minded. This is why the pious Russian martyrs Boris and Gleb, who willingly accepted death to stop the shedding of Russian blood, are so inimitable, and why the tradition of Orthodox monasticism and spiritualism is so unique. Russian Orthodoxy invests the people with a messianic vocation: The purpose of the people and the reason for their existence is to serve Christ the Messiah.

One form of national self-identity is cultural self-identity, which in the case of the Russian people has given rise to the great Russian culture. This culture is profoundly spiritual in content and therefore could not give rise to a materialistic, mass culture as in the West. Russian culture is conciliar in form, as opposed to individualistic Western culture. This is confirmed by the phenomenon of Russian classical literature, which cannot be understood apart from Orthodox consciousness; in artistic form, it grappled primarily with the issues of human salvation, not with the conflicts or collisions of his earthly existence.

Economic self-identity as a form of national self-identity reflected the immensity of Russia's expanses, the Eurasian trade routes, the severe climate and risk-prone agriculture in most regions, the lack of an outlet to the warm open seas, the lack of navigable rivers leading to

those seas, our far-flung, scattered natural resources, and the extremely burdensome state impost, which was borne primarily by the Russian people. Economic self-identity also reflected the national character. For the Christian, ownership is sacred, for it is a microcosm of man as the image and likeness of God, as the responsible master and builder of the natural cosmos. At the same time, the identity of the Russian was not individualistic as in European civilization, but oriented toward communal values and toward the common interests of society. The Russian was characterized by industrious and resourcefulness; otherwise, he could not have developed such enormous expanses in a brief historical period. The colonization of new lands often proceeded simultaneously with or in the wake of Orthodox missionary efforts: The monasteries that were built became both spiritual and economic centers; on the other hand, the first thing the Russian explorers did was to build churches. In keeping with the Russian people's ascetic character, there was in Russia no European piety toward property and wealth; a man's worth was determined by his inner qualities, not his material prosperity, and it is hard to conceive of money being omnipotent in Russian life. The character of economic activity per se did not entail the uncontrolled forces of predatory consumption or the pulverizing of natural resources; rather, it was rather solicitous toward nature.

State identity as a form of the national self-identity of the Russian people was power- and empire-oriented and reflected the geopolitical situation of Russia: the open aggression from the east, south and west, protection from which required a strong state and stimulated the conquest of the aggressors' lands. The identity of the Russian was from the outset monarchical: Genuine power was personified, not self-sufficient; it was crowned by the Church, and subordinated to the dictatorship of conscience—the voice of God in man. For this reason, supreme power in Russia, more than anywhere else, was guided by Christian morality. This was true of the war against Napoleon, in which, through the will of Emperor Aleksandr I, the Russian Army liberated Europe and entered Paris, but did not follow the example of the "civilized" French, who destroyed the Moscow Kremlin, and victorious Russia did not annex any lands. The spirit of state-building was Orthodox messianism (Moscow as the Third Rome)—the defense of the Orthodox faith and the taking of that faith to the masses. The soldier and the monk, the Cossack and the merchant were figures in the development of Russia's vast expanses. Russian imperial policy was completely different from its West European counterpart: Most territories were annexed to Russia by peaceful means, and the peoples of conquered territories were not exterminated or assimilated, not forcibly baptized, and not oppressed or enslaved. This reflected such traits of the national character as tolerance, an accommodating disposition, and decency. The largest empire in world history preserved all the peoples that comprised it until 1917, and for this reason alone, in contrast to the

American Indians and the Australian aborigines, are they able today to demand "sovereign entities."

What caused the collapse of the thousand-year Russian national state organism?

By 1917, many errors and sins of the past had tragic repercussions in Russia. For various reasons (which require separate analysis), Russia was weakened at the moment of its greatest trials. At a time when Russia was provoked into a world war and when tremendously powerful anti-Christian forces fell upon it—in the spiritual and physical dimension—there prevailed within Russia itself an apostasy of everyone from everything, and of everyone combined from the spiritual cornerstone of Russian life—Orthodoxy. And this was the formula for civil war.

As a result, power was seized by the forces of an internationalist, theomachist ideology that sought world revolution and an atheistic and materialistic bright future for mankind.

By the mid-1980s, the strategic defeat of Marxism in Russia had become clear: The attempt at world domination had failed. The Russian national state organism, having made untold sacrifices, proved to be incredibly viable and began "digesting" the ideocratic regime: Pragmatic, not ideological, interests increasingly came to dominate life and politics. In response, the antinational forces sharply changed their strategy and tactics; when these forces found they could no longer parasitize on Russian civilization, they shifted to the direct degeneration and final destruction of national Russia. Naturally, the main obstacle to this is a revival of the people's historical memory and national self-identity. The regime mobilized to combat these new forces, mimicking and imitating forms of democracy and anticommunism while preserving its nature and forming an open alliance with foreign forces hostile to Russia. The vanguard of the party nomenklatura changed its slogans and, in union with its erstwhile adversaries, used Bolshevik methods to impose on society yet another utopia, this time the utopia of the market, and to draw it into a new world order in which Russia was to play the role of colony. The same cadres of the antinational force are now "calling the tune," although they have changed their tactics, means, and methods. After the collapse of the ideological system in which their consciousness and vital interests were shaped, the inner constitution of this human type was revealed: They are driven only by the self-seeking interests of power and enrichment, which is their guiding principle in politics. This is why they so easily traded their party dogmas and attachments for the opportunity to steal and enrich themselves.

Hence it is clear that the Yeltsin regime is not a new Russia and not even a postcommunist society, but the latest zigzag in the general line of destroying Orthodox Russia. The ruling regime seeks to strangle the state self-consciousness of the Russian people once and for all

by dismembering the state, throwing 25 million Russians, along with the stumps of Russia, outside the motherland, destroying the military-industrial complex, the sole guarantor of state sovereignty and the concentration of the nation's primary economic and intellectual resources, and wrecking the army and security agencies. Within the Russian Federation, Russian oblasts are being forced to finance ethnic autonomous entities whose leadership has consistently sought the total dismemberment of Russia. The regime's international policy reduces Russia to a humiliating state, betraying friends and currying favor with foes. Speculating on Russia's traditional state symbols, and even on the idea of the monarchy (even the utterly unscrupulous Shumeyko has proclaimed himself an Orthodox monarchist), the regime is doing everything in its power to prevent the reemergence of genuine Russian state ideals among the people.

The economic reforms are imposing an economic system alien to Russians: a "market" for the chosen, with preferential terms for the unprecedented plundering of the national wealth; the oppression of the majority of citizens, in whom any possibility of coming to view themselves as proprietors, owners, and active participants in economic change is being exterminated; centralized handouts for loyalty, unscrupulousness, venality, and corruption; and destruction of the institutions of social protection. The society is being purposefully lumpenized and turned into a stateless, weak-willed, controllable mass. The rulers are using every means to hurry to make these processes irreversible and to "dive" to a point of financial and economic "stabilization" at a level where the national organism's self-defense system will be destroyed once and for all. The symptoms of relative stabilization will arise as the main stage of privatization unfolds, in which deposits of natural resources, enterprises, infrastructure, and real estate will be bought up for a song by foreign capital and laundered criminal capital from Russia, capital that will also be pumped through Western front and fictitious companies. The new masters are calculatingly imposing on us a regime of half-sated colony. With funds "saved" from the destroyed military-industrial complex, advanced technology, and the scientific-technical and cultural development of the nation and from the sale of natural resources—which constitutes stealing from future generations—a half-sated vegetative state is being prepared for us, one in which there won't be starvation, but no Motherland either.

In order to distort people's thinking and to force them to accept the imposed reality, the state-run mass media are being used to promote alien ideals of a civilization of consumption and mass culture, pornography and alcoholism, violence and enrichment. In the United States, government policy promotes healthy lifestyles and encourages people to refrain from smoking (which is banned in government institutions), while in our country the president vetoed a Supreme Soviet law banning unchecked advertisements for smoking and alcoholism.

As a result, tens of billions of dollars in profits lost by cigarette and alcohol corporations in the West have been recouped a hundredfold in Russia—at our expense and at the expense of health. Ivan Ilyin described how German tribes, in trying to exterminate the Slavs, mainly sought to decapitate the intellectual elite of a tribe, and after two or three generations the ethos disappeared. In our country, the national culture and system of national education and science are being strangled economically. This is a policy of spiritual genocide, of nipping the people's cultural self-identity in the bud. Economic and military potential and the unity of the state can be restored, albeit with difficulty; but if the nation's intellect, created over a period of centuries, is destroyed, Russian civilization will be doomed.

In the spirit of the state-sponsored atheism of the past several decades, the Yeltsin regime is pursuing the covert destruction of Orthodoxy: It showcases services in the Kremlin, the opening of cathedrals and the building of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in the capital, the candles for the leaders in Orthodox churches; but in reality the state is supporting proselytism and the imposition of alien religions on the Orthodox people. The president twice vetoed the Supreme Soviet law restricting the activities of foreign missionaries, which are legislatively regulated in a number of Western countries. The third time the law was shot up, along with the House of Soviets. Today not only does the Russian Orthodox Church lack any state support, but the authorities are everywhere blocking the opening of Orthodox cathedrals. At the same time, the authorities are registering throughout the country numerous parishes imposed from abroad and anti-Orthodox sects that preach sadism, the destruction of the family, the turning of people into zombies, and satanism. State education agencies are sending specialists for training to the United States to Moon, a millionaire who aspires to the role of latter-day messiah but who has done time in prison for tax evasion. State television has been farmed out to foreign missionaries, who are also allowed to use state-owned halls and stadiums, not in order to preach the word of God, but to turn a hefty profit. Meanwhile, the Russian Orthodox Church is the only organization that has maintained its structure intact throughout the territory of greater Russia—the USSR. The regime's objective is obvious: to bleed the Church white and divide it, and to lead away its flock to alien faiths and put the rest under tight control and use them for the regime's own ends.

Consequently, all that is happening to us today is the result of the deliberate destruction of Russian Orthodox civilization. This goal has united the renegade former party bosses and the international financial oligarchy, the anti-Orthodox missionaries, the satanists and the Masons, the inveterate crime bosses, the new Russians, and a sizable part of the Russian liberal intelligentsia. Meanwhile, the national resistance, crushed by the latter-day usurpers, is retreating inward—to church life, creative cultural pursuits, and efforts to defend public

education, to preserve our research potential, and to revive the traditional estates (the Cossack movement, the aristocracy, the merchant class). Other negative consequences of the alien life being imposed on us are the dying-out of the Russian people and extremist forms of defense. Without the revival of the Russian state, a kind of national coat of armor, all attempts at national self-survival and to restore health in all other spheres are doomed. But at the Russian political level, there are still few organized forces oriented toward the revival of traditional national Russia in a new historical image, such as the Derzhava social-patriotic movement led by Rutskey, for which reason an unseen hand has sent a storm of abuse against it.

Today's rulers are pushing Russia toward a colonial vegetative existence and the degeneration of a great culture and nation. And there is one last chance to sober up the national spirit and to rally all patriotic forces in the name of self-survival. Our land, golden from blood—this is historic call to us of 10 centuries and of future Russian generations. The national patriotic intelligentsia is called upon to make a firm choice: to unite in service to the Fatherland and to kindle the paramount ideal—the ideal of national salvation and the revival of great Russia, the revival of Russian civilization, the traditional Russian state and traditional Russian culture, fully cognizant of the uniqueness of the conciliar unity of peoples and cultures in the Russian space.

Tremendous forces—violence, lies, division, decadence—have been unleashed to thwart Russia's national revival. But we can recognize one another by our fruits: Do our efforts serve the restoration of memory and self-identity—the restoration of the nation's health, or, on the contrary, do they compound our spiritual sickness, bring new temptations, captivate us once more with marsh fires, and push us toward the abyss? In this regard, we must at last unmask the detachments of provocation in the struggle against Russia's revival. In my view, they number three. The first is Vasilyev's Pamyat, which seeks to debase and discredit the national idea in the eyes of world and Russian public opinion. The second is the activities of KGB General Sterligov, who seeks to divide the patriotic movement. When this failed, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia was pushed to the forefront, a party whose aim, it seems, is to establish a grip on the patriotic forces, to neutralize them, or to ruin them in geopolitical adventures. There are countless examples of provocations and attempts to deceive some and divide others. The provocateurs are not so much combating the opponents of the Russian idea as pursuing a maniacal witch-hunt among the patriots; they alternate demagogical declarations with real support for the antinational Yeltsin regime at critical moments.

Separating the wheat from the chaff, we must see the main spiritual tasks of Russian national revival. In my view, they are as follows.

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The restoration of real historical memory without gaps and without distortions, a memory enriched by our tragic national experience, not by the fictions and illusions of recent decades.

The acquisition of the full breadth of our national self-identity—worthy, spiritual, conciliar, oriented toward a strong country, and without red vestiges and brown admixtures.

The rejection of communist restoration, for untold blood has proven the utter opposition of the internationalist ideology to the Russian idea. But nor do we want rabid anticommunism directed against the oppressed people, for whom red flags are not so much an expression of the communist idea as the sole accessible symbol of a great state and of protest against its destruction.

The national reconciliation of all and mutual tolerance toward all who want to preserve the Russian state home, for only its walls guarantee the possibility of natural differences and peaceful disagreements.

"We need not great upheavals, but a great Russia" (Pyotr Stolypin). The renunciation of extremism, chauvinism, and fascism, which do not strengthen but destroy the great cause. Russian resistance is possible not under the symbols of the hammer and sickle, the swastika, and heathen or other symbols, which are abhorrent to the Russian spirit, but only under the traditional Russian banner and eagle and before the gaze of the Saviour.

The Russians are coming, not as a phalanx of hard-headed warriors seeking another slaughter, but as a community of brave, committed, and tenacious builders, courageous defenders, and conscientious thinkers who are reviving national Russia, not another utopia. This is not Nazism, but enlightened patriotism.

Sterligov Holds Bryansk Meeting

954F0308B Moscow *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*
in Russian No 50, 30 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Levinskiy: "New Nazis in Partisan Zone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bryansk—A "brown buckle" has appeared on the "red belt" around Moscow. Nationalists from Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia held a representative conference in Bryansk.

Two former KGB generals, Aleksandr Sterligov and Leonid Petukhov, leaders of the Russian National Assembly, headed the motley presidium, draped by a red flag depicting the Divine Savior.

The organizers wanted solidarity. And Sterligov made a profound analysis from which he concluded that only the absence of a "cementing Russian nucleus" in the Supreme Soviet can explain the defeat of October of last year. He mentioned a Zionist conspiracy only once in his speech.

The organizers very much wanted everything to proceed with decorum. But judging from the slip of the tongue of an hysterical nun brought in from Serbia (they had pleaded with her in advance "not to speak of Yids," the audience's frame of mind was different. Unable to restrain herself, she shouted: "Russians! You are feeding Yids, so that the Yids are eating better than you are!" And the hall broke out in applause and gave her an ovation: The nun had uttered aloud what was on the delegates' minds. The next speaker, the St. Petersburg academician Mayboroda, said that God himself was speaking through her.

Birthplace

According to their own claims, they represented 24 political organizations from 30 regions of the three Slavic countries. The Zyuganovites were distributing their publications in the lobby, and at the entrance they were greeted by picketers from the Soviet Party. Members of Nina Andreyeva's and Aleksandr Rutskoy's parties were sitting in the hall, and the seats for special guests were occupied by a deputy to the Federation Council, Yuriy Lodkin, the former communist governor of Bryansk Oblast, who sat next to his former boss, former oblast CPSU first secretary Anatoliy Voystrochenko.

Earlier there had been an inviting swastika, unnoticed by the authorities, at the entrance to the headquarters of the local chapter of the Russian National Assembly movement, which is located in the former political enlightenment house on the central Lenin Square. The building stands in a row with the high-rise city administration building and the oblast administration building.

The swastika can be seen more and more often on leaflets posted throughout the city.

And this is provincially quiet and conservative Bryansk, which used to be so proud of its partisan glory! This is Bryansk. On the one hand, it has a convenient geographical location: the Russian border with Ukraine and Belorussia. Moreover, the population is sensitive to economic problems on account of the Chernobyl disaster, which hit the oblast harder than any other part of Russia. It has also come to light that the territory has the country's largest, in the assessment of professor Lev Fyodorov, stockpile of chemical weapons, including binary chemical weapons. Against the backdrop of the powerful radiation phobia, the government's desire to locate a plant to destroy chemical weapons in the area will only further inflame passions.

There is also the problem of wages in the oblast, which, according to statistics, are only half the national average.

All these things could not help but affect the people's sentiments, and in April 1993 Bryansk Oblast proclaimed its orientation publicly by electing the communist Yuriy Lodkin as its governor in the first free elections. That was followed by elections to the Federal

Assembly, in which the largest number of votes cast in the oblast for party slates went to Zhirinovskiy.

'Brown' Business

Meanwhile, a political metamorphosis has been under way in the oblast, one that has resulted in significant financial support for local and then Russian Nazis. The director of Slaviya, a flourishing firm in Bryansk, moved from the left of the political spectrum to the extreme right flank.

First the critically-minded communist apparatchik—he had been a rayon CPSU instructor, then the secretary of the party committee at one of the largest plants—became a democrat. In August 1991 Yurin attended meetings at the headquarters of the local democratic movement in the basement of the building housing the independent newspaper BRYANSKOYE VREMYA. But he later became a sponsor of propaganda forays into the city by "thinkers" from Prokhanov's DEN and began financing the local "national" newsletter PRAVOYE DELO.

Aleksandr Yurin explains his change of world view as follows: "Two years ago many things could be called mistakes. Now it is clear to me that a deliberate effort to destroy the national economy is under way. It has become clear that nobody wants a Russia back on its feet."

Slaviya does a flourishing business, making commercial stalls and taking full advantage of the boom in kiosks. It has a couple of competitors in Bryansk; on the other hand, as the director himself admitted, the administrations of certain other Russian cities have issued special decisions giving the firm a monopoly.

As a result of his productive work, Aleksandr Yurin, with the blessing of Sterligov himself, was elected chairman of the local chapter of the Russian National Assembly.

Hothouse Effect

In a television interview, in response to a question about his view of the Russian National Assembly and the Russian National Unity movement, Valeriy Rogachev, chairman of the oblast Duma, answered that if they support the national Russian idea, they will meet with understanding on his part.

"I myself am a Russian," the Duma chairman said. "I have friends who are Tatars and Kalmyks, but I am going to uphold the interests of Russians." It would be strange if the city's conversion to fascism did not ripen under such hothouse conditions. The Assembly's fine members have been joined by a newly formed chapter of Barashkov's Russian National Unity movement, under the leadership of Colonel Turikov, who was discharged from the Army. He tries to convince young people not to be embarrassed by the fascist symbols or the name "fascist."

So far the "Slavic Nazis" have elected an organizing committee to restore a united state comprised of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Led by Sterligov, the committee, according to the latter, consists of State Emergency Committee members Starodubtsev and Varennikov, Orel governor Stroyev, and former Russian Press Committee chairman Mironov. Mironov, who delivered a fiery speech at the conference about CIA intrigues and the need for Orthodoxy and a monarchy in Russia, was charged with the task of forming a national patriotic party.

Elections to the oblast Duma will be held in Bryansk on December 11. Aleksandr Yurin, who was a candidate earlier but failed to win election because of insufficient voter turnout, will no doubt make a new attempt. And he has a good chance. Elections to local representative bodies will also be held in 48 other regions of Russia. They too will have their Yurins, supported by "brown" capital.

RNU Election Rally Viewed

954F0308C Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 50, 30 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Yemelyanenko: "Fascism Heads for the Elections—From October to October, a Short Road To Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The election campaign in Mytishchi Electoral District is a test of strength for the Russian nationalists, who are taking part in elections to the Russian State Duma for the first time.

Few people would remember the unsolved murder of Andrey Ayazderdzis had he not "vacated" his seat as a deputy to the Russian State Duma. At first there were many contenders for the vacancy. Among them some well-known people, such as Aleksandr Rutskoy, Vil Mirzayanov, General Makashov, and Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. But none of them decided to take the risk, perhaps foreseeing a public whipping. The 12 registered candidates who have taken the risk (eight "Varangians" and four locals), by their own admission, are torn by contradictory feelings, from bewilderment to anger. Their final meeting with voters in Dolgoprudnyy, outside Moscow, before the election, which is slated for October 30, 1994, gave rise to yet another feeling—fear.

Two candidates, MMM Joint-Stock Company president Sergey Mavrodi and entrepreneur Konstantin Borovoy, did not show up. They were not expected. The organizers had posted warning signs: "Put Mavrodi Behind Bars!", and "Send Borovoy to Israel!" The packed hall began getting to know the contenders, from left to right, as the moderator had proposed.

Presentation

"For the first time since the ban in October 1993, a Russian nationalist has the right to speak at a voters' forum," said Aleksandr Fyodorov, candidate from the

Russian National Unity (RNU) movement, beginning his speech. The hall so applauded and whistled that the flattered candidate had to ask for silence. Thanking voters for their support, Fyodorov said that he would count on that support when he begins imposing "Russian order"—restoring a unified Slavic state, repairing the economy, and expelling the American-Masonic mafia from Russia. At the latter remark, nearly half of the hall again drowned him out with applause. People in the first rows stood up and froze in the fascist salute. Holding up their right arms up and forward, they called on all to stand. Some of them held signs reading "Zionism Won't Succeed" and "Fyodorov is Our Deputy!"

The applause grew into an ovation. It drowned out the moderator's calls for order. Young men in leather jackets jumped toward the handful of us who remained seated. "Why aren't you standing?" Their attempts to take an elderly woman by the elbow and pull her to her feet stopped when she screamed, and the moderator made a meek request for "calm." The hall, from which the more cautious people were now leaving one by one, was brought back to its senses by Duma candidate Aleksandr Fyodorov: "Fellow countrymen, I have a request. Please do not shout from the seats and hear out all the candidates."

Whipping

After everyone took their seats again, the floor was given to Olga Volkova, a candidate from the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. Her name affected the audience like a red towel affects a bull. Women began shouting at her: "Olya, where is the wine that others are paying for?" Volkova's attempts to say something were interrupted by a question repeated three times. "Who gave you money for the election?"

Realizing that she could not ignore the interruptions, Volkova put a question to Fyodorov: "Aleksandr Sergeyevich, how do you intend to impose Russian order?" Pointing to the hall, she added: "Is that order?"

The audience began whistling and shouting: "You don't have anything to say, give back the microphone," and "Go back to your Israel!" The flustered woman, looking at the audience in fright, left the stage to peels of laughter. A group of supporters followed her. Their empty seats were immediately taken by the fellows in leather jackets.

The next candidate was Aleksandr Golovashchenko of the Communist Party. He began his presentation with a question passed up from the audience: "Grandpa, did you hear about Ayzerdzis? Withdraw your candidacy." His comments about law and about the Communist Party's having been liberated from a distorted course were heard in silence. After his 10 minutes were up, people in the hall shouted at him: "Grandpa, enough stories." When representatives of Mavrodi (Vladimir Stolypin) and Borovoy (Georgiy Krimko) unexpectedly appeared and asked for the floor, the audience was indignant.

"How many Jews can a person listen to?"

"Mavrodi, did you bring the money?"

Both Stolypin and Krimko shouted into the microphone over the crowd. The first tried to win its favor, and the second issued a challenge, holding his arms at his sides. The crowd responded in kind. It shouted down Mavrodi's man, saying "they were wrong to let the speculator go." Krimko was promised that an "exile republic" would be established in Russia for Jews and "blacks." The candidate from the Afghan veterans movement, Andrey Sidelnikov, tried to calm the situation. The hall suspected him of having a dubious patronymic—Yulenevich. And so it refused to give him the floor but demanded that he answer this question:

"Isn't it time for the Afghan vets to unite with the RNU?"

"Right you are, comrades," said Sidelnikov, imitating ex-President Gorbachev's voice in an attempt to play up to the audience.

Nevertheless, this did not save the remaining contenders for the Duma seat from the public whipping. Aleksandr Maksimov, the representative of the Christian Democrats, was clapped down by people in the hall, who shouted: "We're sick of chewing democratic gum." Solnechnogorsk administration chief Aleksandr Zharov and independent candidate Leonid Barashkov also got it. Zharov received a note from the hall suggesting that he withdraw his candidacy while he was still in one piece. Before Barashkov spoke, a woman wearing a lot of makeup stood up and declared that as a woman, she found Barashkov revolting. And so no women liked him, she concluded. Another candidate, Georgiy Semin, disappeared by the time he was to speak.

Interrogation

After the candidates spoke to the people, the people wanted to put two questions to each candidate. The first was what is your income, and the second was in whose favor will you withdraw your candidacy.

Aleksandr Maksimov's explanation that every person has a right to keep his income confidential and that this, in his opinion, is an integral part of "freedom, equality, and brotherhood" was interpreted unambiguously.

"That a Masonic slogan," the hall shouted.

The voters demanded that all the candidates disclose their incomes. Reluctantly, the candidates did so one by one.

Fyodorov, 200,000. Applause.

Barashkov, 1 million rubles. "When are we going to split it up?" came a cheerful question from the hall.

Golovashchenko, 80,000. "For what?" the hall asked.

Zharov and Maksimov, 450,000 and 370,000. "And how much extra do the 'shitsocrats' pay you?" people in the back rows shouted.

Sidelnikov, 1.5 million. "When are you going to open a charity foundation for the poor?" the hall demanded once more.

As the candidates for deputy to the State Duma answered the first question, quotations were passed up to all of them except one. "You're not our deputy, Fyodorov is. That's not an insult, but a fact."

The candidates dispersed quietly, knowing that they had obviously lost. In any case, with the voters in the Flight Movie Theater in the city of Dolgoprudnyy. Needless to say, they don't make up the entire 109th Mytishchi Electoral District—its five cities will assign the nationalists their niche. On October 30, election day, we will learn just what niche. However, Aleksandr Fyodorov's supporters were already congratulating their idol. Signing autographs, he asked them not to rush, repeating that everything can be done calmly. "Power is at our feet," said the smiling Fyodorov.

Communists Criticize Patriots Meeting

954F0316A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian
No 20-21, 23 Sep-6 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by V. Bushin: "Congress of Patriotic Forces of Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Congress of Patriotic Forces of Russia has been held in Kaliningrad. The name of the forum was "The Russian Border from Kaliningrad to the Kurils." Participants in the congress included political figures, cultural workers, and business people with extremely varied orientations. They were united by their negation of the present course of the Russian authorities.

Those who consented to participate included V. Zorkin; Gormex chairman V. Neverov; General V. Varennikov; people's artist Zh. Bolotova; and others. Several persons were unable to come to Kaliningrad.

It is a pity that a seat was offered to Oleg Rummyantsev, but not to Viktor Anpilov. I think that it is easier for Comrade Zyuganov to find a common language with Anpilov than with a person who two years ago, in a trial against the CPSU, was in the same company as Fedotov, Shakhray, and a lawyer who calls himself Makarov.

Our television and democratic press have worked a great deal along the line of directly falsifying the events. They stated, for example, that the evening activities in the Rossiya motion-picture theater had proceeded with the theater half-empty, whereas actually the auditorium with 3500 seats could not accommodate everyone who wanted to attend.

On Sunday, in an issue of ITOGI, Kiselev mentioned a split, giving as his justification the failure of Lapshin and Zhirinovskiy to arrive. Actually, Lapshin's absence was

made up by his deputy, and Zhirinovskiy's participation had not been planned at all, although the members of his party did take part and spoke at the rally.

At the conference of leaders of patriotic parties, the resolution was passed: require the resignation of the government and a preterm election of the president.

Hostile forces attempted to disrupt the rally and partially succeeded in doing so, but the congress took place and I am proud to say that that occurred in Kaliningrad, where I met Victory in 1945.

PRES, Shakhray Fortunes Noted

954F0316B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
11 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Feliks Babitskiy: "Brief Course in the History of PRES"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Exactly one year ago the Russian Party of Unity and Consent (PRES) arose. It was founded by Sergey Shakhray, vice-premier, minister for nationality affairs, and permanent advisor of Boris Yeltsin for especially important legal questions. He founded it after long and painful meditation, inasmuch as the name of the new party, the approximate list of founding fathers, and the basic planks in the platform of the future party had been known to journalists for at least two months before it was founded. Incidentally, such doubts, even for such a decisive politician as Shakhray, are completely forgivable, because, within the framework of the political tradition that has developed in our country, the creation of one's own party means the end of one's official career and one's departure on a free political voyage. Shakhray also, during that period, was an extremely influential figure, officially representing the President in parliament and in the regions, and without any broad publicity he also ran the "power ministries."

However, the correlation of forces among the various politicians in the president's camp were decisively changed by "black October," when their chief enemy that had united them—the old parliament—failed to stand, and the influence was supposed to be largely determined by the number of seats won by the proponents of each of them in the new one. The December election forced the all-powerful vice-premier to declare himself to be a party leader. And that is how PRES arose.

Sergey Mikhaylovich, as in previous times, was famous for his exceptional skills with regard to seizing his opponents' slogans. As early as the spring of last year he openly said that the President should declare himself to be an "enlightened patriot," since the extremists had not forced him out of the patriotic spectrum. On those grounds, it would seem, he became closer to Sergey Stankevich. On the eve of the election, however, not only patriotic ideas, but also centrist ones, acquired popularity—the country was really frightened by the cannonade in the very center of the capital. That is why Shakhray's

party took the path of seizing not only the patriotic phraseology, but also the program of the Civic Union, which its leaders themselves—who also were extremely frightened—deemed to be too radical and so they decided not to be present it at the election. As a result, PRES crowded GS [Civic Union] out of big politics and many GS deputies who had been victorious in single-mandate precincts joined up with the PRES faction as being an ideologically close one.

Incidentally, even despite this, the PRES victory in the election proved to be not extremely impressive. Its faction, on the basis of the number of members, is the smallest in the Duma. There had been no realization of the hopes by the founding fathers that their party would act as the protector of the interests of the regional elites before the federal authorities. The independent deputies from the regions preferred to create their own faction—the NRP [National Republican Party]—which, incidentally, is the second largest in size in the Duma.

For a while, PRES was strong in that it had more ministerial portfolios than any other party—more than “Russia’s Choice” and DPR [Democratic Party of Russia] taken together. Essentially speaking, that was the chief party of the governmental coalition. But times changes, and currently only Mr. Shakhrai himself and Labor Minister Gennadiy Melikyan have remained as party activists occupying high positions in agencies of the executive authority. Some, like Kotenkov, Stankevich, Sliva, and Shokhin, have left the positions that they occupied, and others, like Kalmykov, have already tendered their resignations and formally are awaiting their future fate.

Seeing this state of affairs, the party leaders, whose position does not depend upon state service, are experiencing obvious irritation. The conflict between PRES faction leader Sergey Shakhrai and billionaire Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, has not been a secret to anyone for a long time. Seeing how the party’s shares are falling in value, that prominent member of the exchange is ready to leave the game. True, for the time being the leader has been successful in extinguishing that conflict, but it is difficult to say when and how all of this will end.

Today this is no longer the party of regions or the party of the government, but is only the party of the capital’s moderate intellectuals. In the government and at political forums, it is easy to recognize its representatives by a number of typical features. Regardless of how old they are, they look younger, wear well-made suits, not without some foppishness, speak “in an attractive and learned manner,” and appeal to those surrounding them not to quarrel.

Thus, PRES is celebrating its first anniversary at a time that is not the best for it. Nevertheless we offer it our congratulations and best wishes. As for difficulties, everybody has them.

Rutskoy Corruption Charges Viewed

*954F0316C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Nov 94 p 2*

[Interview with Vladimir Kirakozov, by Valentin Maslennikov: “Well, Then, What Was in Rutskoy’s ‘Suitcases’?: In a Conversation About the Corruption of Power, There Are More Conjectures Than Facts”]

[FBIS Translated Text] The stern reality of our days requires increasingly decisive and time-responsive actions in the fight against the rampant increase in crime. In the heat of political passions there has been a constant increase in the number of accusations leveled at the powers that be, which are allegedly failing to take the appropriate measures. Once again people in society have been starting talking about “Rutskoy’s suitcases,” which, according to rumors, were crammed full of denunciatory materials and evidence of corruption in the upper echelons of power.

Our correspondent asked Vladimir Kirakozov, chief of the Russian Federation General Prosecutor’s Office’s Administration for Oversight of Criminal Investigation, to discuss exactly what was in those “suitcases.”

[Kirakozov] Much less than everyone had counted on seeing. All told, the documents submitted by the former vice-president contained materials dealing with 66 instances of violations of legality. Not a single piece of paper pertaining to any of those cases was set aside. They were all viewed in the most careful manner, in what is called in our language preliminary investigation. Violations of the law were established in only 33 of the instances, that is, in exactly half of the cases submitted.

In 17 instances criminal cases were initiated and the guilty individuals were brought to responsibility. Those cases involved 32 persons. Four cases are hanging in mid-air: the accused are being sought by criminal investigation. For six, it was decided to limit oneself to applying measures of administrative action. Six more cases were discontinued on the basis of amnesty or because of a change in the situation.

[Maslennikov] To what extent do all these cases attest to corruption in the highest echelons of power in our state?

[Kirakozov] I feel that it does not attest to this to even the slightest degree. Most of the cases are linked with misuse of “Harvest-90” checks. They are unpleasant cases, but in no instance would I call them serious or politically important. Here a couple of typical ones. Ye. Larionova, deputy chairman of the Altay Kray Union of Consumer Cooperatives, having entered into a criminal deal with Yu. Porvatova, deputy head of the kray administration, and G. Sushkova, section head at the local motor-vehicles store, sold passenger cars in exchange for bribes to persons other than the ones to whom the checks had been made out. A similar situation occurred in Kursk. There M. Lopata, director of the AvtoVAZ store, also having enlisted the support of certain managers,

sold, in exchange for bribes that were considerable in size for those times, several Zhigulis to visiting purchasers from Kazakhstan.

[Maslennikov] Vladimir Ivanovich, we have often heard that many materials in the notorious "suitcases" confirm the corruption among the command element of the former Western Group of Forces [ZGV].

[Kirakozov] There actually have been cases involving the abuse of power and malfeasance by officials in the ZGV.

I shall not speak without adducing any proof. Everyone has already heard a great deal about the case involving Lieutenant General N. Seliverstov, who is accused of misappropriations in especially large amounts, of taking bribes, and of forging official documents. The case is in the court. And it is the court that will have the final word.

Persons involved in another case are Lieutenant General G. Karakozov and Major General V. Yudin. Currently they are being handled by the investigation administration of the General Prosecutor's Office. The generals have been accused in accordance with Article 260 of the Criminal Code—malfeasance. At the moment, I do not have the right to discuss the details of the case. I shall say only that we are talking about schemes in the Voyentorg [post exchange] system. There are no other major cases.

[Maslennikov] Could you, however, mention a few others?

[Kirakozov] In a certain unit it was decided to award bonuses to the personnel for the successful repair of the combat equipment by giving them some kind of consumer good, including perfume. Local schemers, headed by Lieutenant Colonel M. Saburov, the deputy unit commander, sold that property, and the money was misappropriated. In another flight unit, the same kind of "enthusiasts" carried out a similar operation with flight pay, that is, they received personal pay and immediately pocketed it. Our investigation administration is working on the first case, and the military prosecutor's office of the Balashikha garrison is working on the second one.

[Maslennikov] Is that all of them?

[Kirakozov] There are other cases, but they are pettier than the ones I have mentioned. One of them involves a certain I. Klinchuk—commercial schemes in Voyentorg Administration No. 93. He is also accused of malfeasance. There is also another case in which 25 officers and warrant officers are accused of misappropriations, the illegal trade in weapons, and, once again, malfeasance. They include Captain 3rd Rank G. Tsimbalyuk; captains A. Pesin, V. Budin, and O. Zaytsev; senior lieutenants S. Kontrakevich, K. Fanda, and A. Shirokov; and several warrant officers. Some of them stole petty amounts, and others stole a bit more, obviously without informing the

higher leadership about this. They were caught red-handed and will receive the punishment that they deserve.

[Maslennikov] What about the ministerial Mercedes cars?

[Kirakozov] There is nothing about their purchase that involves a criminal act for personal gain. The only thing involved is the incorrect expenditure of funds. This is undoubtedly a violation, but definitely not a criminal intention. No one stole a car. And, in addition, one also cannot make a direct link between their purchase and the costs of building housing for officers: the deadlines for constructing the military housing areas, as everyone knows, were not met, and the funds that had been directly allocated for that purpose were devalued.

[Maslennikov] But why were no steps taken promptly to deal with the facts involving violations of the law that were contained in Rutskey's "suitcases"?

[Kirakozov] Well, the fact of the matter is that such steps were indeed taken. The contents of the "suitcases" were no unusual secret to anyone. For at least ten cases, even before Rutskey's statement at the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, that is, prior to 16 April 1993, nineteen persons had been brought to court responsibility. At least one-third of the facts contained in the "suitcases" were known both to the public and to the law-enforcement agencies.

[Maslennikov] The press published a fleeting communique that most of the cases from the "suitcases" were discontinued with the arrival of Aleksey Ilyushenko at the General Prosecutor's Office...

[Kirakozov] Once again this is, as a minimum, a biased assertion. With Ilyushenko's arrival, four cases were discontinued after careful investigation. Prior to his arrival, incidentally, ten had been discontinued. But all the cases involving the ZGV unfolded while he was there. As the head of the administration for oversight of criminal investigation, I assert with complete responsibility that there is no place today in the work of the Russian General Prosecutor's Office for political sympathies or antipathies. We are guided only by the requirements of the law.

So yet another political canard has quietly died—the attractive fairy tale about the truth-loving vice-president whose sly enemies had prevented him from setting in motion mountains of material exposing the fact that the people in the upper echelons of our long-suffering country were rotten to the core.

However, we shall not prematurely rejoice that the "suitcases" did not prove to contain anything serious. The real-life situation around us is much more terrifying than made-up horror stories, and putting our hopes on having someone point out a single individual guilty of the misfortunes that we are experiencing today, or on having

someone suggest a miraculous decision for all our problems is at least naive. Until the country has in operation a well thought-out system of comprehensive measures for fighting crime, we cannot count on any positive result.

Rumyantsev Discusses Political Views

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[Interview with Oleg Rumyantsev, a founder of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent Olga Koroleva; place and date not given: "Oleg Rumyantsev Is for Socialism: He Intends To Return to High Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Oleg Rumyantsev is one of the founders of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, but he left its ranks due to ideological disagreements with the party's other leaders. He later created the Russian Social-Democratic Center.

Executive secretary of the Constitutional Commission since June 1990, he worked on the draft of the new Russian Constitution but the other, "presidential," draft was preferred to his—and, by the way, a large portion of the "Rumyantsev" draft became part of it.

Right now Oleg Rumyantsev is a State Duma legislative issues expert.

Position

[Koroleva] Mr. Rumyantsev, statements have sometimes appeared in the mass media recently: The Social-Democratic movement in Russia, despite a series of initiatives, is experiencing an ideological and organizational crisis. Do you agree with that, or do you still hope that social-democratic ideas will be the defining ideas in our country?

[Rumyantsev] I am convinced that it is the social-democratic path of development—the path of Russian socialism—that will save us from the consequences of the series of "reforms" that occurred in Russia in the beginning of the 1990's. First of all, in contrast to the nomenklatura "capitalizers," the Social-Democrats are oriented toward the working people. The fact that the majority of the population of Russia were working people was an achievement of the previous system. Right now it is being suggested to them that they don't need to do anything—neither work, nor study—you only need to believe in the "reforms" and dodge and "cut coupons." Such propaganda cannot cultivate a feeling of the creation and participation of a nation.

Social-democracy also has huge prospects in Russia because its values are very close to the Russian consciousness, especially the idea of justice. You can contrast it to some degree to the idea of irresponsible "freedom" which in the understanding of our radical democrats has been turned into anarchy, chaos, money-grubbing, and oligarchy.

Moreover, social-democrats must adhere to the method of consistency and continuity which is very important. The slogan of the right minority "We are building a new Russia" reminds me of the nihilism of the Bolsheviks, who are prepared to throw much that is useful onto the "garbage heap of history." For example, the documents of our ancestors. For some reason I found the materials of the Constitutional Commission not in the State Duma nor in the Federation Council but in the Archives of the October Revolution. It turns out that the new authorities are not interested in the most valuable developments of the previous parliament that was illegally dispersed in September of last year—they are building a "new Russia." All this is sad...

[Koroleva] As far as I know, a decision was made on the creation of the Russian Social-Democratic Union [RSDS] at the Russian Social-Democratic Center Conference, of which you are chairman, at the end of June 1994...

[Rumyantsev] The Union united a number of left-center organizations. Although the RSDS founding congress takes place at the end of October, the RSDS Presidium, of which I am a member, has been operating for three months already at the initiative of my friend and confederate Vasily Lipitskiy, board chairman of the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party. The Presidium consists of representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic Center, the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party [SDPR] (the former NPSR), the Russian Greens Party, the Labor Party, the SDPR's United Social-Democrats faction, and the Russian Young Social-Democrats movement. The Socialist Workers Party and the People's Alliance can possibly also be included.

[Koroleva] Is an alliance possible with the Russian Social-Democratic Party which was equated with your name in 1990-1992?

[Rumyantsev] Hardly, because this small group has an unconvincing face. While calling itself "Social-Democratic," it hysterically supported the state coup in the autumn of last year, justified the violation of the Constitution, and defended the new "Constitution"—an indulgence for the power-hungry which reduced to naught the majority of the fundamentals of constitutional rule: a parliamentary system, government by the people, a republican form of government, and the division of powers. And right now the remnants of the SDPR continue to play up to the regime. Well, right now we are obliged to take into account the experience of our earlier attempts, including the SDPR's instructive experience.

[Koroleva] How do you assess the recent victories of Social-Democrats in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and Poland? Can one utilize their experience in Russia?

[Rumyantsev] I personally know many representatives of foreign social-democracy. Traced, blindly borrowed

Western social-democracy has no future in our country: It will be understood and supported only by 2 percent of the population. This is associated with the distinctive features of our country. In our country you have to emphasize very different aspects, which we understand very well. If we talk about justice, it is not in the abstract but specific. So, for Russia historical justice is not a castrated Russian Federation without a constitution or parliament, without a unifying idea, with border outposts in Smolensk Oblast and Krasnodar Kray, but a state with a normal constitution, strong popular representation, with a sober and predictable head of state, which consists of both Brest, Sevastopol, and other cities that rightfully became part of the Russian (Union) state. Hence—the program tenet on the restoration of historical justice and defense of national interests. The tragedy is that we no longer have a state—as the official representative of society. I am working on the program for its restoration right now.

While speaking about social justice, we must not forget that science, education, and culture in the country have been destroyed in revolutionary ecstasy in recent years. We need to restore them. We received rich coffers, but we are consuming our future while destroying the segments of civil society one after the other and while raising a generation of amoral, Godless rascals—our "entrepreneurial" future.

The principle of a social state has been discredited because it does not work in practice. Our task is to defend it, prevent them from breaking the state sector of the economy, and make it effective.

Finally, legal justice is also being flaunted. And social-democracy is a striking alternative to illegal arbitrariness.

[Koroleva] Some journalists and political scientists assert that the social-democratic movement in our country could degenerate into national socialism.

[Rumyantsev] Russian social-democracy with its correct but aloof ideas will remain an empty hull without the defense of national interests. We need to know how to combine them with deliberate patriotism. I arrived at that conclusion in 1992 (remember my initiatives on the Kurils and Yugoslavia?), and this also foreordained my break with the SDPR.

There is nothing wrong with the fact that today Russian Social-Democrats are moving nearer to state ideas. In recent years, I have been fighting for the unification of social-democratic and state ideas and this alliance is beginning to force its way through only right now. But this frightens the destroyers of the country and they immediately fashion "isms" labels: so it is easier to hide one's own complexes and to frighten persons of narrow interests. But I recall Viktor Chernov's words that were spoken during the opening of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918: "Russian Socialism is international." I will add from myself that there can be no other. Spatial

and civilized thought was always characteristic for the genuinely Russian man and ethical and blood-related disassembling were always alien.

I do not doubt that social and patriotic forces will form an opposition bloc in the near future—a moderate bloc without extremism and hysterics but also without ingratiating itself to the regime. It is this force that can take responsibility for the country. But that opposition must firmly dissociate itself from those people who sow enmity and hate—social or ethnic (they are incompatible with the ideas of a just constitutional system). This is the fate of social-democracy, including my personal fate.

[Koroleva] Do you see an alliance with the Communists as possible?

[Rumyantsev] Today there are several kinds of Communists. The Russian Federation Communist Party, I must admit, is a quite visible party. But the Communists ruled for too long and they clearly have to wait. If the revitalizing Communist Party frees itself of orthodox dogmatism, the portraits of Lenin and Stalin, and utopian distributive slogans, it has a serious chance of attaining success as part of a unified opposition—I stress—a general success. But only under the condition that Zyuganov will not be "co-opted" by the regime like Ryabov and Rybkin have been.

[Koroleva] Can you imagine Gorbachev in the role of leader of the Social-Democrats?

[Rumyantsev] It is impossible to enter the same river twice, however, a broad front of those people who do not intend to reconcile themselves to national shame is important now.

I highly value my friendly relations with Gorbachev. Incidentally, it was to see him—note, for the first time—that I drove on 28 September 1993, after coming out of the besieged White House, and the next day he publicly condemned the coup. He has unexpended potential. I think that he could play a role in strengthening the positions of Russian social-reformism, especially in the foreign policy sphere: Gorbachev is thoroughly outliving the fact that right now his image causes, to put it mildly, a negative reaction among many people. Obviously he needed to act more decisively—for example, arrest the "inspired creators" of the Belovezha agreements right away in Belarus. I think that the text of the Union Agreement which he defended to the end is still interesting.

We must also bear in mind such a major figure as Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. Today native industrialists, entrepreneurs, and financiers are behind him. His positions on the issues of a Union state and a mixed socially oriented economy certainly coincide with mine.

[Koroleva] Who else of the politicians do you consider to be persons holding similar views to yours?

[Rumyantsev] Of the representatives of the middle generation, Aleksandr Rutskey, Vasily Lipitskiy, Valeriy Zorkin, Nikolay Gubenko, and Aleksandr Obolenskiy and, of my contemporaries, Sergey Glazyev, Andrey Golovin, Sergey Baburin, Igor Muravyev, and others are close to me.

[Koroleva] Will the Russian Social-Democratic Alliance strive to become a member of the Socialist International?

[Rumyantsev] The experience of past years indicates: First you need to become strong within the country, become a real, weighty political force, and influence the social processes, and only later think about close cooperation with foreign parties. Of course, we can do self-promotion in the West, but I cannot imagine why we would do that because we do not have anything with which to do that. Everything in good time.

[Koroleva] How do you assess the intentions of Aleksandr Yakovlev and Gavril Popov to create a new social-democratic center?

[Rumyantsev] In my opinion, these people are selling the old half-baked product of the right minority. I remember my conversation with Burbulis at the end of 1991. At that time he said: "We democrats need to have two parties—Liberal and Social-Democratic." Their undertaking is understandable: The two parts of the regime will replace each other, they will rule the country in turn, and everyone else will be left by the wayside. That is obviously what stands behind the statement of the previously mentioned gentlemen. The "democrats" already have one party—the nomenklatura-liberal—the party of the ideologists and puppeteers who established the criminal-nomenklatura system. Right now they are attempting to create a second party in order to play on our society's increasing sobering up from the fruits of "civilized" zeal.

I do not believe in their sincerity. All the more so, you look at who declares himself to be a Social-Democrat—the sadly famous city leaders of our capitals and the pillars of the propaganda machine who were quite happy at the site of the fire...

[Koroleva] Why did you represent the Civic Union electoral association during the last elections?

[Rumyantsev] After the October stress, I rejected the proposal to be nominated based upon my previous territorial district in Moscow and I participated in the election campaign as part of the Civic Union Association because I do not consider its failure to be my personal defeat.

Incidentally, before joining Civic Union there was an attempt to create a social-democratic coalition, but I was incapable of doing that after October: A new bloc would have required superhuman efforts.

Civic Union was for me hope for the embodiment of centrism and social-reformism. But Civic Union won very few votes—due to the gross errors of its leaders, who were afraid to become an openly opposition force. After that, I arrived at several conclusions for myself: It is impossible to be fresh and participate in structures that occupy a vaguely conformist position; you need to learn "to play" on a team of equally large politicians, and you can in no way work for an "uncle."

[Koroleva] You spoke about that at a meeting of opposition leaders in Kaliningrad in the middle of September...

[Rumyantsev] My participation in the Kaliningrad meeting was met with mixed emotions. And to no purpose. I stated there that I represent democratic views in the opposition. And I came out against the premature nomination of a single opposition leader. First of all we need to structure it, create a shadow State Council—a sort of politburo of influential and thinking opposition leaders (each of whom finds understanding and support in various sectors of society) and a shadow government of specialists. Social-Democrats must mandatorily enter these shadow structures. Preparatory work is already being conducted in this direction.

Society must see a cohesive collective alternative to the current "court." The leader will be revealed naturally later—when we need to nominate a candidate for the post of head of state.

Today I see my candidacy for that post, but I want to become convinced that we are not miscalculating, as was done with Yeltsin.

[Koroleva] After Meshkov's election as president of Crimea, you often had contact with him. What kind of relations do you have with him now and how do you assess the situation in Crimea?

[Rumyantsev] In the spring we in our Constitutional Reform Fund prepared a concept for Crimea's state-legal development. Alas, far from everything has been realized. The last time Meshkov called me was on the eve of his decision to dissolve the parliament. I gave him a lot of advice—the exact opposite of what he did later.

The conflict situation in the Crimea has once again pointed out: The principle of the division of power in our country needs the very complex combined joint work of authority and society, otherwise it will remain voluntarism. Low legal and political culture results in the fact that the branches of authority begin to compete, fight for autocracy and unanimous agreement, and resort to games of force. But the price of "revolutionary impulses" is too high.

And this experience is one more weighty argument in favor of Russian social-reformism, which is beginning to come back to life.

Yuriy Skokov Political Career, Possible Prospects Viewed

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[Article by Marina Shakina: "Is Shade-Loving Skokov Emerging Into the Light?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political crisis in Russia presents a new chance to the president's former comrade in arms. However, his own ambitions are not sufficient for success.... "It is by no means an accident that a person, in quite a confident, I would say, concealed form, who has announced his claims to power, not ruling out the highest, has appeared on the political horizon recently. In the country there are influential forces interested in restoration, and these forces rely on people who have fallen or are falling out of the presidential circle." This is how Vyacheslav Kostikov, press secretary to the Russian President, commented on the events of "Black Tuesday."

It is not difficult to discern in this hostile description Yuriy Skokov, former secretary of the Security Council, Boris Yeltsin's former close associate, who was dismissed last spring. Skokov, like former vice-president Rutskoy, refused to sign Yeltsin's edict of 20 March on the establishment of a special administrative order in the country. Skokov's refusal cost him his post. It must be said that until that moment, the president had valued Skokov and did not let go of him. The democrats spent the entire year of 1992 trying to force Skokov out of Yeltsin's entourage. In vain. Yuriy Skokov, general director of a powerful defense enterprise, continued to make a rapid career under the president. The post of secretary of the Security Council became its apex. It can be said that the council is fully the fruit of Skokov's irrepressible energy. He thought it up, drafted a statute, and then headed it. A staggering success, considering that Skokov was little known to the public, primarily because he himself avoided public attention.

First Chance Was Realized

"He does not like to stick out, this is a deliberate policy," one well-known parliament member told me. There are sufficient confirmations of this.

In 1989 Skokov was a candidate for USSR people's deputy. Vitaliy Korotich, editor in chief of OGONEK, who was at the zenith of his fame, was the main favorite in the okrug. People remembered the scandalous case of the preelection okrug meeting, at which Pamyat obstructed Korotich. After voting at this meeting, democratic candidates left the hall as a sign of protest—they were convinced that the results were manipulated.

Democratic organizations in the okrug set up a boycott of the elections. Nevertheless, they were held. Skokov won. "He had taken care of everything. The rayon party committee and the entire state and economic nomenklatura supported him," democratic activists recall.

Incidentally, democrats intended to follow Skokov's activity at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and then in the Supreme Soviet. The thought of rerunning the elections—for example, of organizing Skokov's recall if he did something outrageous—did not leave them. However, Skokov did not give them any trump cards. During the entire time of the congress' existence, he did not speak once on a single matter from the rostrum. He did not stick out. He waited for the moment.

Patriot of His Enterprise

The KVANT intersectoral state association, whose general director Skokov was, had some affiliates in the Baltic States, so that the processes developing there affected him directly. Skokov could not overcome the temptation to look at what was happening there through the prism of his own production interests. In general, he always worried about his association and his business.

How far back does Yeltsin's acquaintance with Skokov go? Some assume that Skokov caught Yeltsin's eye when he was first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Others think that this happened later—in the spring of 1991, when Skokov accompanied Yeltsin on his trip throughout Siberia instead of Ivan Silayev, who could not go there for reasons forgotten today.

According to eyewitnesses' recollections, Skokov displayed frenzied activity on the trip. And Yeltsin remembered this.

From these small details it can be assumed that Skokov is a man who has always believed in his abilities. He built his career, completely in the Soviet manner, on the belief that someone powerful would perceive and value these abilities.

For example, on the eve of elections of USSR people's deputies, Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of perestroika, visited Skokov's association and said some flattering words about the general director, which later were widely publicized by the press.

After some time, reliance on Gorbachev was no longer promising. This was clearly manifested precisely at the end of 1989 and at the beginning of 1990, when the Union began to fall apart. Most likely, exactly at that time Skokov became disillusioned with Gorbachev's capabilities, was annoyed with his spinelessness, and turned his eyes, like many, on Yeltsin.

Skokov is a statesmanlike person....

He Does Not Like To Give Interviews

Belief in himself and even, possibly, in his destiny was always combined in Skokov with contempt for the public and for public opinion. He was prepared to win the sympathies of high dignitaries, on whom something depended, but not of simple voters. Perhaps because he simply did not want to spend time on this. He did not

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give interviews, refused to go to meetings, and did not appear on the television screen.

In April 1992, when Skokov was appointed secretary of the Security Council, I telephoned his reception room. "Yuriy Vladimirovich does not like to give interviews," someone answered me politely and advised me to read NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, where everything was said about the Security Council. However, I was not interested in the council, but personally in its secretary. I insisted: "Where can I get information about him? For example, biographical information?" It was suggested that I call the next day.

The next day the following announcement awaited me: "Yuriy Vladimirovich refused to give biographical information." This was so absurd that I did not restrain myself and quite rudely burst out laughing into the receiver.

I made efforts and obtained information through other channels. To this day, however, I have not figured out what sense it made to conceal his biographical data. Most likely, none. After all, when Skokov was confirmed as secretary of the Security Council at the Supreme Soviet, his brief biography was distributed to deputies. There was nothing secret in it, so that in the specified case the refusal was simply a sign of contempt.

There is also another opinion. Skokov does not present himself to his advantage, and therefore he avoids the press and speeches in public. Secretiveness is his protection. Open appearance in public forces a politician to reveal his most secret qualities, and then it can turn out that the emperor is not quite dressed.

It is not ruled out that behind the unwillingness to appear in public lies a deep lack of confidence in himself, which often is characteristic of people with great ambitions.

A Person Who Knows How To Wait

Yuriy Skokov was born in 1938 in Vladivostok. He received higher education at the Leningrad Electrical Engineering Institute. He is a radio engineer and a technological designer by profession. After graduating from the institute in 1961, he began working at Scientific Research Institute No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Kalinin. In 1963-1966 he did graduate studies at the institute and defended his candidate dissertation. Naturally, the dissertation was closed.

In 1969 Skokov moved to Krasnodar, where he became chief of a sector at the Krasnodar affiliate of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Current Sources. All his subsequent life was connected with this Scientific Research Institute. From 1970 through 1973 he performed the duties of a department chief, and then from 1978 through 1986, the duties of the director of Saturn, the institute's pilot plant. In 1986 Skokov was appointed director of the institute and representative of the board of the KVANT intersectoral state association in

Moscow. From there in 1990 he was transferred to the post of deputy to Ivan Silayev, chairman of Russia's Council of Ministers.

Something can be extracted from the dry lines of his biography. The first lies on the surface. Skokov went through all the stages of the hierarchical ladder of the military-industrial complex. He is a military-industrial general director to the core.

Second: Even from his biography it is clear that this person feels perfectly well in the shade. He calmly endures existence with a vague status—otherwise how could he be an acting director for eight years? He has self-control, does not bustle about, and does not rush at breakneck speed toward his goal.

After the resignation of Ivan Silayev's government in the fall of 1991 Skokov was already in favor, was the president's economic adviser, and could fully expect to become the head of the Cabinet. However.... At that time Yeltsin had another favorite—Gennadiy Burbulis, a radical democrat, the president's fellow townsman. He formed the government of reforms headed by Yeltsin, himself became his first deputy, and brought Gaydar. But a place was not found for Skokov. The democrats always saw in Skokov an alien and demanded from Yeltsin that he be kept a little further away from the government. Since that time the outwardly not bad relations between Skokov and Burbulis began to deteriorate rapidly.

It is surprising that these two figures close to Yeltsin, who were doomed to cooperation, were absolute antipodes. Skokov's and Burbulis' offices in the White House, before the move to Staraya Ploshchad, were located opposite each other. The door to Burbulis' office was hardly closed. People say that he set a record in the number of visitors.

When Skokov came out of the door, leaving the regular democratic get-together in Burbulis' office, an expression of squeamishness appeared on his face for several seconds. It was obvious how sickened he was by the democrats' "laxity" and lack of organization.

Nor did Skokov like the debating style that reigned in the government, and the democrats' inability to work efficiently, quickly, and in a businesslike manner. And their desire to publicize their activity and to be seen on the television screen constantly. Skokov, as before, was devoted to the Soviet style of work—personal connections and prestige with the powerful of this world were important to him.

On the Path to the Security Council

Not having gotten into the government, Skokov began to take advantage of other opportunities, which the status of being close to the president gave him. He did not waste time. By the beginning of the 1992 reform, he headed the Council of Federation and Territorial Affairs

under the president—something not very understandable and obviously designed to find use for Skokov.

At this post, Skokov actively set up relations with regions, gathered information on Russia's supervaluable resources, that is, gold, diamonds, radioactive materials, and nonferrous metals, and, ultimately, made from this council a springboard for the Security Council. People say that Burbulis, calmed by the fact that he had managed to push Skokov somewhat further away, overlooked the latter bypassing him at the turn—he established the Security Council and suddenly became the second man after Yeltsin. At any rate this is what turned out according to the Statute on the Secretariat of the Security Council, which had powers to coordinate the work of executive bodies of power in the absence of the chairman of the Security Council, who Yeltsin is.

According to comments by those who worked with him in various parliamentary committees and commissions, Skokov does not understand the market, although he comes out in favor of reforms. However, by reform he, probably, means ESTABLISHMENT OF ORDER and improvement in executive discipline and in economic management. In this sense he remained an admirer of the previous system.

Who Will Pick up the Receiver of the Automatic Telephone Exchange-2?

Skokov is a typical government official. The statement that the government should be the executive directorate of the state sector of the economy belongs to him.

He is a vivid representative of the authoritarian style of management. To order and to check execution is the only method that he recognizes. He does not understand how relations can be built on interest and initiative.

Judging by everything, he is an advocate of lobby decisions. Skokov is a pedant; he is not one of those that overthrow established rules or scorn an existing tradition. He is sickened by any violation of a generally accepted regulation. He is inclined less than anyone else not only to extravagant, but even to nonstandard, acts, and therefore sometimes he may seem an indecisive man to some. This, in part, can explain his position with respect to Yeltsin's edict of 20 March on a special administrative order.

He does not welcome or adopt any democratic trends in the sphere of business dealings. One of the democratic ministers, who came to the government from science, told me that Skokov reprimanded him for the fact that his secretary, not he himself, had picked up the receiver of the automatic telephone exchange-2. "This is inappropriate," Skokov explained.

I do not know for sure, but it is very likely that, when he himself picks up the telephone receiver, he does not say "hello" or "yes," like most of us, but snaps back in the military manner: "Skokov."

In Yeltsin's entourage he always sought to be responsible for power structures. In August 1991 the president assigned him to communication with the military, the KGB, and the militia. Apparently, he coped successfully with the assignment.

To Govern Russia!

Skokov never had anything to do with security in the strict sense of this word and with the ideology of security. Therefore, specialists right away doubted that he would be able to develop a profound, modern concept of Russia's security—he has neither the experience nor the knowledge nor the mental outlook for this. However, the post of secretary gave Skokov the chance to realize his vision of governing Russia. In the opinion of some people, this was his aim.

He gave clear grounds for such conclusions. In early 1992, the year of reform, Skokov convened a coordinating conference of directors at his association. The next day he sent to the localities a telegram with the proposal to establish local conferences on economic security, the permanent members of which directors, representatives of labor collectives, and heads of administration were to become.

The idea was copied from Soviet instructions for the organization of work under conditions of a state of emergency. However, when everything was revealed, there was a great deal of noise. Skokov is establishing small state emergency committees? Skokov is establishing cells of a directors' opposition party? The democrats did not take their eyes off him.

Skokov, like present secretary Oleg Lobov, did not demonstrate special achievements in the post of secretary of the Security Council. Perhaps because this post, with all its pomposity, is secondary.

However, Skokov managed to increase his prestige with regional and economic elites. He proved to be in tune, like no one else, with the deputy corps of the Supreme Soviet, a significant part of which was made up of the former party and economic nomenklatura. Then fate gave him another blinding chance: During the elections to prime minister at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies in December 1992, Skokov received the largest number of deputy votes. Chernomyrdin was second, and Gaydar, third.

Skokov's fate was in the hands of the president, who had the right to choose any of the three. Yeltsin preferred Chernomyrdin.... It is unlikely that Skokov would ever agree that this was fair. Since that time an obvious breach appeared in his relations with the president.

He Moved Away, but He Did Not Move Toward

It is interesting that, having moved away from Yeltsin, Skokov did not become close to those who openly opposed him at that stage—to Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. He never took the former vice-president seriously.

It can be assumed that Rutskoy's excessive love for verbal outpouring, lack of restraint, and unbridled energy in combination with a lack of competence contributed to this. In Khasbulatov, probably, Skokov discerned a political game of a low flight. Furthermore, Skokov's correctness and nonacceptance of actions violating ORDER applied not only to the president's unexpected actions, but also to the opposition's tricks. He hardly approved an invitation to a drink or the appeal to storm Ostankino. Incidentally, such a line of behavior always remained attractive to a certain part of the political elite and evoked the respect of many people.

Today Skokov is going his way, changing his tune. He has to give up his dislike of publicity. In part. One cannot assert that Skokov, having taken the helm of the Federation of Commodity Producers and having founded his own movement, "Consent for the Sake of Russia," immediately turned into an open personality. As before, it is difficult for a journalist to come close to him.

However, Skokov gives press conferences and makes statements for the press, obviously overcoming his squeamishness. "An independent press does not exist, and with the dependent press it is not worth having dealings"—these are his words. He has hardly changed his opinion.

At this stage of Skokov's fate the fundamental contradiction of his nature—contradiction between his feelings for his great destiny and the desire to go out of the light of soffits into the shade—has simply become aggravated. It is impossible to realize state administrative ambitions without popularity and without a favorable disposition of public opinion toward him. Skokov's ideal—a career in the shadow of a powerful, charismatic personality—has already been disrupted.

All the talk about Skokov's future appointment as deputy prime minister seems idle. He will never forget that, in essence, Chernomyrdin occupies HIS place. And Chernomyrdin will not forget this. Moreover, Kostikov's hint cited at the beginning of the article indicates that there is no road back.

Skokov will not give up the movement toward his goal. However, how to go toward it—this is his main problem. As a leader of a strong party bloc? As a presidential candidate? Both these paths are extremely difficult, burdensome, and uncomfortable. However, to give up faith in himself is inconceivable.

Commission Meets on Nonpayments Problem at Regional Level

954F0283A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
3 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by SEGODNYA correspondent Yelena Kolokoltseva: "Oleg Soskovets Has Examined Nonpayments 'at the Regional Level': Heads of Administration Urge the Government 'To Compel the Regions To Work With the Securities Market'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's session of the operational nonpayments commission was dedicated to establishing a settlement system at the regional level. Opening the session, First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets stated that during the three months of its existence the commission had examined the situation that has developed in a number of sectors and at individual enterprises; now the time has come "to discuss the problem at the regional level."

During the course of the discussion of the experience of Tula and Yaroslavl Oblasts on overcoming the nonpayments crisis, it was ascertained that the representatives of the 26 regions who graced the White House sessions hall with their presence are worried about one and the same problem: chronic budget under-financing, continuous wage payment delays, and an inadequate level of development of standards for "undoing" nonpayments.

However, despite the existing difficulties, the heads of administration practically to a man noted that the "struggle with nonpayments is producing results." So, they managed to conduct R6.9 billion worth of reciprocal credits between local budgets and enterprises in Tula Oblast; they managed to conduct more than R10.6 billion worth of reciprocal credits of the oblast budget, agrarian farms, and petroleum industry and construction enterprises in Yaroslavl Oblast. Besides the traditional networks, the regions have created their own nonpayment commissions and they are attempting to introduce new methods to combat nonpayments with the assistance of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The Yaroslavl Oblast Administration is preparing to float an oblast bond issue—in December they propose floating a R30 billion issue among juridical persons for whom a system of benefits has been provided, including abolishing taxes on income from securities, etc.; and the exchange of promissory notes is in effect in 20 of Russia's regions and nontraditional measures are being utilized—for example, the naturalization of financing obligations (replacement of a monetary tax by products or services equivalent to the same amount), etc.

But then again, the session did not get by without the traditional complaints and persistent appeals for the government "to forcefully compel the regions to work with the securities market." However, Tax Administration head Vladimir Gusev somewhat slackened the ardor of the speakers when he noted that it is impossible to "prescribe" all standards, "and it is not necessary."

Yerin Press Conference on Slight Reduction in Crime

954F0283B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
3 Nov 94 p 7

[Article by SEGODNYA correspondent Artem Vetrov under the rubric "Encounter": "Viktor Yerin: 'I Am Not a Proponent of Self-Assessments'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting between RF MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] head Viktor Yerin and

Moscow newspaper journalists took place on Tuesday evening at the RF MVD. According to tradition (these meetings occur annually before Militia Day), the event was devoted to militia work on the whole during the past year and to the criminal situation in the country.

As Mr. Yerin stated, according to this year's data, a decline of the total number of crimes—by nearly 4%—has been noted for the first time in Russia in recent times. It is a pleasant trend but, in the minister's words, this trend has caused the minister a great deal of anxiety. Our country has rich experience in the "formation" of statistics and the MVD leadership had to painstakingly analyze the situation and verify all of the data. As a result, Mr. Yerin stated that they did not manage to find concealment of crimes or number juggling (if you do not take into account isolated cases) in local administrations. And for the time being there are no grounds to doubt at least the existence of this pleasant trend.

The minister briefly described the main directions of his department's work during the past year. First—the creation of a common front to combat crime. The law enforcement organs in and of themselves, due to the nature of crime, theoretically cannot conquer it. Therefore, the MVD has attempted to join forces with local administrations, public organizations, and other departments. In the minister's words, on the whole they managed to do quite a bit here, thanks to which the situation has begun to straighten itself out. The second direction is improving the legal foundation. New legislation is progressing slowly in this country but that, in the minister's words, is not the main thing. When all is said and done, he thinks that society's needs will prevail over political ambitions and the laws will appear. It is more important that they manage to avoid extremism and prevent the emergence of illegal methods while combating crime. Although this threat is very real in the current situation.

The third, most labor-intensive, direction is improving the system of law enforcement organs itself. Mr. Yerin cited the resolution of cadre and financial problems as one of the main successes in this context. The opportunity to select cadres has appeared in many regions and subdivisions, but not everywhere. Furthermore, the increase of staffs has permitted a reduction of the workload on militia men to a reasonable level. They have managed to create fundamentally new subunits—RUOP's [Regional Administration for Combatting Organized Crime] and SOBR's [expansion unidentified], thanks to which today the militia can render harmless any, even the most dangerous, group. We must point out that right now Western specialists are prepared to adopt our experience—for the release of hostages, the detention of terrorists, etc. Nevertheless, in the minister's words, it is early to talk about correcting the situation. Fear of crime among the population remains very high because people simply do not see militia men—there is not enough density of the guardians of order.

Touching upon rumors of his possible retirement, Mr. Yerin said that he is attempting to ignore them. "I will

carry out my duties," he said, "as long as I occupy this post and as long as they trust me. It is not for me to judge how it turns out for me: I am not a proponent of self-assessments." Mr. Yerin also regards his impending speech in the State Duma calmly. In his words, it is not his duty to inform the deputies, although the minister is also prepared for the fact that they will not "thank" him there. Furthermore, progress on the murder of Deputy Ayzderdzis will obviously also be reported to the Duma. In the minister's words, this crime has already been solved, but one can talk about the details only with the concurrence of the investigators.

Director Views State TV, Radio Company Financial Difficulties

954F0264A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Oct 94 p 5

[Interview with Anatoliy Lyenko, general director, All-Russian State Radio and Television Broadcasting Company, by Antonina Belyayeva; place and date of interview not given: "'I Don't See Any Prospects': Anatoliy Lyenko Doesn't Believe That Yeltsin Watches Television"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Anatoliy Lyenko, general director of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, rarely watches television: When he gets a free minute, he prefers to spend it with a good book. But when he does watch, it's primarily his rivals, because he tries to see programs of the "Rossiya" channel before they are aired. In the past he was a professional economist, and a no less professional KVN [not further identified] member (he only rarely gets a chance to sit on a jury today), and he likes to make programs interesting. Though over the last 25 years of work in television he has also worked on political programs.

[Belyayeva] Does the Russian Television and Radio Company deserve the status of a state company in your opinion?

[Lyenko] Naturally. The All-Russian (and that's precisely what it is!) Television and Radio Broadcasting Company is financed by the budget, and its leadership was appointed by the president.

[Belyayeva] In that case, who is developing the channel's strategy, and upon whom does change in its concept depend?

[Lyenko] We're talking about a large group of people. There are so-called programmers, who submit proposals. There is the overall scheduling framework, consisting of daytime and evening hours. Then the "lines" are filled in—the news programs that make up the schedule's "backbone." This is followed by building in the blocks between the news programs—morning and afternoon programs, and evening and night programs.

After the programmers submit their proposals the board puts out its counterproposals. The ratio of children's, news, sports and art programs and movies is practically the same as in Europe. It's true that we have slightly more sociopolitical programs—after all, we are a more-politicized country, and we have fewer channels. And it's the job of the planners and programmers to determine which programs are going to have the highest ratings. Though ratings aren't what is most important.

[Belyayeva] Then what is?

[Lysenko] Two things. On one hand, ratings should be the dominant criterion because they show whether a given program is interesting to the viewers or not. While I don't want to insult sociologists, I must say that I don't believe in ratings very much, because we don't yet have an efficient system and good quality equipment for determining them. And the viewers are not always right. There are the programs featuring Vitaliy Vulf and Lev Anninskiy. They don't have high ratings, or at least they are significantly below those of the "L-Club." These are programs meeting today's needs. And it's not at all important how many people watch them. They perform a culture-directing role, which many Western television companies have rejected. They have specialized channels intended for the "tadpoles." But we don't have the possibilities for establishing such a channel.

[Belyayeva] Do you have any form of censorship?

[Lysenko] There is no censorship now. Unfortunately. In the sense that there is no control over what is good taste, and there should be control over responsibility. We are living in an all too nervous state, with an all too nervous population. And the influence of television and radio is very great in a time when the circulation of many newspapers is falling catastrophically. There must be control over the facts, over the tone in which facts are presented. "Do no harm...." The harm that a doctor might cause in no way compares with that which may be inflicted by an incautious report, especially from regions of international conflict. I encountered such a thing back when I was working with the "Vzglyad" program. In 1988 a terrible thing happened—a horrendous crush occurred during a hockey match in Sokolniki, in which I believe several people were killed. Nothing. Well, the newspapers did carry an obscure reference—"...there were casualties." We *never had* disasters—they simply never were reported. Therefore now that there is a great deal of information available, there must be censorship in regard to taste and responsibility.

[Belyayeva] What is the approximate percentage of your own programs on the "Rossiya" channel in comparison with bought programs?

[Lysenko] We buy almost a third of the products that are aired. We buy or order some of the programs from independent producers. Programs like "Maski-Shou" from small television companies ("Moskovskiy Stil" for example). "Videointerneshni" does some things for us—

"Be Your Own Director" and "From the Lips of Babes." VID provides the "L-Club." I feel that this is one of the paths of television's development. There must be some kind of structure bringing together children's, sociopolitical and news programs. And the rest must be ordered from independent producers and purchased abroad. Primarily serials, which we don't know how to make, and art films. Strange as it may seem, our films cost more than Western ones.

It is not absolutely necessary for a television company to itself produce its own programs—such a thing doesn't happen in the world. Small producers are more mobile, and they can adjust to change easier than those on the company payroll. In principle, development of television will proceed along the lines of developing and ordering programs from outside. But there should be a program market, there should be competition, there should be two or three organizations offering programs on a permanent basis. And then we and the viewers would make the selections. They say we now have competition: Films are shown in the same time slots on "Ostankino," on NTV, on the "Rossiya" channel. The viewer is free to choose.

[Belyayeva] Is this healthy competition?

[Lysenko] For the moment this is competition, and I would want to believe that it is healthy. All talk about vying for viewers is fiction. We all essentially came from the same company—from Ostankino. What we are vying for among one another is for that certain good film or some major sporting event. For ourselves? No, for the viewer.

[Belyayeva] Do you have any plans for solving your financial problems by, let us say, forming a joint-stock company?

[Lysenko] I think not. I don't believe in converting national companies into joint-stock companies. The outlays turn out to be a little too great, and it is difficult to find the right kind of stockholder.

I'm talking about an open joint-stock company, in which any person could buy stocks. And stocks are bought chiefly for the sake of profit. As for real profit, if it rarely forms at all, a stockholder would get it after 5-7 years—no earlier, and perhaps even later. Though regional stations can already make a profit. But as for the all-Russian television network, which relies upon the network of the Ministry of Communications—a gigantic mastodon, an old network—it can't. The all-Russian television network has to get the signal to every village, to every cottage. We work in 10 time zones, and the programs are repeated five times for the different regions. Consequently I can't believe in any kind of transformation of such a giant machine into a joint-stock company. This isn't Luxembourg, after all. Moreover if we were to establish a joint-stock company, we would have to reject too many programs.

[Belyayeva] Do you have to reject many today?

[Lysenko] We're holding on for the time being. But I'm afraid that our strength is waning. You can't exist normally when financing covers 30-35 percent of your outlays.

[Belyayeva] Where do the other funds come from? From advertising?

[Lysenko] The rest are simply not to be had. We do of course get something from advertising. Everyone says: Oh, you skunks, you take all that advertising money and stuff it in your own pockets. We purchased a mobile television station—that was several million dollars. We are buying spare parts and films, and we are buying equipment. Because what we inherited is obsolete, it's only good for a television museum. Our debts are out of sight. We owe hundreds of billions of rubles to the Ministry of Communications. And no one can handle such a thing.

[Belyayeva] Could a situation arise in which the channel would find itself on the brink of shutting down?

[Lysenko] It's always on the brink of shutting down. The total debt is so great that it could close any day. By the way, this is also happening with "Ostankino"—we are all fed from the same bucket. And the percentage of the budget we get remains the same—it's only we that are "shrinking"—there are now four times fewer of us.

[Belyayeva] And there are no prospects?

[Lysenko] None that I see. We can't introduce pay TV now—that's unrealistic. That is, anything could be introduced by edict. But who is going to collect the money? Two thirds of the population isn't paying for its apartments in our country. By the way, if it becomes pay TV (naturally retired and disabled persons and people living below the poverty line would have to be exempt), this would become truly independent television. That is, it would depend only on the television viewers. But we need on the order of 2-2.5 billion rubles daily. What sort of independence can there be, what stockholders would be willing to invest money and wait several years for a meager return? Only the kind who are interested in using television as a political platform. That's one place money can be found.

[Belyayeva] Have there been such offers?

[Lysenko] We have expensive tastes, and there have been offers.

[Belyayeva] Do you anticipate any kind of changes in connection with the fact that the president has "taken offense" to Russian television?

[Lysenko] No. The president may be offended by us, but we aren't offended by the president. We perceive this as a given. We are faithful chiefly to our own line, and not to the president. The line which Yeltsin himself promoted in his time. And when President Yeltsin begins contradicting Yeltsin's policy, we criticize, and we have the right to do so. Because our job is to be not a mirror

and not even a magnifying glass, but an X-ray machine. Why become irritated at the photographer when you don't like your own X-ray photograph? The president expressed his own point of view. He is an individual, after all. Though I don't believe that he watches television. I have too much respect for the president to believe all of this.

[Belyayeva] Does this mean that you have your ill-wishers?

[Lysenko] So it seems. This was the point of view of those who place their own "opinions" on the president's desk. And these are the most dangerous people. The fact that Russian radio and television has always placed the interests of the country and the interests of the reforms above everything else has been demonstrated twice. In August 1991 and in October 1993. Even when we were absolutely defenseless. Many don't like it that we don't want to be a club in the hands of politicians wanting to smash each other up.

[Belyayeva] Nonetheless, your channel appears the most politicized of all.

[Lysenko] It was created that way. Though if you take a closer look, the quantity of openly political programs is gradually decreasing. The number of economic programs is increasing. Unfortunately I don't like them any more than political ones, with rare exceptions. Though television can now help people to understand the complex economic situation.

[Belyayeva] Aren't you afraid for your future?

[Lysenko] I have a year and a half to retirement.

[Belyayeva] What about the channel's future?

[Lysenko] I'm afraid, of course. After all, the principles on which the channel of was founded haven't been followed. Perhaps they were in the very beginning. At that time, it was an opposition channel, a nonparty channel. I'm afraid of excessive politicization. I'm afraid of the impossibility of experimentation and risk. I'm afraid that the day will begin and end with the word "money."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Congress of Polar, Far North Cities' Union Detailed

954F02744 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
2 Nov 94 p 6

[Article by Valentina Kulakova "The North: Russian Outpost Struggles for Survival"—Congress of the Union of Polar and Far North Cities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Cities was founded in April 1992. It now brings together 35 cities. They include Murmansk, Magadan, Vorkuta, Norilsk, and other major cities of the Russian North, as well as other

cities that are less well known but that exist in the same conditions and have the same problems, among them Koryazhma, Lesosibirsk, and Akha-na-Sakhaline. The cities formed a union in order to work together to solve the problems of stabilizing the Northern economy and environment and the social situation of northerners and to preserve the unique cultures of the indigenous peoples.

The union held its eighth congress a few days ago. It examined issues of extreme importance to inhabitants of the polar region and the Far North: financing, credits, taxation, the resettlement of northerners, and the shipment of foods, fuel, and other essentials for the winter.

As the president of the Union of Cities, Igor Shpektor, a deputy to the Republic of Komi Supreme Soviet, reported, the Far North's need for state support amid the transition to a market economy has become greater than ever before. The gap between the levels of actual support of residents of the North and of the middle latitudes of the country has sharply increased. While family budget shortfalls in the middle latitudes are covered by means of private plots and the ability to lay up homemade preserves, the northerners have no such capability. Most importantly, people go the Far North not in order to live there, but to earn a living. In other words, to earn enough money for an apartment or house, a car or a dacha. It is at present still possible to exist in the North while systematically undermining one's health and shortening one's lifespan, but it is impossible to earn money for a normal life. For this reason, the existing level of northern guarantees and compensation payments cannot stop the migration process, as a result of which experienced and highly skilled personnel are leaving the North, and it is impossible to draw new personnel to the region.

Meanwhile, the problem of those who have completed their employment stints remains. They cannot move to the places where they would like to live. The savings they earned in the North are being eaten up by inflation. Northern cities are unable in the current conditions to provide a normal life for their residents. Housing construction has been suspended, and unfinished construction projects in permafrost conditions are destroyed in just one year. The high cost of fuel and electricity make it impossible to support the functioning of social infrastructure: Kindergartens, laundries, and bathhouses are closing. The lack of sanitation threatens the cities and settlements with epidemics.

The presidential edict on resettlement is not being carried out—for there is no money or means to compensate people for the cost of housing they leave behind. The preferential loans that the edict establishes are not available, only loans on the standard terms. Cooperative construction has essentially come to a complete halt. The cities are aging. While the average age of residents used to be 28 to 30, today the death rate exceeds the birth rate.

The Union of Northern Cities Joint Venture, which was founded in December 1993, is trying to help northerners

solve the problem of resettling to regions with more favorable climatic and socioeconomic conditions. Under share contracts, 576 apartments have been purchased in Russian cities in the middle latitudes. Contracts with 18 cities in Central Russia have been concluded. But the venture has run into the problem of "freelancing" on the part of local officials. For example, the administration of the city of Voronezh adopted a decision to impose additional taxes and is doing everything it can to impede the issuance of residency permits to former workers from the northern territories. The Union of Cities has had to file suit with the Russian Federation Constitutional Court in connection with such violations.

The well-known polar resident and deputy to the State Duma Artur Chilingarov, who spoke at the congress, recounted the critical situation that has arisen this year with respect to shipping food products and fuel to remote regions of the Far North and the de facto breakdown in the supply of such goods. The previous administrative system, for all its shortcomings, nonetheless succeeded in bringing in supplies on schedule, and the northerners were able to obtain everything they needed during the navigation season. The transition to a market economy has been disastrous: The old system has been destroyed, but no new one has been created. Credits are being received late, and the shipping lines are demanding prepayment, for which there is no money. Most importantly, there is no single authority in charge of solving these problems. Not long ago, for better or for worse, the problem of bringing in supplies was handled by the State Committee for the North. With its inclusion in the Ministry for Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy, the functions of "manager of Northern affairs" have been diluted among the multitude of problems that the ministry deals with.

Mr. Chilingarov sees the solution in the creation of a new structure with ministerial powers that would deal solely with matters relating to the North and would merge the organizational elements of the previous administrative system and the current market system. (Merchants have penetrated the Northern territories in a haphazard fashion, but they sell exotic fruits and sweets, for the most part; however, no one is bringing in potatoes and cabbage.) In order to provide residents of remote areas with all essentials this year, a state of emergency had to be imposed in the North. At the initiative of Sergey Shakhrai, the government adopted a special decree on this matter that extends the navigation period. But since, despite the decree, winter has already come to the North, the supply ships are now being escorted by icebreakers, and part of the cargo is being brought in by airplane and helicopter. Needless to say, this increases shipping costs by several times.

A strange situation exists with respect to financial support for the Russian Supreme Soviet's law "On State Guarantees and Compensation Payments for Persons Working and Residing in Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Localities." The services of the Ministry of

Finance and the Duma expert group on a uniform methodology calculated and evaluated the "cost" of the law independent of each other. The Ministry of Finance came up with a figure of R78.49 trillion, while the State Duma ended up with a figure of R4.29 trillion. This resulted from their different interpretations of the same articles of the law. The Union of Northern Cities has asked the prime minister to bring members of the two groups together to formulate a uniform approach and uniform interpretation of the law's expenditure clauses. This work will make it possible, first, to obtain a realistic figure, and second, to clarify the wording of articles that currently permit different interpretations.

The Union of Cities also offered proposals regarding the draft of the president's Program for Stabilizing the Standard of Living of the Population of the Russian Federation. The draft does not mention the North altogether. In the opinion of the congress's participants, the authors have no understanding of the essential problems facing the North, their universal character, and the potential consequences of ignoring these problems. The Union of Cities is prepared to help the authors incorporate ways of solving the problems facing the Far North and equivalent regions in the program.

The congress of the Union of Polar and Far North Cities adopted the text of an appeal to the Russian president. In it the northerners call attention to the vital problems facing the region, which accounts for one-third of the Federation's territory and produces more than 50 percent of its national income—the problems of a North that Boris Yeltsin himself once called an "outpost of Russia."

It was 27 degrees below zero in Vorkuta yesterday, with northerly winds.

Financial Ills Prevent Ecological Progress

954F0311A Novosibirsk VECHErNIY NOVOSIBIRSK
in Russian 9 Nov 94 p 3

[Remarks by N.M. Denisov, director of the Siberian Ecology and Use of Natural Resources Design and Research Center, recorded by an unidentified VECHErNIY NOVOSIBIRSK correspondent: "From Katun to Kamchatka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ecology is a popular conversation topic these days. As it was five and 10 years ago, for that matter. But as soon as practical issues are brought up, the number of those willing to help drops dramatically. And how are things now, considering that difficulties with financing prevent doing something in areas even more "important" than ecology?

Our correspondent discussed this with N.M. Denisov, the director of an organization directly related to ecology—the Siberian Ecology and Use of Natural Resources Design and Research Center.

"Our center," said Nikolay Martimyanovich, "is engaged in various work involving natural protected lands, national parks, game preserves, hunting reserves, and so on.

"Our most interesting project this year is the Katun State Preserve in Altay. It was established only three years ago, but at the time many things were not completed. For instance, only a fragmentary survey of the territory was done. Also, those who set it up chose the path of least resistance in the matter of land appropriation. A preserve must include territories that are both unique and at the same time typical for a given natural zone. Organizations that are land users, however, are mostly willing to give up the areas they do not need. The result was that the lands that were assigned to the preserve are not those that should have been logically included. We are currently working on the territory's optimization, developing a plan for the preserve's development, and defining its scientific profile.

"We have only a small part of work to finish. But this particular project also experiences the greatest financial difficulties. It has come to the point that there is no money to pay to Holeslav Fedorov's team working on the preserve, and people are now on leave without pay.

"At other projects, the situation is somewhat better, but not without difficulties either. For instance, Yuriy Kuchkin's team has finished field work and finalized allotment of territories for a comprehensive zoological game preserve in Aldan Rayon in Yakutia. All that is left to do is implement the design of the game preserve structure, but at this point they, too, encountered the common problems of financing.

"Our largest project is restructuring the hunting reserves system in Kamchatka. This was quite an undertaking for Stanislav Shibanov's team: The territory they are working with comprises more than 15 million hectares. The substance of the project is to redistribute large hunting preserves, which in the past were assigned to hunting enterprises, to new users: private companies, individual persons, and aborigine clans. That is, divide hunting reserves into smaller segments, map each of them, and issue a passport for it, on the basis of which the new owners will be accountable for the effectiveness of their work.

"Thus, despite the current difficulties and with varying degrees of success, we nevertheless still manage to find both the projects and sources of financing for our work, the purpose of which is to improve the ecological situation and to optimize the use of natural resources."

Statute on Local Self-Government Elections

954F0284A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR
in Russian 2 Nov 94 pp 1, 2

["Statute: On Elections to Representative Organs of Local Self-Government of Novosibirsk Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] (Approved by decision No. 2 of the Minor Soviet of the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, 26 January 1994, with amendments and additions introduced by decision of the Sixth Session of the oblast soviet of deputies, 25 October 1993).

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1. MAIN ELECTION PRINCIPLES

1. Elections to the representative organs of local self-government in Novosibirsk Oblast are conducted by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of universal, equal, and direct right to vote by secret ballot for a term of two years.
2. Elections to the representative organs of local self-government are conducted based on a majority system for single-seat districts (one district—one deputy) and a single representational norm for a given organ of local self-government. The structure of organs of local self-government is established in accordance with the Statute "On the Organizational Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation for the Period of Phased Constitutional Reform" approved by Edict No. 1760 of the Russian Federation President dated 26 October 1993.

ARTICLE 2. RIGHT TO VOTE

1. The right to vote in elections to the representative organs of local self-government belongs to citizens of the Russian Federation who hold permanent residence in Novosibirsk Oblast and who have reached the age of 18 as of election day.
2. In order to be eligible for election as deputy an individual must hold permanent residence in the given population center, be a Russian Federation citizen, be at least 18 years of age on election day, and have the right to vote.
3. Citizens pronounced incapable of voting by a court and citizens held in confinement under a court sentence which has legally entered into force may not vote and may not be elected.

ARTICLE 3. DATE OF ELECTION

The date of elections to representative organs of local self-government is determined by the oblast representative organ.

ARTICLE 4. THE RIGHT TO NOMINATE CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTY

1. Candidates for deputy (henceforth—candidates) are nominated by electoral associations and by groups of voters.
2. The following electoral associations have the right to nominate candidates:

local branches of federal-wide parties, movements, and other public associations whose charters are registered by the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice and envisage participation in elections;

local branches of regional parties and movements whose charters are registered by the oblast administration justice directorate and envisage participation in elections;

regional branches of blocs of parties and public associations established for the election period, that are subject to registration with a city electoral commission.

3. Local branches of parties, movements, and public associations may not belong to more than one electoral association. In the event they are part of a bloc, they may not function as an independent electoral association.

No fewer than 30 citizens may comprise a group of voters acting to initiate the nomination of candidates. These citizens must permanently reside in the territory in which elections to the representative organ of authority are being held.

A group of voters acting to initiate such a nomination draws up a resolution on participation in the election campaign, indicating the last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, place of residence, passport number and series, and the personal signature of each member of the group.

The above-mentioned resolution is submitted to the city electoral commission and constitutes the basis for the group's registration.

ARTICLE 5. ELECTION FINANCING

1. Measures related to the organization and conduct of elections to representative organs of local self-government are financed from funds of the oblast budget and budgets of the appropriate territories.
2. Candidates and electoral associations have the right to use their own funds and voluntary monetary contributions in financing their election campaign.

ARTICLE 6. CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS BY ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. Responsibility for the organization of elections to representative organs of local self-government is entrusted to the electoral commissions. In deciding all matters related to the preparation for and conduct of elections, electoral commissions are independent,

within the framework of their jurisdiction, from state organs and from public and other organs and organizations.

2. Electoral commissions function collegially. They engage publicly and openly in preparation for and conduct of the elections.

ARTICLE 7. LEGAL BASES FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS

Elections to the representative organs of local self-government are organized and conducted on the basis of Russian Federation legislation currently in effect, insofar as this does not contradict presidential edicts on the conduct of phased constitutional reform, as well as on the basis of this statute.

CHAPTER II. ELECTORAL DISTRICTS. ELECTORAL PRECINCTS. VOTER LISTS.

ARTICLE 8. FORMATION OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

1. Electoral districts in cities, villages, and settlements are established by the appropriate electoral commissions. Boundaries of the electoral districts are confirmed by the city, settlement, and rural electoral commissions upon recommendation of the appropriate head of administration, no later than 48 days prior to the scheduled date of elections, and are published in the local press not later than five days following their determination.
2. In their aggregate, electoral districts must encompass the entirety of the territory of the administrative-territorial entity in question. Military servicemen vote at general election precincts.
3. Electoral districts are established so as to contain equal numbers of voters, reciprocal deviations of up to 15 percent being permitted. For the repeat elections 4 December 1994, the city electoral commission may, in exceptional instances taking into account local conditions and attempting to superimpose the boundaries of election districts and administrative entities, adopt a decision permitting great deviations from the average number of voters in the district.

ARTICLE 9. FORMATION OF ELECTION PRECINCTS

1. Election precincts are formed not later than 45 days prior to the election by decision of the appropriate administration heads (in a city divided into rayons—by the rayon administration heads), based on the formula of one precinct per 100-3,000 voters.

In low-population localities, it is permitted to form election precincts on the basis of 20 voters.

2. Election precincts are formed taking population center boundaries into account, for voter convenience. Election precinct boundaries must not cut across electoral district boundaries.

3. A list of election precincts, indicating the addresses of precinct electoral commissions, is published by the head of the appropriate administration within five days of adoption of the decision on formation of the election precincts.

ARTICLE 10. VOTER LISTS

1. The local administration (in a city divided into rayons—the rayon administration heads) maintains the register of voters and provides information to precinct electoral commissions concerning the voters permanently residing in the precinct.

Voter lists are compiled by the precinct electoral commission and are signed by the commission chairman and secretary.

2. The updating of voter lists must be completed not later than 20 days prior to election day. Voters moving into an election precinct after this time frame and prior to election day are included by the precinct electoral commission in a supplemental voter list on the basis of documents confirming place of residence.
3. The voter list is compiled in alphabetical or other (by street, building) order. The list indicates last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, and address of the voter.
4. The voter list includes the name of every Russian Federation citizen who meets the requirements of Article 2 of this statute as of election day and who holds permanent residence in the territory of the appropriate election precinct.
5. The voter list of military servicemen assigned to units in a given territory is compiled separately on the basis of data submitted by the military command. Family members of these servicemen are included in the regular voter lists compiled by place of residence.
6. The voter list includes the names of Russian Federation citizens, by temporary settlement location, who hold status as forced resettlers, with confirmation of such status by the appropriate administration.

CHAPTER III. ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

ARTICLE 11. TYPES OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. The following types of electoral commissions are formed for the organization and conduct of elections in cities, villages, and settlements:

in cities with oblast and rayon status—city electoral commission;

in villages and settlements—corresponding territorial electoral commissions;

in the electoral district—the district electoral commission;

in the election precinct—the precinct electoral commission.

2. Proceeding from local conditions in instances where the territory of the electoral district coincides with that of the election precinct, the authority of district and precinct commissions is exercised by one of them.

ARTICLE 12. PROCEDURE FOR THE FORMATION OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. City, rural, and settlement electoral commissions are formed by the heads of the appropriate administrations, and consist of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and 10-15 commission members. They are formed not later than 50 days prior to the date of the election.
2. District electoral commissions are formed by the head of the appropriate administration (in a city divided into rayons—by the appropriate rayon administration head) in each electoral district not later than 45 days prior to conduct of the election, and consist of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and five to 10 commission members.
3. Precinct electoral commissions are formed by the head of the appropriate administration (in a city divided into rayons—by the rayon administration head) in each electoral district not later than 40 days prior to conduct of the election, and consist of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and five to 10 commission members.
4. An electoral association, group of voters, and candidate for election to a representative organ have the right to have their own representative in the appropriate electoral commission, with the right of consultative vote. In this regard, they inform the commission in writing not later than 20 days prior to the start of the election.

ARTICLE 13. AUTHORITY OF CITY, RURAL, AND SETTLEMENT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. City, rural, and settlement electoral commissions:
 - a) supervise the organization of elections to the representative organ of local self-government for their territories;
 - b) form electoral districts;
 - c) direct the work of district and precinct electoral commissions;
 - d) examine declarations and complaints with respect to the decisions and actions of district and precinct electoral commissions, and make decisions in this regard;
 - e) may independently fulfill the functions of district electoral commissions;

- f) ensure the observance of equal legal conditions with respect to the preelection activity of all candidates;
- g) dispose of monetary and material assets allocated for the conduct of an election, and afford this right to district commissions;
- h) ascertain the voting results for the applicable territory, publish this information in the local press and disseminate it to the populace through other means;
- i) monitor the provision of premises, transportation, and communications by precinct commissions, and examine other questions of material-technical support for the election;
- j) issue instructions and directives on matters concerning organization of the election according to procedure as stipulated by this statute, and ensure its uniform implementation;
- k) monitor the legality of conduct of the election, establish the form of election ballots and other election documentation, and establish procedure for their safekeeping;
- l) exercise other authority as envisaged by this statute and other legal enactments of the Russian Federation.

ARTICLE 14. AUTHORITY OF DISTRICT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. District electoral commissions:
 - a) supervise implementation of this statute in the territory of their electoral districts, and dispose of monetary and material assets allocated to them;
 - b) direct the work of precinct electoral commissions, examine declarations and complaints with respect to decisions and actions taken by these commissions, and make decisions in this regard;
 - c) register candidates and their proxies, issue them identification as prescribed;
 - d) ascertain election results for the district and submit these results to the appropriate city electoral commission;
 - e) approve the text of the voting ballot, ensure that ballots are prepared and supplied to the precinct commissions;
 - f) exercise other authority in accordance with this statute and legislative enactments of the Russian Federation.
2. District electoral commissions function until expiration of the term of authority of the city electoral commission.

ARTICLE 15. AUTHORITY OF PRECINCT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS**1 Precinct electoral commissions:**

- a) organize the verification and supplementation of voter lists for the precinct;
 - b) acquaint voters with the voter lists, receive and examine statements on errors and inaccuracies in the voter lists, and resolve matters dealing with the insertion of appropriate changes to them;
 - c) inform the populace as to the date of the election and polling station location;
 - d) ensure preparation of the voting premises, ballot boxes, and other election equipment;
 - e) organize the voting at their election precinct on election day;
 - f) tally the vote and determine the results of voting in the precinct;
 - g) examination declarations and complaints dealing with preparation for the election and organization of the voting, and make decisions in this regard;
 - h) exercise other authority as envisaged by this statute and other legislative enactments of the Russian Federation.
2. The authority of the precinct electoral commission is terminated simultaneously with cessation of the term of authority of district electoral commissions.

ARTICLE 16. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. A session of the electoral commission is considered competent if at least two-thirds of commission members with the right of deciding vote are present, as well as the commission chairman or his deputy.
2. Decisions of the electoral commission are adopted by a majority vote of commission members present at the session.
3. Sessions of the electoral commission are convened and conducted by the commission chairman. Sessions are also conducted upon demand of at least one-third of the commission members.
4. Observers and representatives of the local press and other mass media may attend sessions of the electoral commission.
5. Upon decision of the appropriate electoral commission, the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and specific members of city, district, and precinct electoral commissions may work in the commission on a permanent basis or under condition of temporary absence from their main occupation.

Pay for this work is provided within the limits of budget appropriations allocated for upkeep of the appropriate commission.

6. Decisions and minutes of electoral commission sessions are signed by the commission chairman and its secretary, or by persons acting in their name. Appendices to decisions are signed by the commission secretary.

ARTICLE 17. APPEAL OF THE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

1. Decisions and actions of an electoral commission effected in violation of Russian Federation laws or of this statute may be appealed to the electoral commission or to a court in accordance with procedure established by law.
2. Electoral commissions are obliged to provide an in-substance response to a complaint within seven days, and on election day—immediately.

CHAPTER IV. NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES**ARTICLE 18. PROCEDURE FOR THE NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES**

1. An electoral association or group of voters has the right to nominate no more than one candidate in each district.

Nomination of candidates begins as of the time election district boundaries are published.

2. In order for a candidate to be nominated, the signatures of at least 1 percent of the total number of voters residing in the territory of the district in question must be collected in his support.

Collection of signatures in support of a candidate begins following his nomination by the electoral association or group of voters.

3. In placing his signature on a signature list, a voter indicates his last name, first name, patronymic, city of birth, address, series and number of passport or substituting personal identification. The signature list is also signed by the individual collecting the signatures, indicating his last name, first name, patronymic, address, series and number of passport or substituting personal identification. This list is signed as well by the individual whose nomination is being supported by the signatures collected.
4. A candidate may run for only one representative organ of local self-government or organ of state authority.
5. Persons initiating the nomination of a candidate or the candidate himself submit for registration the nomination document, signature lists, and candidate's declaration on submission of his candidacy

for office in the given electoral district to the appropriate district electoral commission, not later than 27 days prior to election day. In instances where a candidate is nominated by an electoral association, copies of the association's charter and registration documents are submitted to the district commission for its perusal. The district electoral commission verifies conformance of a candidate's nomination to the requirements prescribed by this statute, registers the candidate within five days of submission of the signature lists, ensures that information about him is published, and issues him registration identification, or rejects his registration.

6. Registration of a candidate for deputy is completed 22 days prior to the date of the election.
7. A decision to register a candidate for deputy is made when documents nominating the candidate in an electoral district, the candidate's declaration on candidacy in the district, and signature lists are present. In the event it is discovered that 3 percent or more of the number of signatures collected are invalid, the district electoral commission denies the candidate's registration.
8. The district electoral commission draws up documentation on the registration of candidates for deputy, which is submitted, together with candidate declarations on consent to run in a given district, to the city, rural, and settlement commissions.
9. All candidates for deputy nominated in compliance with this statute must be registered in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Rejection of a candidate's registration may be appealed within three days to the city, rural, and settlement electoral commissions.
10. Candidates for deputy and their proxies may not be members of any electoral commission.
11. The district electoral commission publishes in the press, within four days of registration of a candidate for deputy, information on the candidate's registration, indicating the last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, occupation, and work place of each.
12. The district electoral commission issues identification to each registered candidate for deputy.

ARTICLE 19. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CANDIDATES

1. An employer is obliged to afford a candidate, at his request, unpaid leave as of the time of his registration and continuing until publication of the election results.
2. A candidate for deputy may run in only one electoral district.

3. A candidate may have up to five proxies, registered with the same electoral commission that registered the candidate. Proxies receive identification from the district electoral commission and conduct activity contributing towards the election of their candidate.
4. A candidate has the right to withdraw his candidacy at any time prior to election day. If this takes place in the absence of compelling circumstances (illness, etc.), the electoral commission charges the candidate's account for the applicable portion of expenses incurred.
5. An electoral association or group of voters may, upon decision of the organ so authorized, recall the submission of any candidate it has nominated at any time prior to election day, and submit a new candidacy for registration to the district electoral commission.

If this takes place in the absence of compelling circumstances (illness, etc.), the electoral commission charges the account of the applicable electoral association or group of voters for the appropriate portion of expenses incurred, including expenses on preelection campaigning.

CHAPTER V. PREELECTION CAMPAIGNING

ARTICLE 20. RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN PREELECTION CAMPAIGNING

1. Citizens of the Russian Federation and public associations have the right to conduct unimpeded campaigning "for" or "against" candidates.
2. The participation of state organs and organs of local self-government in preelection campaigning is prohibited.
3. The dissemination of anonymous or false materials is prohibited.

ARTICLE 21. PROCEDURE FOR THE CONDUCT OF PREELECTION EVENTS

1. State organs and organs of local self-government are obliged to render assistance to candidates and electoral associations in the organization and conduct of preelection encounters and meetings of candidates and their proxies with the voters.
2. Preelection demonstrations are organized and conducted in accordance with procedure established by existing legislation.
3. Campaigning in the premises of election precincts is prohibited.
4. The proprietors of premises comprising state and municipal property are obliged, upon the demand of electoral commissions, to afford these premises for use by candidates and their proxies for meetings with the voters. Electoral commissions are obliged to provide equal opportunities to all candidates in this regard.

5. All candidates have equal rights with respect to presentations in the local press and other mass media.
6. Candidates and electoral associations have the right to effect unimpeded distribution of posters, pamphlets, and other campaign materials.
7. Preelection programs, election campaign materials, and presentations must not contain appeals for violent overthrow of the constitutional regime or violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, nor can they incite social, racial, ethnic, or religious discord.
8. An election campaign is conducted effective the date of registration of a candidate and is terminated on election day. All campaigning is prohibited on election day.

ARTICLE 22. THE FINANCING OF PREELECTION CAMPAIGNING

1. Candidates have the right to establish election funds in order to finance their election campaigns. These funds may consist of the following:
 - a) a candidate's own assets;
 - b) funds allocated to a candidate by the electoral association nominating him;
 - c) voluntary monetary contributions of physical and juridical persons;
 - d) budgetary funds released to candidates for the conduct of preelection campaign measures.
2. The amount of money an individual physical person contributes to a candidate's fund may not exceed 10 times the amount of the minimum wage, and to the fund of an electoral association—15 times the minimum wage amount. The amount of money an individual juridical person so contributes may not exceed 100 and 10,000 times, respectively.
3. The right to manage election fund assets belongs exclusively to the candidates who have established these funds.
4. All monetary assets deposited in the election fund of a candidate for deputy are transferred to a special bank account opened by the district electoral commission following registration of the candidate for deputy.
5. The accounting procedure for expenditure of monetary assets of an election fund is established by the oblast organs of state authority.
6. Contributions from foreign states, organizations, and citizens, Russian juridical persons with foreign participation, international organizations, and international public associations are prohibited.
7. Funds allocated out of the oblast budget for the organization and conduct of elections are made available for use by city, rural, and settlement electoral commissions, and are distributed among district electoral commissions.

8. District and precinct electoral commissions submit a report to city, rural, and settlement electoral commissions on the expenditure of funds they have been allocated, not later than 20 days following the date of official publication of the election results.
9. City, rural, and settlement electoral commissions submit a report to the elected representative organ on their expenditure of funds not later than two months following the official publication of election results. This report must be published in the mass media not later than one month from the date of report submission to this organ.
10. Candidates for deputy who have established election funds in accordance with Point 1 of this article are obliged to submit to the district electoral commission, within 30 days of determination of the election results in the district, a financial report on the use of assets in these funds. This report must be provided to the mass media at the same time that it is presented to the representative organ, not later than two months following official publication of the election results.
11. Unspent monetary assets of an election fund are sent to the oblast budget in an amount proportional to the amount of monetary assets that were allocated by the district electoral commission to the candidate.

CHAPTER VI. VOTING AND DETERMINATION OF ELECTION RESULTS

ARTICLE 23. VOTING PREMISES

1. The head of the appropriate administration provides voting premises for the use of precinct electoral commissions.
2. Voting premises must contain an auditorium outfitted with booths for casting secret ballots, or rooms that would be suitable for casting secret ballots. Entry into the booths or rooms for secret balloting, exit from them, and the path from them to the ballot boxes must be within the field of vision of the precinct electoral commission and observers.

ARTICLE 24. ELECTION BALLOTS

1. In elections to organs of local self-government, each voter obtains one election ballot.
2. The election ballot contains the names of all registered candidates in alphabetical order, indicating last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, occupation, work place, place of residence, and designation of the electoral association nominating the candidate.
3. In the event the names of certain candidates are removed from consideration prior to election day but after preparation of the election ballots, district or precinct electoral commissions delete the information concerning these candidates from the election ballots or draw up new election ballots, upon instructions of the city electoral commission.

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ARTICLE 25. VOTING PROCEDURE

1. Voting takes place on election day from 0800 to 2200 local time. Taking local conditions into account, city, rural, and settlement electoral commissions may change the time of the voting.
2. A voter who leaves his place of permanent residence within 15 days of election day and will not be there on election day may vote ahead of time, completing his election ballot at the premises of the district (four to 15 days prior to election day) or precinct (one to three days prior) electoral commission in such a manner as to preclude any violation of secret balloting procedure. If a voter casts his ballot in the premises of the district electoral commission, the seal of this district electoral commission is placed on the reverse of the election ballots issued to this voter. The voter places his completed ballots into an envelope, which is then sealed and turned over to the district or precinct electoral commission member on duty. The seal of the applicable district or precinct electoral commission, or signature of two members of the precinct electoral commission, is affixed to that area of the envelope where it is sealed. District electoral commissions deliver lists of voters who have so cast their ballots and the envelopes containing these ballots to the appropriate precinct electoral commission simultaneously with delivery of the package of election ballots. The precinct electoral commission makes an annotation on its list with respect to voters who have cast their ballots in this manner.
3. At 0800 on election day, the chairman of each precinct electoral commission announces the start of the voting and presents empty ballot boxes to the commission members, voters in attendance, and observers. The ballot boxes are subsequently sealed. The chairman of the precinct electoral commission then opens the envelopes containing ballots completed by voters temporarily absent from the area, and drops these ballots into the ballot boxes. Following this, he invites the voters present to obtain their election ballots. The number of envelopes is announced and entered into the report of the precinct electoral commission.
4. Upon obtaining election ballots, on consent of the voter or at his request, the series and number of the passport or substituting identification document presented may be entered on the voter list either by a member of the precinct electoral commission or by another individual. The voter verifies the correctness of this entry and signs to this effect.

If it is not possible for a voter to sign independently, he has the right to enlist the assistance of another person, but in this case it must be a person who is not a member of the precinct electoral commission. The last name of this person must be indicated on the voter list in the column "voter signature for receipt of ballots."

5. Election ballots are completed in the special booth or room, where absolutely no one except the person casting his ballot is permitted. A voter who is unable to independently complete his ballot has the right to invite some other person into the booth or room for secret balloting. This can be any person except a member of the electoral commission or observer.
6. On the election ballots for the election in a single-seat electoral district, the voter places an X or other symbol in the empty square opposite the last name of the candidate for whom he is voting, or places such a mark in the square opposite the line "Against all candidates."
7. Leaving the booth or room for secret balloting, the voter drops his completed ballots into a ballot box. Ballot boxes must be located within the field of vision of precinct electoral commission members and observers.
8. The chairman of the precinct electoral commission monitors the procedure being followed in the voting premises. His instructions must be obeyed by all present. In the event the chairman is absent, the deputy commission chairman takes his place, and in the latter's absence—the secretary or other commission member so authorized. In those instances where citizens who have the right to participate in the voting are unable to come to the precinct to cast their ballots for state of health or other valid reasons, upon written or oral declaration of these individuals, the precinct electoral commission sets up the voting procedure at their location in the presence of observers, if the latter are present at the voting precinct. A special portable ballot box is used in this regard. The number of portable ballot boxes at an election precinct is determined by decision of the district electoral commission. An oral declaration must be confirmed by the voter in written form when the precinct electoral commission members arrive at his location. When members of the precinct electoral commission are engaged in such an effort, they sign for and receive a number of election ballots corresponding to the number of written or oral declarations. The last names of voters casting their ballots at home are entered on a separate supplemental listing, where the voter signs for receipt of his ballot, and the commission member—for having issued it.

ARTICLE 26. TALLYING THE VOTE AT THE ELECTION PRECINCT

1. Upon expiration of the time allotted, the chairman of the precinct electoral commission announces the voting terminated. Following this, only persons already located in the voting premises may obtain and cast election ballots.
2. Prior to the start of the vote tally, the chairman of the precinct electoral commission, in the presence of the entire commission and observers located in the voting

premises, cancels the unused election ballots and announces their number as entered in the report. Following this, he verifies that seals or stamps on the ballot boxes are intact and then opens them. All ballots taken out of the ballot boxes are distributed by electoral district. The tallying of the vote at the election precinct must take place without interruption until results of the voting are obtained. All members of the precinct commission and observers must be notified as to the voting results.

3. First of all, the invalid ballots for each electoral district are separated. Ballots are considered invalid if they are not officially drawn up, if they do not show the seal of the district or precinct electoral commission or signature of two electoral commission members, or if it is impossible to ascertain from them the will of the voter, in particular—those where an X or other symbol (symbols) have been placed in more than one box or not placed in any box.
4. The precinct electoral commission draws up a report on the voting results for each electoral district, with respect to which voting was conducted in the given precinct. This report indicates:
 - a) the total number of voters registered in the election precinct;
 - b) the number of canceled, unused ballots;
 - c) the number of election ballots issued on election day and number left by voters who previously cast ballots;
 - d) the number of election ballots found in the ballot boxes;
 - e) the number of invalid election ballots;
 - f) the number of election ballots declared valid;
 - g) the last names and initials of candidates entered on the election ballot;
 - h) the number of valid votes cast for each candidate;
 - i) the number of votes cast against all candidates;
 - j) complaints and declarations received by the commission on voting procedure and the decisions made in this regard.
5. The report is drawn up in two copies and signed by all commission members. A commission member who does not agree with the report overall or with a specific provision of it has the right to attach a special opinion to the report.
6. One copy of the report of the precinct electoral commission is sent to the appropriate district electoral commission. The other is kept together with the sealed election ballots by the precinct electoral commission until its work is completed.

ARTICLE 27. DETERMINATION OF ELECTION RESULTS

1. Upon receipt of the reports from all precinct electoral commissions of the electoral district, the district electoral commission tallies the votes cast by summarizing the data contained in these reports.
2. The district electoral commission draws up a report which indicates the following:
 - a) the total number of voters registered in the electoral district;
 - b) the number of issued election ballots;
 - c) the number of ballots extracted from the ballot boxes;
 - d) the number of election ballots declared valid;
 - e) the number of invalid ballots;
 - f) the last names and initials of candidates entered on the election ballot and number of valid votes cast for each. If the last names and initials of two or more candidates coincide, supplementary identifying data are indicated;
 - g) the number of votes cast against all candidates;
 - h) one of the following decisions:
 - acknowledgment that the candidate receiving the greatest number of valid votes is duly elected. In the event an equal number of votes have been received by more than one candidate, that candidate for which the greatest number of voter signatures were collected during the nomination process is considered to be duly elected. In the event an equal number of signatures appear on the applicable signature lists, that candidate who was the first to submit registration documents is declared duly elected;
 - declaration that the election in the given electoral district is invalid, if violations of existing legislation or of this statute committed during conduct of the election are substantive, or if such violations prevent the will of the voters from being ascertained with confidence;
 - declaration that the election in the given electoral district is invalid, if the total number of election ballots found in the ballot boxes and showing the seal of the electoral commission or signature of two commission members on the reverse is less than 25 percent of the number of registered voters;
 - i) complaints and declarations received by the commission with respect to the voting procedure, and decisions made in their regard.

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3. The report is drawn up in two copies. One copy is sent to the appropriate city, rural, or settlement electoral commission; the other is kept by the district commission until its work is completed.
4. In those instances where the authority of precinct and district electoral commissions is exercised by one commission, this commission draws up the report of the district electoral commission only.

ARTICLE 28. ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERALL ELECTION RESULTS

1. Based on the reports of district electoral commissions, the appropriate city, rural, or settlement electoral commission determines and publishes in the local press the overall results of the election.
2. In election districts where the election has been declared null or invalid, the appropriate city, rural, or settlement electoral commission schedules new elections.
3. A city electoral commission declares the election in certain single-seat electoral districts to be invalid if it establishes that violations of this statute committed in these electoral districts during the election prevent the will of the voters from being ascertained with confidence.

ARTICLE 29. REGISTRATION OF ELECTED DEPUTIES

1. Following establishment of the overall election results, the appropriate electoral commission informs the candidate that he is duly elected as deputy to the representative organ of local self-government.
2. City, rural, and settlement electoral commissions effect the registration of elected deputies and issue them identification as having been duly elected.

CHAPTER VII. RESOLUTION OF COMPLAINTS AND DISPUTES

ARTICLE 30. DISPUTING IRREGULARITIES IN VOTER LISTS

1. A citizen of the Russian Federation may submit a statement to the precinct electoral commission regarding an error or inaccuracy in the voter list. The precinct electoral commission is obliged to examine the statement and ascertain the error or provide the applicant an explanation as to why his statement is rejected.
2. The actions and decisions of an electoral commission may be appealed to a court.

ARTICLE 31. DISPUTING REFUSAL TO REGISTER A CANDIDATE

1. In the event of refusal to register a candidate, the electoral commission is obliged to provide information explaining the reason behind the refusal to an

individual authorized by the electoral association, the candidate, or the candidate's proxy.

2. Refusal to register a candidate may be appealed to a court.

CHAPTER VIII. REPEAT ELECTIONS. DEPUTY REPLACEMENT ELECTIONS

ARTICLE 32.

If the election in an electoral district is declared null or invalid, the city, rural, or settlement electoral commission makes the decision to conduct a repeat election in the electoral district.

The time frame for conduct of election activities envisaged by this statute may be reduced by the commission, but not by more than one third. In this regard, the commission may decide it is necessary that a new convocation of the district and precinct electoral commissions conduct the election.

The voting takes place at the same election precincts and using the same voter lists as was the case for the general election.

ARTICLE 33.

In the event the authority of an individual deputy is declared invalid, or deputy authority is terminated prior to normal expiration for other reasons in a certain electoral district, new elections are conducted within three months of departure of the deputy in question.

Elections are scheduled not later than two months prior to the date on which they are to be held, and are organized in compliance with this statute.

In the event of early termination of a deputy's authority or departure from office of a deputy with less than six months remaining until expiration of his normal term of office, replacement elections are not conducted.

ARTICLE 34. LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF LEGISLATION ON ELECTIONS

Administrative and criminal liability is incurred for violations of legislation on elections in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation.

Appendix

SIGNATURE LIST

We whose signatures appear below support as a candidate for deputy to the (name of organ to which elections are being conducted), from Electoral District No. , (last name, first name, and patronymic of candidate), born (date of birth of candidate), residing at (permanent place of residence), engaged as (type of employment).

No.	Last name, first name, patronymic	Date of birth	Address	Passport (identification)	Signature
1.					
2.					
3.					

I authenticate this signature list (last name, first name, patronymic, address, passport data, and signature of individual authorized to collect signatures)

Candidate:

(Date and place)

Poll Reveals Increase in Luzhkov's Popularity

954F0312A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET
in Russian 26 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by VTsIOM sociologist Oleg Savelyev: "Not Everyone Who Likes Watching the Mayor Is Satisfied With Him"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two questions regarding the attitude of Moscow's inhabitants toward city authorities were asked of approximately 1,700 Muscovites during a quick survey conducted in mid-October of this year by the VTsIOM [All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center].

The following distribution of responses was obtained to the question "ARE YOU GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH YURIY LUZHKOV'S HANDLING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MOSCOW MAYOR?". The figures are given as percentages together with data from a similar survey conducted in November of the year before last.

	November 1992	October 1994
Yes	21	46
No	57	30
Hard to say	22	24

	October 1992	June 1993	October 1994
Watch regularly	12	11	11
Watch rarely	29	35	27
Aware of program, but do not watch	31	26	27
Not aware of program	28	27	35

It is noteworthy that steady interest in this program in recent years, on the backdrop of the advent of serials and numerous entertainment programs on a greater number of broadcast and cable channels, means an increase in the attention of Muscovites toward television appearances by leaders of the city administration.

Characteristically viewers watch the "Facing the City" program regardless of their sympathies or antipathies toward the mayor, and of their political views. Evidence of this can be found in an analysis of the composition of the viewers of this program.

Retired persons expressed satisfaction with the mayor more often than the average respondent, while satisfaction was expressed somewhat less often by business owners and, in general, respondents over 55 years old, with below a secondary education, with a higher education, with average income, and with particular party affiliations—they said that if parliamentary elections were to be held next Sunday, they would vote for the PRES ((Party of Russian Unity and Accord)) (Shakhray), Russia's Democratic Choice (Gaydar), Yavlinskiy Bloc ((Yabloko)) and the EFP ((Economic Freedom Party)) (Borovoy).

Least satisfied with Yu. Luzhkov are the unemployed, unskilled workers, engineers, technicians, and the same businessmen (because of a small number of neutral assessments), and, in general, respondents 25-40 years old with a secondary education, with the lowest and highest incomes, and voting for Russian National Unity (Barkashov), the Derzhava Party (Rutakoy), and the Democratic Party of Russia (Travkin).

The following distribution of responses was obtained to the question "ARE YOU AWARE OF THE APPEARANCES OF CITY LEADERS ON THE TELEVISION PROGRAM 'FACING THE CITY,' AIRING TUESDAYS ON THE MOSCOW CHANNEL? DO YOU WATCH THIS PROGRAM? REGULARLY, OR FROM TIME TO TIME?". The figures are given as percentages together with data from similar research conducted earlier:

Thus, retired persons and business owners, and in general, persons over 55 years old, with below a secondary education, with low and moderate income, and voting for different political forces—they said that if parliamentary elections were to be held next Sunday, they would vote for Russia's Democratic Choice (Gaydar), for the Communist Party (Zyuganov), for Zhirinovskiy's party, and for the PRES (Shakhray)—are encountered more often among regular viewers of this program than respondents on the average.

Most persons who watch the television appearances sporadically (apparently when the need for doing so is

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evoked by aggravation of the situation in the city) are executives of different ranks, specialists, and, in general, respondents over 40 years old, with a higher education, and voting for PRES (Shakhray), Women of Russia (Lakhova), Zhirinovskiy's party, and Russia's Democratic Choice (Gaydar).

Petersburg Lacks Workers Due To Close of Technical Schools

954F0051A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 11 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by T. Zazorina: "Closing Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In St. Petersburg during the past two and a half years more than 10 PTU's [Vocational and Technical Institutes] have been closed. More than 20 have been reorganized and consolidated. In today's labor market, while unemployment exists among engineers and researchers, there is a shortage in the city of about 35,000 construction workers, machine operators, bakers, and carpenters. Where, and by whom will workers be trained if we so easily allow our institutes to go to the bulldozers?

Vanka Zhukov Writes Again

PTU-63 received the order to shut down. "Just what kind of danger does our institute represent for the state that necessitates its eradication?" the teachers puzzled indignantly. "I also felt completely perplexed," admitted the director of PTU-63, Yuriy Alekseyevich Andrianov. "We have always been at full enrollment, and the specialists we train are needed by the city: construction and railroad workers. All our graduates find employment."

Not only were the teachers disturbed by the threat of closure, but, of course, so were the students. "We like our future profession, we are becoming highly qualified parquet layers," Slava Kapitonov, Sasha Verevkin and Roma Tumanov told me. "We like our teachers. We especially like our lessons in aesthetics. We go to the Hermitage and study art. We listen to music. We even have our own orchestra. Our students are good artists, and exhibitions are organized."

The aesthetics office has become just like a club, where one can relax, listen to music, dance a little, or celebrate a birthday. This is very important for teenagers. "After all, 112 kids from boarding schools are being trained here," explained aesthetics teacher Vitaliy Andreyevich Yakovlev. "They chose our institute themselves, or were given advice by friends. They have come to feel at home here, they sense a feeling of warmth and caring."

They are not only well fed and dressed here, however. They also receive assistance in finding employment and housing.

And now the institute is going to be reorganized, meaning that these boys and girls will be split up among various other PTU's. For this reason, the boys wrote a letter to the mayor of the city. They wanted him to

understand their sadness and pain and to stop the institute from being shut down, as they had gotten used to one another and loved their teachers. The letter reminded me of that written by Vanka Zhukov. It has become a good Russian tradition to turn to Grandfather Konstantin Makarovich, Lenin, or Sobchak.

The instructors turned to the trade union of workers and students of vocational education. The chairman of the latter, V.G. Yaushev, asked the lawyers of the Federation of Trade Unions for Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast to conduct a legal review of the PTU closure order. The latter was determined by the experts to be in conflict with existing legislation.

Having familiarized themselves with the laws, the PTU-63 board and the trade union sent a letter to Minister of Education Ye. V. Tkachenko. Once again to a good grandfather. And at the same time they reported that in Petersburg PTU-3, PTU-31, and PTU-43 were also being reorganized.

What was the result? The minister sat down to write a letter, just as Vanka Zhukov had. Please excuse the recurring metaphor! He wrote: "Dear Oleg Yermolayevich!" addressing the chairman of the Petersburg Committee on Education, Lebedev. "In spite of agreements reached with a number of territories, we are informing you that, in consideration of the massive character of illegal activity at the local level, whereupon the PTU material base has been "pilfered" and used for other than its designated purpose, the ministry is exclusively reserving the right to close (create, reorganize) basic vocational education institutions by power of order No. 359, dated 18 Aug 93."

Do you think the Committee on Education heeded the ministry's request? Far from it! They went right on with their closures. Then Deputy Minister Yu. M. Rogovskiy sent a government telegram: "The Russian Ministry of Education again asks you to repeal your orders to shut down and reorganize PTUs."

And do you think that the Committee on Education heeded the second request from the Ministry of Education? Correct. Then, in addition to request No. 248, order No. 236 went out, issued by Deputy Minister Yu. M. Rogovskiy: "I hereby order that the reorganization and closure orders for PTU-3, 31, 43 and 63, which were issued by the Committee on Education in excess of its powers, and which infringe upon the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Education and Committee on the Administration of State Property, shall be considered null and void. The mayor's Committee on Education shall see to the repeal of said orders."

Thus, an enigmatic situation had taken shape. One order (from the committee) shut down PTU-63. The second (from the ministry) declared the first to be null and void. In which direction were the poor students and instructors of PTU-63 supposed to yield?

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Trading Something for Nothing

"How is one to solve this crossword puzzle?" I asked the deputy chairman of the committee, Mikhail Ivanovich Zhivotikov, the head of the Administration for Vocational and Technical Education. He responded that they considered the ministry's order one-sided, referring to an agreement reached long ago between the ministry and mayor to adopt decisions to close and reorganize PTUs at the city level. "But this agreement was nullified by order of the minister," I retorted. Zhivotikov remained silent.

I thought: There is probably some great strategic goal for which it is necessary to shut down and reorganize institutes even despite the law. "What is this goal?" I asked of Mikhail Ivanovich. "From the point of view of a journalist, it is, of course, not clear," agreed Mikhail Ivanovich, "but we are conducting a general reorganization of vocational and technical education. PTU-63 is not a bad institute at all, and perhaps it would be possible not to touch it..."

"Do you know that two orphan boys from PTU-63 have promised to pour gas over themselves and light themselves on fire if the institute is split up?" I asked. "I have received no appeals from the kids," replied Mikhail Ivanovich. Then I recalled an anecdote. An administration head, having walked out of his administration spied a wailing child and asked her, "What issue are you crying about, little girl?"

At last I received an answer to the question torturing me: Why was PTU-63 being split up? As it turns out, one of the city's enterprises was in need of expansion. For this reason, PTU-4 was being given away, and the latter, it was decided, would move to PTU-63. In short, they traded something for nothing.

This was only one of the giant steps of reorganization, however. There were others. In the order and telegrams sent by the ministry, mention was made of the illegal closure of institute No. 3. I spoke with its former staff. "We were ordered to clear out of the institute as though a war had started." Machines were taken out through the windows, and equipment was carried out in an expedient manner; equipment that had taken years to collect and arrange. After all, our institute had been in existence since 1944. Our graduates install and assemble radios in the city's leading enterprises. We cried as we left the institute. Our senior expert, a war veteran, Pavel Vladimirovich Mikhaylov, could not withstand such a heartfelt blow. He died not long ago."

No trace of PTU-36 even exists now. It was not even mentioned in the ministry's orders. Its history dated back to 1922. It was an institute that trained fitters, welders, and assemblymen, which today are in short supply in the city. Last year, as always, it was at full enrollment. Then August 31 the order came to shut down the institute.

"Teachers were forced to look for work themselves. Naturally, no one asked the kids' opinion. They were thrown around like sacks of potatoes from one warehouse to another. After all, it was namely our institution that they had chosen to come to," explained the former director of PTU-36, Yuriy Nikolayevich Polikarpov. "It was a great pity about the equipment and machinery. Everyone had saved, bought, and mended it themselves. For a long time I kept coming to the institute. I helplessly watched it being plundered. Doors and frames were broken down, fires were built on the stairways. I cannot go back any longer. It pains me."

Instead of being shut down altogether, however, institutes may also be plundered piece by piece. The director of the "Servis" lyceum, Svetlana Aleksandrovna Antonova, was on leave when the mayor's Committee on Education issued the order on August 10 requiring the institute to give up one third of its building complex. Already 1400 were being trained in the institute instead of 930. Carrying out the order, that is, relinquishing one third of their facility, would have meant that the director would have had to assign two and a half people per desk, or studies would have had to be conducted in two shifts, until 9:30 in the evening.

It had been planned that the vacated facilities would go to a curriculum and methodologies center.

The collective at the "Servis" lyceum could in no way agree to such an order from the committee. The director of the lyceum, Antonova, turned to the mayor of the city. In literally one day the committee repealed the order.

A radio electronics lyceum was also subjected to the same sort of consolidation. At first one of its buildings was given to the Estonian consulate. Then a second building was given to the Eastern European Institute of Psychoanalysis.

"Mikhail Ivanovich, does not it bother you that the purpose of this whole reorganization is absolutely unclear to the instructors and directors of the institutes? That they see closure in it, not development?" I finally asked Zhivotikov. "This plan was authorized within government of St. Petersburg," Mikhail Ivanovich briefly replied. It is hard for me to form an opinion as to why our government is would look calmly upon the closure of PTUs. The directors of many institutes say that they did not have any part in discussing a program of development. And those that did, did it at a run, and as a result they even presented O. Ye. Lebedev with a work memorandum stating that the program was not sufficiently thought through. Even the trade union of workers and students of vocational and technical education said, in general, that it was completely nonconstructive.

In addition to discussion and approval at the city level, the program to develop vocational and technical education was supposed to have been approved by the Ministry of Education. Interesting. What do they think in Moscow of our program?

Close Down Today, and Tomorrow?

"Does not the minister of education intend to go to our city and personally resolve this problem?" I asked of Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Butko, the deputy director of the Department of Vocational Education under the Russian Ministry of Education. In response he replied, or rather stated, that they were looking into the closure of the institutes. "How much can one look into it? After all, correspondence and trips from Petersburg to Moscow have been going on since June?" "We gave the committee until the 29th of November to present us with legal grounds for their actions."

"So that is it! The ministry, while issuing its own orders, is not sure of their legal basis?" "No, we are sure of it!" "But as you know, the fact that the committee's orders conflict with existing legislation has been confirmed by a lawyer from the Federation of Trade Unions, as well as by independent experts? What else must one wait for? After all, institutes are being destroyed: buildings, teaching staffs, student bodies..."

Yevgeniy Yakovlevich assured me that upon receiving a response from the committee the ministry would send a representative to the mayor of St. Petersburg. Whenever would that be? After all, the committee may manage to issue a couple or so more orders in the meantime to shut down or reorganize, which will take another couple of years to look into.

Butko was in agreement too, that the program of development was generally not well thought through. When and by whom then will a conclusion be made, if in accordance with the latter institutes are now being reorganized and closed? Also, instead of thinking about the future, lyceum and PTU directors await orders to shut down.

The chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast, Ye. Makarov, turned to city prosecutor Vladimir Ivanovich Yermenko with an appeal to intervene in the actions of the Committee on Education and to appeal the orders to close down the institutes. As of yet there has been no response.

The city's institutes have already been reduced by a third. However, sociologists calculate that by the year 2000 the number of teenagers will increase by 1.5 times. By whom and where will they be taught if we so freely squander our PTUs? The fact that the number of drop-outs from general academic institutions has risen must also be considered. These kids will need to go to vocational and technical institutes. In addition, the number accepted into VUZs [Institutes of Higher Education] has been reduced, meaning that those who do not get into academic institutes will be redirected into vocational institutes and lyceums.

Today we have a shortage of workers in shops, transportation, and construction. Tomorrow, with growing privatization, there will be a shortage of small and mid-size business specialists who are capable of opening their own bakeries, dressmaking and tailoring establishments,

repair shops and dry cleaners. As is known, they too must be trained by lyceums and vocational institutes.

However, even if empty facilities exist in a PTU, they should be used for courses to retrain adults, or for other educational purposes. In no case should they be given up for other needs! Tomorrow they will be needed by our youth, and the chance for their return will be gone!

The committee has a program for developing the vocational and technical education system. It contains outstanding ideas on the need for training young workers not only in accordance with the needs of the city, but with European standards. There has been success, demonstrated by the past "Holiday of Young Craftsmen." Educational centers are being planned for orphaned children, as is a division for training mentally and physically handicapped children, and invalid children. Special structural subdivisions will also be created for retraining and increasing the skills of St. Petersburg adults temporarily out of work. General instructional divisions will also be organized in PTUs. Naturally, all of the aforementioned will require the reorganization of vocational and technical education in general, and PTUs and lyceums in particular.

However, the program states in black and white that changes to the network of existing institutes shall be introduced by the committee in concordance with the Ministry of Education.

In the meantime, closing down PTUs gives cause for doubt; for the Ministry of Education, because of the issue of concurrence with existing legislation; for institute directors, out of practical necessity; and for us, the average citizen, out of logic.

In our city there are scores of excellent institutes and lyceums that are known throughout all of Russia. Outstanding instructors and directors are at work in them. What kind of reorganization in vocational and technical education would they like to see? We would like to continue this discussion, a discussion of great importance to the city, with the help of the instructors and the Committee on Education. While it is still not too late...

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Recent Emphasis on Russia as 'Great Power' Considered

954F02734 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 42,
2 Nov 94 p 5

[Article by Vladimir Kedro: "Diplomats or Arms Peddlers?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrey Kozyrev's statements regarding Saddam Husayn to the effect that world public opinion may make a mistake in declaring a given political figure a terrorist astonished even journalists who were used to the surprising and sharp metamorphoses of our democratic leaders. After all, it was just recently that our officials were referring to the Iraqi leader exclusively as a dictator and criminal. That was in contrast to the

way he was referred to by the most implacable opposition. And here even the president said that it was necessary to stop the United States and not enable it to undertake the most decisive actions against Iraq.

What? Can it be that Saddam Husayn has changed for the better? No, it's more that the Russian leadership's world outlook has changed. Russia has more and more loudly been declaring its status as a great power, wanting to take an active part in addressing all international problems that are important to it, and expecting an appropriate attitude toward it on the part of other countries. But the West, while agreeing to Russia's dominant role in the space of the former USSR, that is, in the near abroad, does not particularly want to see Russia as a partner (or rival) in more remote regions.

This has been understood for some time in Moscow. The euphoria over admission to the "free world" has passed, especially since Russia never has been admitted beyond its threshold. Talk about "universal human values" has long since died down, for not a single country wants to forego its own national interests in the name of such values.

And what has Russia gained over the years of naively expecting an invitation to the club of rich democratic states? In the broad sense, practically nothing. And it has lost a great deal. Including the market for the only Russian high-tech export item for which there was a stable demand—weaponry. At one time, in the joy of renouncing the communist past, the Russian leadership refused to supply arms to odious regimes that had been their main purchasers and that made regular and full payments on their accounts—the Iraqi, Iranian, and Libyan regimes. Moreover, in joining the boycott of those regimes, Russia deprived itself of tens of billions of dollars that were owed to it as the result of past cooperation.

About a half year ago Moscow began to speak, first cautiously and then more and more loudly, about the possibility of easing the sanctions that the international community had imposed on Baghdad. Iraqi officials began to pay more and more frequent visits to Moscow—visits, however, that were not particularly advertised.

That turn of events seriously alarmed the Kuwaiti leadership. Over the summer two fairly high-level Kuwaiti delegations visited the Russian capital, one of which, to prove that the Baghdad regime was not fulfilling the UN Security Council resolutions, brought with it the children of Kuwaiti prisoners of war whose fathers Saddam Husayn was refusing to return to their homeland. Reports appeared to the effect that Kuwait was buying a shipment of arms in Russia. Moreover, the emirate's leaders hinted that they were counting on Russian arms in carrying out a comprehensive program of rearming their army.

However, how can the diminutive emirate with its small army vie in attractiveness with the potential market of its powerful northern neighbor, in which a militaristic

totalitarian regime is in power! At it is the latter to which Russian arms producers and merchants are, first and foremost, directing their gaze. Having overcome a period of confusion and stagnation, they are attempting to break out into the broad international space. They have been given a boost, in particular, by the successful deal for the delivery of MiG-29 fighters to Malaysia.

The resumption of Russian activity in this market alarmed the West. It is with good reason that one subject in Bill Clinton's and Boris Yeltsin's talks in Washington was the termination of arms shipments to Iran under contracts that had been concluded with the Soviet Union. And from every indication, the sides failed to reach full agreement on that issue.

It is characteristic that at the same time that the Russian president was concluding his talks in the American capital, in Moscow General Sergey Oslikovskiy, the first deputy general director of Rosvooruzheniye was sharing his agency's plans. He stated that Russian arms exports had been steadily growing in recent years. They were estimated to reach \$3.4 billion this year and \$5-\$6 billion in 1995. And if it was possible to resume arms sales to Libya and Iraq, they could rise to \$12-15 billion.

In this connection, the general stated that he was hoping for the help of the diplomats, who were supposed to get the international sanctions against those countries lifted. It is noted in informed circles that the pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the military-industrial complex and Rosvooruzheniye on this score has been steadily increasing. It was in good part due to Russian efforts that the question of easing sanctions on Iraq was able to be placed on the UN agenda and that there were certain hopes it would be decided positively.

However, another crisis broke out on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, a crisis which for all practical purposes buried that possibility. Such a turn of events had in no way entered into Moscow's calculations. Moreover, a chance appeared to show itself to be an influential world power capable of playing an active role in solving urgent international problems. A powerful Russian diplomatic landing force consisting of Andrey Kozyrev, his first deputy Igor Ivanov, and Viktor Posuvalyuk, head of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, was sent to Baghdad and Kuwait City. After talks with Saddam Husayn, the Russian minister of foreign affairs arrived in the Kuwaiti capital with the look of a victor who was bringing peace to the Persian Gulf region.

But that news failed to meet with enthusiasm either among the Kuwaitis or among their Western protectors—no one wanted to accept on faith the promises that Saddam had given Kozyrev to recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and existing borders. Moreover, the Baghdad leader made a good many counter demands. In particular, he linked his blessing of Kuwaiti independence to the lifting or easing of international sanctions against his country.

Therefore, the West refused to accept the Russian minister as a victor following his visit to Baghdad. In New York, despite Kozyrev's eloquence, the question of sanctions against Iraq was not brought up for discussion. In this case it is not important whether Saddam Husayn himself committed an act that appears strange from the standpoint of common sense, or whether he was "put up to it"; what is important for us is that we finally displayed an approach to an international problem that was dictated by our own interests. Granted, as a result the Russian Foreign Ministry's relations with the Foreign Office were complicated at the important moment of Elizabeth II's visit to Russia, and talk got started in the United States about the beginning of a second stage of the Cold War. That's not so terrible—so far, these misunderstandings have been overcome.

Have they been overcome for long? The Russian leadership continues to hope to collect Iraqi, and then Libyan, debts. Personally, I very much doubt that, in the event that Iraqi oil exports resume, Saddam Husayn will rush to settle his accounts with us first thing. But Russian arms producers and traders will demand that the foreign policy department do everything in its power to bring about a resumption of arms exports to Iraq and Libya. So we may yet be witnesses to a gripping turn of events connected with attempts to make a "drive to the south," wherein the arms-exporting generals are doing their utmost to rouse the diplomatic vanguard.

In the near future Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will make a trip through the Gulf countries. His entourage will most likely include people from the military-industrial complex, the Ministry of Defense, and Rosvooruzheniye. Today Russian foreign policy is being determined equally by the professional international specialists and by those who to a significant degree influence domestic policy-making—the fuel and energy, military-industrial and arms lobbies.

Russia's Stake in Korean Peninsula Viewed
954F0296A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Valeriy Denisov, doctor of historical sciences: "Russia on the Korean Peninsula: Moscow's Interests in This Region Are Obvious, and They Should Be Consistently and Actively Upheld"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Both Korean states have as of late been taking an increasingly close look at Russia's policy on the Korean peninsula, and they have not simply been taking a close look, what is more, but would like to pull Moscow onto their side. Which has been the preoccupation of the United States, China, and Japan also. This interest has grown particularly following the visit to Pyongyang of Aleksandr Panov, special representative of the president of the Russian Federation and deputy minister of foreign affairs. Seoul, Washington, and other capitals have suddenly begun to talk about a

change in Moscow's Korea policy and about its aspiration to enhance its role on the peninsula, pursuing a line of "equidistance" from the DPRK and South Korea and so forth. I believe that our partners had forgotten or that we had simply weaned them from the habit of considering that Russia could have its own national interests, in an area of such vital importance to us as the Korean peninsula included.

Unfortunately, the geopolitical arrangement in this zone, as in certain other regions, come to that, is not taking shape in our favor. The reasons here are obvious. It is important, however, that this process—highly mobile and frequently hard to forecast—occur with our active and consistent participation, which may be secured by a flexible combination of Russia's political-diplomatic and military possibilities.

We are today observing a broad-based political offensive of the United States in the Korean direction; paying practically no heed to Russia's interests, it is endeavoring to spread its influence to the northern part of the Korean peninsula also in order to be the individual arbiter of the fate of Korea in the future.

The essence of the national interests of the Russian state on the Korean peninsula is as follows.

First. The maintenance of mutually beneficial, good-neighbor relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. Under no circumstances does this contradict the fact that the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, for example, have declared an aspiration to build their relations on the basis of mutually complementary constructive partnership. It would be useful in this connection to draw up and sign a political document that also records the principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, although both parties have in the course of diplomatic contacts agreed in practice to build bilateral relations on the basis of noninterference in each other's internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, and the right of free choice of paths of socioeconomic and political development. Pyongyang and Seoul should recognize, evidently, that there is no need to attempt to play the "Russian card" in the hope of inclining Moscow in this direction or the other. If Russia is so inclined, neither Korean party nor, equally, Russia itself would be the beneficiary of this. It is hardly legitimate, therefore, to speak of the priority for us of North or South Korea. It may and should be a question of the priority of the entire Korean peninsula for it is impossible to calculate where we would gain or lose more were we to choose in favor of Pyongyang or Seoul.

Our economic relations with the Republic of Korea and the DPRK are today developing unevenly. Russia has substantial commodity turnover with the Republic of Korea compared with the DPRK. In the current year it will probably be in excess of \$2 billion. And from the viewpoint of prospects, economic relations with Seoul appear preferable. But there are problems here also. The

\$1.5 billion of our debt, for example, which we are proposing be partially repaid by supplies of military assets. Or take the question of South Korean investments in the Russian economy. They are laughably small: approximately \$30 million, while the Republic of Korea intends to invest \$5 billion in the Chinese economy, for example.

Economic relations with the DPRK are altogether in a state of crisis. The North Korean debt to Russia is over \$5 billion. Trade is declining, and commodity turnover this year will not exceed \$150 million. But the problems need somehow to be resolved. And to resolve them it is essential to maintain normal relations, conduct a political dialogue, and find mutually acceptable solutions. There is this desire on Pyongyang's part. Nor should we ignore this, despite the voices of discontent being heard from Seoul. These voices, incidentally, conflict with South Korean statements to the effect that good relations between the Russian Federation and the DPRK will strengthen peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

Second. The nuclear problem. Here Russia is for observance of the international nuclear nonproliferation posture by both Korean states and a settlement of the nuclear problem of the DPRK in accordance with its commitments ensuing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the supervision agreement with the IAEA. Moscow also supports the joint declaration of North and South on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Moscow takes a positive view, on the whole, of the American-North Korean accords, seeing them as a way toward realization of the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the territory of the Korean peninsula. But there are certain points that cannot fail to make us leery. Primarily, the IAEA has somehow been left out of the settlement. Russia's role in the planned process is not visible as yet, although we contributed actively to the achievement of the American-North Korean compromise. And, most important, Moscow has found itself shunted aside from the reprofiling of Pyongyang's nuclear program. We have, in fact, been denied supplies to the DPRK of light-water reactors of Russian manufacture. And to be completely frank, it should be observed that both the United States and the DPRK have made honest use [as published] of the ideas contained in the Russian proposal concerning the convening of an international conference on the security and nuclear status of the Korean peninsula.

Third. The problem of Korea's unification. All the states involved in this problem pay lip service to support for the idea of the restoration of the unity of Korea by the peaceful democratic path. But the practical policy of some states is very far removed from the theoretical arguments on this score. I believe there is no alternative for Russia. Primarily—and this is what is most important—the voluntary, peaceful unification of Korea would eliminate the present military-political confrontation on the peninsula, which in turn would stabilize the

situation on Russia's borders and in this currently troubled area as a whole also. Unification would afford an opportunity for the extensive development of economic, cultural, and other cooperation between Russia and Korea. The historical-psychological factor has an important role here also. Russia is the sole neighbor of Korea that did not encroach on its independence. In addition, the Russian state repeatedly rendered Korea support in its efforts to defend and strengthen its independence. And in 1945 it was we who liberated Korea from the long Japanese colonial domination.

Fourth. Russia recognizes that China, the United States, and Japan, as neighbors of the Korean peninsula, have their interests there consisting, in our view, of preventing an escalation of tension, consolidating the foundations of stability, and contributing in every possible way to the progress of both Korean states toward peace and accord and a strengthening between them of trust and mutual understanding. It is this that is seen as being the role of the neighbors of the Korean peninsula. When, however, some attempt to squeeze out others and to impose their own understanding of a resolution of the problems of the peninsula, this leads to the opposite—a growth of tension and confrontation, which naturally throws back inter-Korean relations also.

Russia does not want any special privileges on the Korean peninsula, but nor does it want others to strive to obtain them either. Moscow should have a good relationship with the two Koreas, for only such a relationship corresponds to Russia's national interests, which Russian diplomacy should defend actively and consistently.

Lack of Need for Formal Borders With CIS States Examined

954F0276A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 44, 2 Nov 94 p 12

[Article by Nikita Sorokin, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* special correspondent: "Transparent Russia—Do We Have Borders Today, and Do We Need To Secure Them?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Old, New, and Disputed Borders

With the exception of those sections that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, Russian borders are rather indistinct.

In other words, the historical border is being protected and maintained in more or less proper order, but nearly 14,000 kilometers of new Russian borders have yet to be codified in treaties and hence lack border infrastructure.

There are many reasons for this, but among the main obstacles that prevent us from beginning work to demarcate the new borders, one can boldly name one—the territorial claims that certain former republics have against Russia. For example, the Estonian Government

is convinced that it has a right to territory on the eastern bank of the Narva in Leningrad Oblast and lands in Pechory Rayon, Pskov Oblast; and Latvia claims territories in Pytalovo and Palkino Rayons in Pskov Oblast.

The border question is perhaps most sensitive in the Russian-Estonian talks that have been under way since 1993. In March of this year, the Estonian Government forwarded a draft law "On the Estonian State Border" to the State Assembly; it holds that the border with Russia is defined by the 1920 Tartu Treaty, and that the lands of "Pechory District and Zanarovy" are a part of Estonia that "is not under its jurisdiction." The State Assembly's adoption of that law, contrary to the expectations of its Western partners, prompted our president to take a decisive step: In June B. Yeltsin signed an edict "On Delimiting the State Border Between the Russian Federation and the Estonian Republic on Location," which instructs that border markers be installed along the Russian-Estonian border unilaterally pending the conclusion of an appropriate bilateral agreement.

As for similar talks with other neighbors, they have proceeded without any particular problems or mutual recrimination. The talks with Latvia have produced agreement on the entire land border, and disputed issues will be addressed in continued negotiations. A commission on delimiting the border between Russia and Lithuania has established the land border, although, it is true, Lithuania is proposing to "divide" the sea along a parallel running from the extreme western point of the land border on the Kurshskaya shoal in a clever bid to acquire a "sizable part of Russia's economic exclusion zone." Such a demarcation of the maritime territory, our border experts say, violates Article 15 of the UN Convention on Maritime Law. However, a compromise borderline will likely be drawn fairly, for the Lithuanians are not as ambitious or Nordically unyielding as the Estonians. The talks on delimiting the border with Greece, the republics of the Northern Caucasus, and Azerbaijan are proceeding quite favorably.

The fact that Russia's borders with China, Mongolia, Japan, and the United States were not officially codified until recently is rather surprising. An agreement on the Russian-Chinese border was signed only on May 16, 1991, with the islands of Ussuriyskiy and Tarabarov in the Khabarovsk area and the island of Bolshoy in the Argun River still in dispute. The entire maritime border with Japan has not been codified in a treaty. An agreement between the USSR and the United States signed in 1990 demarcated maritime areas in the Arctic and Pacific oceans, but the agreement has not been ratified.

Nevertheless, Russia's external borders are more or less secure. As for its internal borders....

'Crystal Transparency'

"Proclaiming a border to be a state border is only half the job," a Border Guards officer with whom I am acquainted told me. "Such a border cannot be established by drawing a line on a map, so to speak, for 'states are formed over a period of centuries, and borders are drawn in blood.' The task of transferring borders and everything that goes with them from official maps to the actual land must be accomplished as quickly as possible.

An official of the State Customs Committee, V. Klimov, told me sadly that Russia's new borders are a heavy burden on customs checkpoints and local police stations and that few areas have even small barriers maintained by the Federal Border Service.

The overall situation on the Russian periphery can be summed up in the expression "transparent borders." This sounds very modern and quite trouble-free, but what does it mean in practice? Dry and laconic statistics provide the best answer to this question.

The total value of contraband seized on Russian borders in the first eight months of this year was R1.6 trillion, with strategic materials accounting for most of exports:

nonferrous and rare-earth metals, 16,000 tonnes;

petroleum and petroleum products, 978,000 tonnes (20,000 tonnes were seized in the first half of 1993, or 48.9 times fewer);

timber and timber products, 42,620 tonnes.

Unfortunately, State Customs Committee officials were short on specific examples: They cited some outdated facts, but even they were enough to illustrate the downright dreamlike transparency of our borders.

The Transneft joint-stock company in Moscow had no particular trouble sending 2.6 million tonnes of oil across the Russian border to Ukraine—by contraband means, needless to say, with no customs processing, licenses, etc.

From December 1992 to February 1993, the Alfa limited liability company exported copper and aluminum—metals that are classified as strategic raw materials and may be exported from Russia only by so-called special exporters—from Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts to the West. The Alfa limited liability company was not registered with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations as such an exporter. Alfa simply bought its export licenses and submitted fraudulent contracts to customs and other agencies.

In the first half of 1994, customs agencies seized R12 billion worth of foreign currency from private individuals, as well as 7.5 kg of gold items, 47 kg of household and industrial silver, 6,407 objects of antiquity and art, 8,340 rounds for rifles and automatic weapons, and 662 revolvers and pistols.

How many firearms can one person take across the border? The following is taken from a Customs Committee document: "The smuggling of weapons and ammunition, above all from trouble spots, into Russia continues to grow. New actively used routes for importing weapons and ammunition, in particular by motor vehicle and railroad from the Baltic countries, have been identified."

An Estonian citizen bound for Russia was found by the Pechory customs house to be in possession of six European-made automatic pistols and 226 rounds for them. The same customs house detained a Latvian citizen bound for Russia in a car who had 20 TT pistols, 35 magazines for a Kalashnikov assault rifle, and 350 automatic 7.62-caliber rounds (one bullet of that notorious caliber can bring down a rhino). And so on and so forth.

The smuggling of narcotics into and via Russia. A Customs Committee information bulletin devotes an entire 14 pages to this type of commodity—an entire tract!—in small typewritten print, accompanied by diagrams and graphics.

In the first half of this year, customs agencies, border guards, and special units of the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs seized 1,011 kg of narcotics, primarily of plant origin; 345.5 kg of narcotics were seized in the same period last year.

The most active attempts to smuggle narcotics were recorded on Russia's borders with the Baltic countries in Pskov and Kaliningrad Oblasts, in the sectors of the Chernyakhovsk, Pechory, Pytalovo, Sebezh, and Kingisepp customs houses.

The situation on the border with Ukraine is also difficult, especially on the sector of the Bryansk customs house, which seized 809.3 kg of narcotics in the first half of the year.

But this is not the only thing that our "transparent borders" are noted for. Criminal-related illegal immigration is on the rise, especially in the northwestern region (more than 700 foreign citizens, most of African and Middle Eastern descent, who had illegally arrived in Russia were discovered on the Russian-Finnish border in 1993), the North Caucasus, and the Far East.

From an information bulletin issued by the Federal Border Service: "On May 27, at a conference with officials of the Federal Border Service and the Border Guards on the eve of Border Guard Day, President Boris Yeltsin... called attention to the existence of an entire set of threats to Russia's national and vital interests that has arisen along virtually the entire perimeter of the Russian border." And he was quite justified in doing so.

One and a half months later, on July 13, the Russian Federation Security Council reviewed the agenda item "On the Russian Federation State Border." In that esteemed council, the commander in chief of the Border

Guards and the Federal Border Service, Andrey Nikolayev, proposed that a Russian state border policy be formulated forthwith and that the policy be put into effect as quickly as possible. A. Nikolayev's proposal naturally met with enthusiastic support and approval from the high-level council. Fundamental issues facing the Border Guards of financing, manpower acquisition, and material and technical supply that the commander in chief raised also met with comprehensive support and understanding. All the problems and issues were understood and exceptionally positive decisions were adopted on them.

Unfortunately, there have been no noticeable changes.

A Match in an Assault Rifle

The following was recounted by a senior lieutenant who serves in the 201st Motorized Infantry Division in Tajikistan: "At a remote post I took a border guard's assault rifle that had been polished till it shined. I fired a few rounds, and then it misfired. It misfired after every one or two shots. It looked inside and was astonished to see that one small part of the internal mechanism had been replaced by a match. The rifle could fail at any moment, and this was a forward post. I looked at the fellow, and he just shrugged, saying he had had the weapon since Afghanistan. He had not been able to get a replacement no matter how hard he tried. I had gotten used to a lot of things there, but a match in an assault rifle?"

Just one detail. And here is the overall picture.

As of July 19, 1994, the Border Guards numbered 170,272 men, as against an authorized strength of 229,827. They were understaffed by 57,882 men, including 9,258 officers.

The state of affairs with equipment and weapons is much worse.

Forty-two percent of all vehicles have been in service for six or more years, and 36 percent of all the Border Guards' armored vehicles had been in uninterrupted service for 10 or more years. By all existing norms and standards, all this equipment should have been replaced with new a long time ago. But in reality, even elementary spare parts are unavailable.

There are no fewer problems when it comes to safeguarding our economic zone and territorial waters:

of 260 ships and 514 patrol boats used by the Border Guards, 56 ships and 194 patrol boats have exceeded their service lives and should be replaced immediately;

the density of our fleet of vessels per 100,000 square km of economic zone is 2.1 ships (for purposes of comparison, the U.S. Coast Guard has 3.2 and Japan 8.2);

in addition, the Border Guards have lost the shipyards that built high-speed patrol boats such as the Grif and river patrol boats such as the Aist, which are in

Ukraine and Georgia. On account of a lack of funding and constant unpaid debts owed to shipyards, delivery dates for new ships are continually being postponed, and the state defense order for 1994 is going unmet (the state shipbuilding order in 1993 was fulfilled at a rate of 50 percent);

Insufficient appropriations for upkeep of the forces have reduced the stability and quality of communications. The quantity of hopelessly obsolete communications equipment is now almost 40 percent of the total, and this figure goes up to 60 percent in the Border Guards' tactical units;

Border Guard aviation units owed industry R31 billion as of July 1, resulting in protracted repair periods, idled aircraft, and reduced aviation combat-readiness;

Injuries sustained by personnel working with worn-out equipment more than doubled in 1993 alone;

60 percent of all alarm systems, one of the most important components of ensuring border security, is obsolete junk that constantly goes out of commission.

The state, to say nothing of the Border Guards high command, lacks sufficient funds to protect the border, and so the Border Guards have tried to find a solution to the problem on their own—by trying to get the Defense Ministry to transfer new equipment and arms.

From a conversation with a Federal Border Service officer: "We cannot rely on the Defense Minister for supplies of equipment, arms, and ammunition. In response to our requests we hear one answer: 'I will not give it to you.' And so we have to look for other ways and to bend over backwards looking for money to buy what we need. Today, at a time when the state is broke, it is absurd to buy weapons of which the Defense Ministry has a surplus! It cannot keep up with the schedules for destroying military equipment, while the Border Guards have either shortages of such equipment or none at all."

Defense Minister P. Grachev is a member of the Security Council, and like its other members, no doubt, he understood and supported Commander in Chief Andrey Nikolayev's proposals at the aforementioned session but did nothing about it.

But the problem here is probably not in the minister's administrative greed; after all, it is well known that P. Grachev very much wanted to take over the Border Guards and make them part of the Defense Ministry. But the proud and, until recently, elite Border Guards want to maintain their independence. Apparently, the Defense Ministry's reluctance to share with its poor colleagues probably has its roots in a kind of behind-the-scenes confrontation battle between the two departments.

In Europe there are no borders and no problems, but we and our "native borders" remain crude "Sovs" and thus frighten the civilized world. Why does Russia need borders? Against whom are we protecting them, and who wants us anyway?

Some of our starry-eyed intellectuals are asking these questions today. I hope this article has helped provide, if not an exhaustive answer, at least an understandable one.

Volkskiy for Economic Integration With Former Satellite Countries

954Q0078A Moscow *DELOVOY MIR* in Russian
1 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Arkadiy Volkskiy, president, Russian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen, and chairman and council coordinator of the International Congress of the Industrialists and Businessmen, by correspondent Konstantin Viktorov; place and date of interview not given: "Fated To Integrate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Viktorov] Arkadiy Ivanovich! In the early 1990s, when the mechanism of market reforms was started up in Poland, and Russia was only just preparing for such a step, I came across an article by the well known Polish economist R. Kravchik. I remember him saying this: "The world can exist without Poland, but Poland cannot exist unless it is systemically united with the world."

[Volkskiy] What R. Kravchik said pertains equally to all countries of the former USSR, and the former CEMA, especially in the present stage, when the integration factor is perhaps the principal one in surmounting the extremely grave economic crisis in which we have all found ourselves.

It is precisely recognition of the importance of this factor, even in more-favorable conditions than ours, that led to the inception and expansion of economic integrative processes in different regions of the world—be they the European Union, ASEAN, NAFTA, and other integrated groupings.

To stray from this dominant principle of today's system of world economic ties would mean serious consequences. All of us have already suffered them in our own experience. This is true of practically all countries. In Poland for example, because of the loss of CEMA markets production of railcars, mining equipment and equipment for food industry decreased by two times, manufacture of road building machinery dropped by three times, and manufacture of textile equipment dropped by six times.

Almost the same thing can be said for production and export of Russian equipment. Consequently reintegration of the economies is not only natural and necessary, it is inevitable. In the meantime many facts show that the centrifugal tendencies for recovery in our state, which are presently gathering momentum, are very troubling to some politicians both in the West and in the East. They see in this some sort of imperial ambitions of Russia, and a threat to its stable democratic development, and on the basis of this they are suggesting the ideas of neo-isolationism.

I must note that this topic keeps coming up on the agendas of many international symposia, such as for example the recently held conference of the American-Ukrainian Committee, the Russian-American meeting under the framework of the "Aspen Dialogue," and others.

What could be said in this regard? Democratic development of our countries is already irreversible, and their reintegration, let me emphasize once again, is just as inevitable. That's first.

Second. We're talking not about revival of the dead-and-gone mutual relations of CEMA's administrative command system, but rather about mutually advantageous economic cooperation. This I'm certain is just as indisputable. In short, the efforts of neo-isolationists, both Russian and foreign, have no future. In other words, for Russia, utilization of the experience of only America or Western Europe and integration with it is not the sole direction on the path to creation of a socially oriented market economy.

[Viktorov] However, it remains a fact of Russian history that the West has always been a great temptation.

[Volskiy] Today the alternative in my opinion is to take from the West only that which would strengthen Russia as a state, for which Eastern markets are no less important than Western ones. This is why the Russian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen, which represents the interests of our country's business circles, supports the idea of forming a unified economic space in the future. This idea, by the way, is gathering more and more supporters outside of Russia, in its near and far abroad.

I also see the future of all Europe in formation of such a space. After all, historically it has essentially been fueled by two sources—Western European and Eurasian. And this latter one cannot be divided or split without creating the danger of a chain reaction that could become a geopolitical catastrophe.

[Viktorov] Arkadiy Ivanovich, a large group of well known industrialists and businessmen of Eastern Europe and China recently discussed the problems and prospects of economic integration in, so to speak, "post-CEMA" space. Why was this forum organized namely by Poland?

[Volskiy] It was the first of the Eastern European countries to opt for reform, and the first to begin emerging from the crisis, having halted the decline in industrial production in 1992 by means of a tight budget policy and state regulation of the economy.

[Viktorov] Having chosen tactics that seem to be similar to those chosen by Poland, we in Russia have actually arrived at somewhat different results. The price of the reforms has turned out to be unacceptable to the majority of the population. Why?

[Volskiy] One reason is the length of the period of a nonmarket economy. There are others. We for example forsook our potentially powerful domestic market—

Poland doesn't have such a market—and liberalized foreign trade according to the Polish model and according to recommendations of the IMF. As a result there has been a gigantic flight of capital and raw materials abroad. Each year we are in a sense granting loans to the Western economy amounting to 10-15 percent of our GDP.

Nor was it considered that at the moment the reforms began there was absolutely no private sector in Russian agriculture and trade (all of this was present in Poland). This alone necessitated a different pace of transformation. The result was high inflation and a decline in production.

Worse still, we are still trying to force ourselves to believe in a monetaristic concept, we argue that the Central Bank is to blame for inflation, that the economy is being suffocated by a surplus of money and not by its from the population, and so on.

Nonetheless, discussing the situation in Russia, I would still say that the growing influence of mechanisms that formed during the years of the reforms and weakening of the action of nonmarket factors are still the main features of the present moment. In 1992-1993, the economy's transformation was noticeably stimulated, the degree of its liberalization and its opening was significant by our Russian yardsticks, and the planned distribution system was dismantled. Under the influence of privatization and development of private entrepreneurship, the nonstate sector has assumed a noticeable position. Around a fourth of the GDP is now produced in this sector of the economy.

At the same time the economic position in Russia is now complex and rather contradictory. And we can understand why. We are living through the time of a transitional economy, the duration and stages of which haven't yet been theoretically substantiated by anyone in the history of the civilized world.

As the well known English economist F. Hayek [transliteration] noted, market competition is experimental in nature, and the optimum relationships that evolve in the course of competition cannot be predicted. Market experience has now shown that many of the ties were fully justified. And this is not surprising, inasmuch as the system of specialization that had been selected was not altogether accidental.

[Viktorov] However, restoration of economic ties between CEMA countries and Eastern Europe will be made difficult by the differences in state and economic policies, unless industrial and business structures tackle this matter actively and energetically.

[Volskiy] That's absolutely right. Evidence of the real results that could be achieved in this area can be found in the fact that during the time of existence of the International Congress of Industrialists and Businessmen, the number of cooperative ties restored directly through its

efforts at the "enterprise-enterprise" level has surpassed 500. With the help of the congress 42 bilateral agreements on mutually advantageous cooperation were reached between associations of industrialists and businessmen.

All of this directly serves to shape a common market for the states of the former USSR and countries of Eastern Europe. The main reason for creating such a large-scale integrated system is not to enlarge the hierarchy of supranational administrative structures even more, but to remove the barriers to movement of goods, capital, services and manpower—that is, to promote development of civilized business in countries formerly in CEMA and the USSR.

Tougher Stance on Caspian Oil Said Planned

954Q0050A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 21 Oct 94 p 3

[Unattributed article under "Russia on the Caspian Oil Shelf" rubric: "Moscow May Toughen Its Position"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, a ministry concept expressing a negative attitude toward the contract recently signed by Azerbaijan for the development of the Caspian oil shelf has been given to Viktor Chernomyrdin for his review.

The document characterizes the contract in its present form as being in conflict with the interests of Russia and it is proposed that the part involving the participation of "LUKoil," whose controlling package of shares belongs to the government, be denounced. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is proposing that the question of the status of the Caspian be presented for discussion in the United Nations. Moscow's position is this: the resources of the shelf are subject to joint development by the countries around the Caspian Sea. Until the problem of the status of the Caspian is resolved, it is proposed that economic pressure be applied against Azerbaijan. As for the intergovernmental agreement now in effect between Russia and Azerbaijan, to which Baku has heretofore referred and where it is stated that the Azeri, Chirag, and Gunedysli deposits belong to it [Azerbaijan], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia intends to denounce it.

Last week Aliyev's press service reported that in his telephone conversation with Andrey Kozyrev, he expressed to the Russian side his "perplexity with respect to the appeal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the United Nations" (on the question of the shelf) and also with respect to the "initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia proposing to the government that it undertake some sanctions against Azerbaijan." It was thereby noted that "Chernomyrdin does not see any problems in connection with the oil contract." A few days ago the Azerbaijani press reported to Chernomyrdin on the concept of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoting the above-mentioned positions of the document. There were no

denials from Smolenskaya Square. Experts from KOMMERSANT-DAILY infer that considering the present disposition of forces in Moscow the chairman of the council of ministers may support the concept of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ankara-Led Eurasian Union Foreseen

954Q0050B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 21 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Georgiy Bovt under "Results of the Summit of Turkic Countries" rubric: "'Eurasian Union-2': If Not With Moscow, Then With Ankara"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The summit of Turkic states ended Wednesday evening in Istanbul with the adoption of a joint declaration. The summit took place under the sign of the striving for further integration. Agreement was achieved on the realization of a whole series of joint projects—for example, for the laying of a transnational oil pipeline across Turkey. The next summit is planned to be held in August 1995 in Bishkek.

The summit (on its beginning, see KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 19-20 October) was a decisive step on the way to the establishment of a new regional political and economic union. Turkic integration (under the sign of which it was held) will certainly make substantial corrections in the order of geopolitical forces. And these changes will take place in the context of the gradual withdrawal of Russia. One of the bases for political and economic integration will be oil. As is becoming clear from the results of the Istanbul meeting, the contract between Azerbaijan and an international consortium for the development of the Caspian shelf may be the start of an extensive process of activation of new players in the region—in addition to Russia (and in part in place of it)—and also the reorientation of the entire regional system of oil and gas pipelines from Russia to Turkey (possibly to Turkey and Iran).

At the concluding press conference, in touching on the question of the development of the Caspian oil shelf, as the agency TURAN reports, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan greatly favored a "poly-stan contract." It is obvious that the leaders of the post-Soviet states, as one could expect, view this deal above all as a successful precedent for a gradual distancing from Moscow in the resolution of the region's energy problems. All of the presidents agreed that Russia's position on the question of the Caspian shelf (and Moscow is insisting on its joint development, hoping that in this event it can exercise more influence on the making of strategic decisions) should not be seen as categorical. In other words, it should be noted (at least for the time being) but there is no reason to be in a hurry about expressing absolute loyalty. In particular, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev declared that his country is also developing the sea shelf, having in mind the subsequent active involvement of Western investors. The development of the Turkmen part of the shelf is also

being accelerated and this is being done on a unilateral basis: just a month ago, according to TURAN, the Azerbaijan state oil company GNKAR began exploratory work in the Turkmen sector of the Caspian at two oil and gas deposits—"I.A.M." (11 million tonnes of recoverable reserves) and "Zhdanov" (12 million tonnes). An agreement was also reached between GNKAR and the National Iranian Oil Company on the performance of joint geophysical work in the Iranian sector of the Caspian.

Of course integration is not limited to oil and gas. Nazarbayev, who has repeatedly put forward different kinds of ideas on integration in the scope of the CIS, remains true to himself. At the same time, his proposals that were heard in Istanbul were to some degree sensational. He declared that the project that he previously put forward for a Eurasian Union must be viewed as an invitation for the unification not only of the former republics of the USSR (while preserving and strengthening their sovereignty) "but also other countries of Europe and Asia." Thus, the plan previously put forward as an alternative to the efforts of Moscow at unification (in the scope of the CIS) acquired a new shade in Istanbul—a Turkic one.

Economic Cooperation Between Russia, Lithuania Reported

954Q0077A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 29 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Konstantin Smirnov: "Lithuanian Business Still Remembers Russian Business"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's economic relations with the Baltic countries depend on the degree to which political problems are settled. For Estonia, which has been constantly making territorial claims on Russia and following an ethnic policy that draws its neighbor's condemnation, it is hard to count on the complete normalization of commercial and economic relations with Russia in the near future. The prospects for Latvian economic relations are better. And Russia has the fewest unsettled political problems with Lithuania. Yesterday a Russian-Lithuanian meeting of business circles, at which it was decided to establish a bilateral business cooperation council, ended at the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry's Congress Center.

The restoration and expansion of commercial and economic relations with the republics of the former USSR is a priority objective of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Meetings of Russian entrepreneurs with the representatives of the CIS countries' business circles, conducted under the chamber's auspices, have become a regular occurrence. In particular, Russian-Latvian talks that were, on the whole, successful were

held in the spring of 1994. A joint meeting of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Lithuanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry that was held in Moscow on 27-28 October was the latest Russian step in the area of stabilizing commercial relations with the Baltic countries. Assessing it, Stanislav Smirnov, president of the Russian chamber, noted in a conversation with a KOMMERSANT correspondent that the atmosphere was calmer and more businesslike than during the earlier meeting with Latvian colleagues, who feel greater pressure from radical nationalist circles: "The Lithuanians have traditionally been distinguished by a healthy pragmatism." Let us note that the working language at the session was Russian.

At first glance, the results of the business summit amounted solely to the standard agreements on encouraging direct contacts between the two countries' businessmen and the exchange of legal and commercial information. However, the agreement that was signed on the results of the Russian-Lithuanian meeting, titled "On Cooperation Between the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Lithuanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry," notes the need to establish a bilateral business cooperation council whose purpose would essentially be to lobby for the interests of business circles in the two countries' governmental structures. Granted, one should note that for now Lithuanian and Russian businessmen stress different points in the area of normalizing the treaty and legal basis of bilateral economic relations. Whereas the priority for the Lithuanians is putting most favored nation status into effect in Russian-Lithuanian trade, the Russian side proposes to first of all settle the issue of the transit of Russian cargo to Kaliningrad Oblast across Lithuanian territory.

In this respect the chamber is acting in unison with the Russian Government, which has been trying, including through influential entrepreneurial circles, to get Lithuania to establish favorable conditions for Russian transit. At the same time, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry strives to avoid any politicization of its activities. It refused to support the initiative of Arkadiy Volskiy and his Lithuanian colleague Mikolas Alelijunas, who attempted to put direct pressure on the two countries' governments to conclude a major economic and political treaty. The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry have chosen a strategy of gradual lobbying for their interests. It may be that an emphatically pragmatic approach is more in keeping with the Russian leadership's long-range strategy, which is aimed at forming in neighboring countries a stable business lobby that has no interest in a worsening of relations with their neighbor.

[begin box]

Commercial Relations Between Russia and Lithuania
(Based on the data of the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and the Ministry of Cooperation
[Minsotrudnichestva].)

- Deliveries from Russia constitute 60 percent of all products imported into Lithuania. Lithuania accounts for 4 percent of all Russian imports from the republics of the former USSR.
- 70-100 percent of Lithuanian imports of oil, gas, timber and lumber, and ferrous and nonferrous metals come from Russia.
- Lithuania's 1993 trade deficit with Russia was placed at \$250 million.
- In 1993, 100,000 tonnes of crude oil, 165,500 tonnes of petroleum products, 1,841 cubic meters of natural gas, and 134,400 tonnes of coal were delivered from Russia to Lithuania. That group of commodities accounts for 56.8 percent of Russian exports to Lithuania.
- In 1993, \$24.4 million worth of nonferrous metals and \$33.9 million worth of chemical products were delivered from Russia to Lithuania.

- Machinery and equipment account for 46.8 percent and food accounts for 25 percent of Russia's imports from Lithuania.

[end box]

Lithuania's Main Trading Partners
(according to figures as of 1 July 1994)

Country	Percentage
Finland	2
Sweden	3
Netherlands	3
Italy	3
Poland	4
Latvia	4
Belarus	5
Ukraine	7
Germany	13
Russia	35
Other countries	21

Payments Between Russia and Lithuania Through Central Bank of Russia Correspondent Accounts (billions of rubles)

Transaction	1992	1993	1994 (as of 28 September)	Total
Payments from Russia	25.5	22.2	9.3	57.0
Payments to Russia	16.4	29.3	10.4	56.1

**Russian Foreign Policy Prospects in
Mediterranean Region Viewed**

954F0280A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Konstantin Sorokin, Russian Academy of Sciences' Europe Institute: "We Must Not Retreat Any Farther: Prospects for Russian Policy in the Mediterranean"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It appears that from the Russian standpoint it would be proper to identify two Mediterranean geopolitical spaces. The first is the zone of the "near Mediterranean" (let's call it "Zone 1"), which would encompass the vast Black Sea-Caucasus region, that is, essentially the southwestern regions of Russia and the CIS, along with the regions of the "far abroad" that adjoin that zone, including, without fail, the Black Sea straits. The second geopolitical space is the "far Mediterranean" (let's designate it "Zone 2"), by which is meant the territories lying farther to the south, west, and southwest—southern Europe, North Africa, and the Arab Middle East.

There are at least three reasons for such a division. First, although Russia's national interests unquestionably extend throughout all of Eurasia, including the entire Mediterranean, no matter how one interprets it, Zone 1

is a sphere of the Russian state's vitally important, critical interests, while in Zone 2 Russia has "simply important" interests.

Second, in the first zone the challenges to Russia's interests appear much more acute and can have much graver consequences for the country than events in the second zone that are, from Russia's viewpoint, negative.

Third, in Zone 1 Russian influence continues to be fairly substantial, which, at least theoretically—in this case we are not speaking of the actual clumsy practice of Russian diplomacy—enables Moscow to use a whole array of means and methods to advance its geopolitical goals and national interests. At the same time, in the far Mediterranean, Moscow's positions, which were not that strong during the Soviet period, have weakened even further in recent years. And that means that Russia will have to rely there primarily on naked diplomacy that is not backed up by either the economic or military might of the country, that is, on a diplomacy that experience has shown to be fairly ineffectual.

Of course, in the past few years, the relative weight of that region of the world in global politics has declined in comparison with what it was just a decade ago. It has declined primarily because the region of the far Mediterranean has been rapidly falling behind other regions of the world in terms of its rates of economic and

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technical progress, the development of integration processes, accumulation of free capital, level of domestic and foreign investments, and so forth.

Another reason is the ending, in that zone, of the former intense politico-military confrontation between East and West, a confrontation that riveted the whole world's attention on the Mediterranean. At the same time, today a number of other conflicts and contradictions that in past decades defined the "face of conflict" of that region and its adjoining regions have died out or become latent. I am referring to the results of the series of Arab-Israeli agreements in the past few months, the quiet behavior of Colonel Qadhafi in Libya and Hussein in Iraq, a certain stabilization in Lebanon, and the end—at least in open form—of the dispute between Spain and Great Britain over the ownership of Gibraltar.

That does not mean, however, that the Mediterranean has, in general, lost its geopolitical significance. Its enduring value both today and in the future will be determined chiefly by its major reserves of energy resources and other raw materials, as well as by the fact that transport routes for energy resources and other cargo pass through the Mediterranean. In a situation in which the world is moving from a state of conflictual bipolarity to competitive multipolarity, other forms of conflict that are in keeping with the new era arise, and, thus, the Mediterranean maintains its importance as one of the key strategic military staging areas.

Moreover, notwithstanding all the present outward pacification in that region, its underlying potential for conflict has by no means been exhausted. Without attempting an exhaustive analysis, one can cite the following axes and causes of potential conflicts that could once again place the Mediterranean at the focal point of world politics:

- rivalry between global power centers for geopolitical influence and control over local resources and communications passing through the Mediterranean. To the traditional rivals—the United States and Western Europe—one must add the states of the Asian-Pacific region, especially China, whose oil reserves are supposed to run out by the beginning of the next century. Since an oil famine threatens to stifle the Chinese economic miracle, Beijing will have to seek sources of raw materials outside, including in the Mediterranean and Middle East;
- conflicts between world leaders and local powers, again for spheres of influence in the region. The possibility of conflict between outside and "local" powers is fairly well illustrated, for example, by the ambiguity of the Arab countries' assessment of the victory of the anti-Iraqi coalition, which was often perceived as a victory by the West over the Arab world;
- the revival of traditional friction and disputes and the emergence of new ones between states, such as the conflicts in Greece's relations with Turkey, Macedonia, and Albania;

- a group of so-called new challenges to regional security, such as the environmental problem resulting from the economic and military activities of the region's countries, population migration, refugees, and so forth;
- the possible resumption of Arab-Israeli confrontation after the present cohort of leaders of the Arab world and Israel is replaced;
- the continuation and expansion of the conflict in the Balkans.

That is why, in the future, it would not be at all a bad idea for Russia to expand its presence and have solid bases in the far Mediterranean in order to be able to exert influence on the course of events in that part of the world. But, at the present time, it is practically impossible to achieve that. Russia is weak as both an economic partner and a participant in regional geopolitical games. The region's countries probably do not take Russia seriously. Under these conditions, it is naive to count on any sort of broad cooperation with them. The most that Moscow can do today is primarily to attempt to prevent any further retreat from the Mediterranean—possibly through the development of military cooperation and arms sales to that region and through the provision of state incentives for tourism and Russian private commercial activity. In the latter case, it would be realistic to rely on Cyprus, which has, de facto, already become a beachhead of Russian private business activity in the Mediterranean.

But all that would merely be the preparation of a beachhead. Real entry into the region and full-scale participation in its life would only be possible at later stages, when the Russian economy has been put in order and Russia is able to consolidate its positions in the near Mediterranean, from which it would then be possible to carry out its geopolitical advance into the far Mediterranean.

Unlike Zone 2, the near Mediterranean is of direct vital interest to Russia. Here there are: sources of raw materials, chiefly in the Transcaucasus, important sea routes leading to the Mediterranean Sea and, beyond that, the world ocean; a considerable number of Russian and Russian-speaking inhabitants; important industrial enterprises concentrated in southern Russia and Ukraine; good conditions for agriculture—chernozem soil and a relatively mild climate; and also probably the greatest concentration of hotbeds and areas of conflict, from which instability could migrate directly to Russia's central regions. The list could go on and on.

From the geopolitical standpoint, this region is important in two other respects. On the one hand, as a buffer separating Russia's central regions and the Urals from states with which Russia had conflicts in the past and/or which presently maintain relations with it that, albeit correct, are by no means friendly. In particular, Turkey. Given a favorable set of circumstances, that same buffer is capable of becoming a barrier to the spread of Islam from the south to the territory of Russia's autonomous entities in the Volga region, although even this does not

fully solve the problem of the infiltration of Islam from the Southeast—from Central Asia. Under unfavorable circumstances, however, that is, given Russia's loss of strong positions in the region in question, the buffer, conversely, could turn into a conveyor belt for unfavorable foreign religious and geopolitical influences.

On the other hand, as previously noted, Zone 1 is extremely important for the subsequent expansion of Russia's geopolitical influence into the far Mediterranean. Indeed, with unstable and even dangerous rear areas—a hostile Ukraine, a warring Caucasus, an unstable Crimea, and Black and Caspian seas that are uncontrolled by Russia—it would be fruitless and risky to try to pursue an active policy in the external region, that is, in Zone 2.

Therefore, to the extent that it is possible, while attempting to protect Russian positions in the far Mediterranean, Russia should first and foremost concern itself with the state of affairs on its own borders and only then give serious thought to remote frontiers.

In practical terms, in attempting to bring about a maximum consolidation of its positions in the near Mediterranean, Russia should strive to achieve the following goals:

- the establishment of close relations and, if possible, those of alliance with Ukraine, taking advantage of the change of leadership in Kiev;
- the preservation in the Crimea of a Russian presence—naval; cultural; without question, economic and financial, even if it be through private rather than state Russian activity; and a state presence, as well—on the level of autonomous entities if direct official contacts between Moscow and Simferopol do not work out. In this connection, it is essential that autonomous entities loyal to Moscow be involved;
- the strengthening of Russia's positions in the Transcaucasus through peacekeeping and economic activities and the establishment of political dialogue with the broadest possible spectrum of parties, movements and groups. The latter move would enable Russia to avoid losing out, no matter how events unfold;
- the solution of the problem of the Black Sea fleet—basing, division, and the subsequent building up and improvement of the Russian part of it;
- the preservation of the inviolability of the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention. In this connection, it should be clearly understood that, from a geopolitical standpoint, any curtailment of Russia's rights with regard to the straits would, for all practical purposes, put an end to any further Russian Mediterranean policy.
- the utmost resistance to Turkey's expansion of influence in the Transcaucasus and its establishment of closer relations with Ukraine; this might be accomplished, in part, by pitting Turkish interests, where possible, against Western, Bulgarian, and Iranian interests.

The obvious difficulty of achieving these goals does not relieve Russia from attempting to accomplish them, since it is today that the geopolitical landscape of the 21st-century Mediterranean is being formed.

Successful Outcome of Russo-Egyptian Trade, Cooperation Talks

954Q0085A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 12 Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Svetlana Sukhova, KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent: "Oleg Davydov: It Would Be Good if, Instead of All Debts, There Would Be 'Zero'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the delegation from the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] of Russia will return to Moscow after completing negotiations in Cairo. It was able not only to resolve the problem of the old debts (on Thursday an agreement on the "zero variant" was signed), but also to outline the prospects for future cooperation. Our KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent Svetlana Sukhova reports from Cairo.

On Wednesday the head of the MVES, the new Vice-Premier Oleg Davydov and Minister of Electricity and Energy of Egypt Maher Abaza signed a protocol of intent between the power corporation APE and Russia. In a conversation with our KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent, the head of the V/O "Tekhnopromeksport" (this is the main partner of the Egyptian company in building power facilities), Stanislav Bokov, said that the protocol speaks of modernization of power facilities which already exist in Egypt, as well as of construction of new ones. "Tekhnopromeksport" will sell Egypt new transformers for the Aswan GES (hydroelectrical plant), as well as insulators for LEP (electrical transmission lines). Bokov emphasized that Russian experience and technology in the field of power engineering (especially in transmission of electrical power for long distances) is unique. This is specifically why "Tekhnopromeksport" was involved in the construction of the first section of the so-called "Arab power ring." It will connect the countries of North Africa and the Near East. Moreover, the Russian firm will participate in the construction of heat and power plants of the combined cycle. "Tekhnopromeksport" will also engage in the construction of several GES along the Nile River. Prospects for cooperation in non-traditional spheres of power engineering were also outlined. For example, in building solar power plants (at the present time, only the Israelis stand out in the development of this technology in the region).

On the evening of the same day, Davydov and Minister of Foreign Relations of Egypt Yusef Bhutros Gali (we might add, the nephew of the U.N. Secretary-General) signed an agreement on trade and technical cooperation. In the course of the negotiations, Davydov announced that "Arab markets have always been traditional for the former USSR." It is specifically here, in his words, that "our interests lie," and it is specifically in this region that "our technologies and equipment are needed." A curious

detail: Egypt is still the only country where Russian diplomatic license plates begin with "I"—that was the decision of then-President Nasser, who wanted to emphasize the importance of the partnership with the USSR. Davydov explained the decline in bilateral trade in 1992-1993 by the fact that Russia was occupied primarily by domestic problems at that time. Yet now, in the opinion of the vice-premier, the time has come to return to the foreign markets. Egypt, as Davydov believes, occupies a key place in the Arab world, which makes its market particularly important to Russia. The talks also touched upon questions of legal provision of trade-economic cooperation between the two countries. In the words of Davydov, in the near future agreements will be concluded on the protection of investments and the exclusion of dual taxation.

The second day of the visit could be called "forgiving Thursday." The parties signed an agreement on a "zero variant" of regulating mutual indebtedness. In the words of one of the members of the Russian delegation, such a variant of the resolution of the problem of debts was the result of 2-year negotiations, in the course of which the impossibility of adopting any other decision became apparent. It turned out that even the amounts of the mutual indebtedness were difficult to compute. The debt of Russia was formulated in the period from 1987 through 1992 due to the "overweight" of import from Egypt, while the previously concluded trade agreements provided for equal volumes of deliveries. By the end of 1992, this difference comprised \$450 million. Egypt owed \$200 (primarily for military shipments). Thus, the "zero variant" may be viewed as being profitable primarily for Moscow. The indebtedness will be resolved over a period of 19 years. In the opinion of Davydov, the resolution of the question of debts removes the main obstacle in the path of development of cooperation between the two countries. Upon conclusion of the negotiations, the vice-premier noted with satisfaction that "in just a few minutes, we were able to resolve the problems of many years."

The Egyptian trip by the head of the MVES was notable in two respects. First of all, Moscow demonstrated that it not only does not intend to concede its economic interests in the Near East, but that it will also defend them. This was especially important—at the recent economic summit on regional cooperation held in Casablanca, the place where the representatives of business circles of Russia were to sit was empty. Secondly, it is specifically Davydov (instead of Aleksandr Shokhin) who is now charged with dealing with questions of Russian foreign debts. Therefore, attention to all the statements by the vice-premier regarding debts was most rapt. And he justified this attention, making an almost sensational announcement in Cairo (almost—because previously Davydov had already spoken out in favor of writing off Soviet debts from Russia), in the sense that the example of mutual write-off of Russian and Egyptian debts could serve as a model for talks by Russia also with Western creditors. Russia, he said, will pay its foreign debts. As

for the debts of the former USSR, their servicing will be performed in accordance with the current economic situation.

Status of Sheremetyevo Free Economic Zone Discussed

954E0137B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
2 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI staff correspondent Vladimir Chuprin: "The Curved Roads of the 'Free Zone'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow Oblast—The second stage of development of the free economic zone on the grounds of Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow Oblast has begun.

There was an empty field here two years ago. And the first construction workers who came to lay the "concrete foundation" on the outskirts of Solnechnogorskiy Rayon were high swamp boots.

But the journalists who were there recently rode over the 1.5-kilometer route in a matter of seconds. Everything has been done with a high degree of quality and thriftily. Both the bridge across the small river and the wide concrete strip which loops among the neighboring fields.

The first section of the free economic zone will go into service in five years. It will immediately begin to work on the reforms and yield revenue. In particular, just Moscow Oblast's budget will receive around \$1.5 million annually.

"The founders of our joint-stock company are the government of Moscow Oblast and the administration of Solnechnogorskiy Rayon," says Valeriy Linnik, general manager of the AO Sherrizon. "They each hold 25 percent of the shares. The Moscow commercial bank Vozrozhdeniye, Mosoblavtofinans (Moscow Oblast motor vehicle transport), the oblast road department, Mosoblinzhstroy (Moscow Oblast engineering construction), and Aeroflot have from 6 to 10 percent of the shares. The basic purpose of our joint-stock company is the construction and management of the free economic zone and the preparation of documents for the creation of the legal mechanism for the activities of the SEZ (free economic zone)." It should be noted that almost all the attempts to establish free economic zones in Russia, about which there was a lot of talk at the beginning of the nineties, have met with failure. As a rule they encompassed the territories of large administrative units. And they came into contradiction with the principles of federalism.

In the Moscow suburbs they decided to proceed along a different path—one adopted in world practice: to localize the zone's boundaries and make it the object of attention of a region and not of the entire country. The head of Solnechnogorskiy Rayon, Aleksandr Zharov, allocated 125 hectares of land, geodetic surveys have

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already been conducted there, and a general plan for the construction of the first section of the SEZ has been prepared.

Also being placed here are customs terminals, a center for repairing the electronic equipment of aircraft, office buildings, and plants for the production of disposable dinnerware.

The project's total cost comes to \$375 million. Talks with such world-famous firms as Collins, Partec, Westinghouse and others (around 200 in all) have made it possible for AO Sherrizon, even now, to put together a basic package of investment proposals.

Register of Most Reliable Firms Created

954F0235H Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Oct 94 p 9

[Article by Maksim Zarezin: "Register of the Reliable: RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry Attempts To Choose Russian Partners for Western Firms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Information on the financial condition of potential partners has always been in demand: After all, possessing such information helps avoid losses from collaboration with nonviable or unscrupulous businessmen. The German company Buerget, for example, has existed for more than 100 years now, and its data banks contain information about companies throughout the world. The first steps in this area have now been taken in Russia, where inquiries are already being received from foreign firms about the condition of our enterprises. Thus, the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry got the idea of creating its own reliability register.

Fairly strict conditions are imposed on those who want to get on the register. An applicant is required to confirm the stability of his economic condition by showing evidence of profits over the past two years. And his coefficient of coverage of short-term debts must be no less than two and no greater than four. Other requirements: Immediate liquidity ratio and level of equity capital must be over 60 percent, absolute liquidity ratio—at least 30 percent, ratio of borrowed funds to

own funds—no higher than 70 percent, and ratio of balance-sheet profits to production expenses—more than 25 percent.

It is also necessary to show a faster rise at the end of an accounting period than at the beginning in the rate of turnover of equity capital and the profitability of assets and sales. In addition, an enterprise must not have any overdue debt on bank loans, etc.

In order to be included on the register, it is necessary to present copies of a firm's founding documents and its registration certificate, copies of its balance sheet and its report of financial results certified by an auditing firm or the tax inspectorate, and a bank's certification of its solvency and the lack of overdue debt on bank loans. Registration is valid for one year.

The names and number of enterprises on the register are a commercial secret. However, it has been possible to learn that there are only several dozen enterprises that have demonstrated their viability. At any rate, there is a far larger number of firms (mainly foreign) that are interested in whether potential partners are on the register and in other information about them. According to Tamara Arabkina, senior expert with the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry's Administration of Contract Law, two or three inquiries come in daily from the FRG alone. Of course, most of the replies are negative.

On the one hand, this indicates that so far not many in Russia know about the register, while others have gotten used to working "as God commands the soul" and hope that applies to foreign economic business as well. On the other hand, while the desire is great, few are capable of making it to the circle of the chosen: After all, on average only one in four firms that apply to the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry are placed on the register. On the whole, strict selection criteria are not typical of foreign registers; for example, the requirements of the aforementioned Buerget firm bear more resemblance to a questionnaire, while our version is closer to an audit. Granted, the specific nature of the Russian market and its participants dictates the need for a more detailed analysis. At the same time, the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry intends to improve the system for compiling the register. Provision may be made for different levels of requirements and, correspondingly, different gradations for participants.

KAZAKHSTAN

Nazarbayev Approves Concept for Citizens' Socioeconomic Behavior

054202804 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Sergey Kozlov: "President Approves New General Concept for Citizens' Behavior: Republic Attempts To Yoke Market Individualism and Post-Soviet Collectivism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A closed-door meeting of President Nazarbayev's National Council on State Policy was devoted to formulating a "general concept for new socioeconomic behavior of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan."

The general concept for shaping behavior that was proposed to Nursultan Nazarbayev turned out, according to him, to be "fairly decent and specific." In the president's view, the model proposed by members of the National Council will help lay the ideological foundation for a new Kazakh society.

"No matter what may be said about ideology today, society still has to have some sort of guiding principles," the head of state noted.

One idea ran through all the speeches by members of the National Council: for all practical purposes, the reforms about which the state's leadership is continually talking are either a totally incomprehensible subject or often simply unknown to the public. The authorities' actions are often viewed as harsh levies, imposed now by a new oligarchy. If one is to believe the findings of the sociological survey services, on whose information the analysts on the president's staff themselves rely, only 6.5 percent of the state's population expresses satisfaction with the course of what the government calls economic reform.

The situation in regions where social and interethnic tension has risen in the past few months is especially worrying. In East Kazakhstan, for example, there was a sharp upsurge in participation in rallies after controls on bread prices were lifted. Some city maslikhaty (bodies of local representative authority) simply voted to demand regional autonomy. The situation is tense in the North, too. One of the lowest figures for the "level of faith" in reform was noted in the republic's principal grain-growing oblast, Kustanay Oblast, where only 3.8 percent of those surveyed could be called optimists.

The general figures are distressing, too. Forty-two percent of the republic's inhabitants expressed the belief

that the state of the country's economy would deteriorate significantly in the near future and that nothing good could be expected to come of the leadership's actions over the longer range. As for the government's notion of a "pure market economy," only 12 percent of those surveyed favored such a concept. (Granted, just how the respondents interpreted that concept is unknown.)

It is obvious that all this is what created the need for the urgent development of a special general concept for citizens' socioeconomic behavior. Its goal is to study the degree of the public's perception of what the leadership is doing and to develop methods for "explanatory work" among citizens.

Just what is the document that was proposed to the president by the National Council?

The first chapter of the general concept is titled "The ideal model of socioeconomic behavior." It defines the two main parameters of the society toward which the republic's population is moving: they are a socially oriented market economy based on private property, and a civil society and rule-of-law state.

Other countries' experience indicates that the main representative and conveyor of the values indicated is usually the so-called middle class, which is characterized in the document as "working" and "autonomous in terms of property." It is on it that the main stakes should be placed in the process of putting through accelerated changes. Granted, first of all a middle class must be given the opportunity to form in Kazakhstan.

And just what is blocking the implementation of reforms?

First of all, the dominant type of socioeconomic behavior in society, which stubbornly maintains a fundamental orientation toward state paternalism. Another reason cited is the "lack of a dynamic social structure capable of becoming a conveyor of new socioeconomic behavior." In the opinion of the members of the National Council and authors of the general concept, the distinctive feature of the local mentality and the Kazakh path toward a market economy and democracy lies in the "preservation of the logotype of maximum reliance on the state that marked the Soviet period."

The principles on which the new norms of citizens' conduct should be based are the harmonious combination of market individualism with a post-Soviet and patriarchal collectivism, but in this connection it is essential to create all the necessary conditions for the formation of a fully economically independent individual, in order to relieve the state of the burden of caring for that individual economically.

Socialist Party Official on Early Elections

954K0288A *Almaty KARAVAN in Russian*
No 44, 4 Nov 94 p 6

[Interview with Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, secretary of the Socialist Party, by Viktor Verk; place and date not given: "Before Getting Into Something, Think About How You Will Emerge From It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Verk] How do you view the idea of a second self-dissolution of the Supreme Council that is hovering in the parliamentary lobbies?

[Yertysbayev] If there truly is this idea and parliament adopts a decision to dissolve itself (which is unlikely), this would be the sole smart decision in the seven months of parliament's work. The present parliament is illegitimate and was "elected" with the aid of unprecedented and scandalous violations of the Constitution and the election standards of international law. Immediately after the elections, the president termed them "a success for the young Kazakhstani democracy," for he sincerely hoped that the new parliament really would be professional, would work in a single mode with the government, and would very soon provide a legislative base for the market transformations. The role of the legislative body is particularly important in a transitional period, and from this viewpoint there has been a legal vacuum in Kazakhstan for almost a year now.

Not one in the least bit significant law has been adopted in practice, and there is a constant absence of a quorum, since considerable numbers of deputies are, in defiance of the Constitution, combining positions with their former places of employment. It was not fortuitous that 60 deputies addressed to the president a letter setting forth a request for a return to the old status of the Supreme Council. Parliament is adopting some declarations and political statements instead of making decisions. First it expresses no confidence in the policy of the government; some time later it confirms practically unanimously the very same people who had determined this policy. Such an unscrupulous parliament is a danger to the president: If there is a mass social explosion (and it could happen) and the situation becomes exacerbated to the utmost, parliament could advocate early presidential elections or the abolition of the institution of the presidency altogether and the transition to parliamentary government. Politically, the majority of deputies have insufficient experience: Anything at all might be expected.

[Verk] But many members of the opposition (members of parliament included) are already speaking openly about early presidential elections. The leaders of your party included....

[Yertysbayev] I can say unequivocally: I am opposed to early presidential elections. On tactical issues of political struggle it is possible, of course, to adhere sometimes to the well-known Napoleonic rule: "The main thing is to engage in battle, then things will be clear." Napoleon could permit

himself this, for he had the strongest and best army of his time. The opposition has no such "army," I mean a powerful organization, ties to broad social groups of the population, a ramified network of primary organizations, detachments of mobile and skilled canvassers, the support of the corps of directors, part of the machinery of state, and the vigorous and capable part of society, and so forth. Early elections at the present time, therefore, would bring defeat for any leader of the opposition who ventured to throw down a challenge to Nazarbayev. The present president would win despite the difficult socioeconomic situation. I have already said repeatedly at sessions of the Respublika Coordinating Council and at meetings with leaders of parties, trade unions, and other nongovernment associations that it is time to switch from superficial politics (statements, interviews, TV appearances) to routine and painstaking work on the creation of a powerful organization, since the opposition will have to fight not Nazarbayev specifically but an organization called the state. And the outcome of this struggle is obvious. Of course, Nazarbayev would not amass such a quantity of votes as in December 1991, but the "controlling block of shares" would unambiguously be his. On the question of early elections, therefore, I have a different position: Before getting into something, think about how you will emerge from it.

In a future presidential race, three factors will be of tremendous significance: 1) the authorities (whose side the machinery of state is on); 2) money; 3) the support of the press.

From this viewpoint the opposition is entirely unprepared in the immediate future for fighting in earnest for the seat of head of state.

[Verk] You have mentioned the three most significant factors in a future struggle for the presidency. As regards the authorities, all is clear. But money—what specifically do you mean?

[Yertysbayev] The fact that any election campaign costs a tremendous amount. Sergey Mavrodi, the president of the already legendary MMM joint-stock company, was the winner at recent elections to the State Duma not because he was in the voters' eyes a martyr but because the votes of the electorate had been paid for in advance—the vast majority of them are investors in the MMM joint-stock company. In addition, Mavrodi promised investments of \$10 million (!!!) for realization of a program of popular capitalism. Such stories cannot be ruled out in a future presidential election race, and with us the correlation of the forces of the authorities and the opposition here also is that of an elephant and a pug dog. The powers that be have not simply money but a great deal of money, and if the struggle becomes exacerbated to the utmost, it will all be put to use. A substantial part of the electorate is illiterate in the political sense and simply ignorant, and it is easily bought. Tremendous funds are needed for the printing of campaign literature, advertising on TV and radio, to pay for the work of the propagandists, and so forth.

The opposition would inevitably have to apply to the structures that have funds. And money is not, as we know, given out just like that. It is easy in the heat and excitement of the struggle to fall into the clutches of mafia-clan capital. On the eve of the presidential race in America, the Democrats and Republicans amass campaign funds that run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. But all this is enshrined in legislation, and there is a system of federal and public supervision. We, however, have a dark forest in this respect. No, I am definitely against early presidential elections until we have imparted to them the appropriate legal base.

[Verk] You mentioned one further factor—the news media. What role do you assign them?

[Yertysbayev] The press, the independent media particularly, is beginning to perform an enormous role in the social and political life of Kazakhstan. When certain hotheads call Nazarbayev a dictator, this is, of course, rubbish. There is in Kazakhstan a free press, and there really is freedom of speech here, as distinct from neighboring Uzbekistan, not to mention Turkmenistan, where a Niyazov "personality cult" reigns. As distinct from his Central Asian colleagues, Nazarbayev understands full well that Kazakhstan is a Europeanized state and that we have a common democratic space with Russia, and attempts to limit democracy and freedom of speech would evoke mass discontent (Nazarbayev's rating in the eyes of the great powers is high because the fundamentals of democracy in Kazakhstan are actually working). That there could be problems for the independent newspapers at election time (the printing machinery at the printers' could "unexpectedly" break down, for example, or fire-safety rules are violated) is another matter. But, in any event, it is very important whose side the independent press is on. And the position of KARAVAN, which is published in an edition of more than 300,000 copies, is incomprehensible to me from this viewpoint. KARAVAN wants to be a "newspaper for all," but it will have sooner or later to determine where it stands. In any event, KARAVAN's status as a political instrument at the coming elections will be pronounced.

[Verk] KARAVAN's role in history should not be exaggerated.... But seriously, we will never be either anyone's "instrument" or anyone's "organ."

[Yertysbayev] Nonetheless... No presidential candidate would begin a fight without having won the unambiguous support of a popular newspaper.

As far as the semi-official press is concerned, everything is clear here: It is fully under the control of the authorities. And far weaker in terms of its influence on the reading electorate also.

[Verk] Nonetheless, discussion of the candidates at the future presidential elections, has already begun; M. Ospanov and G. Aldamzharov specifically have named Serikbolsyn Abdildin and Olzhas Suleymenov.

[Yertysbayev] It seems to me that Nazarbayev is considerably underestimating Abdildin, specially since Abdildin has already once inflicted a defeat on the president, who did not want to see Abdildin in the office of chairman of the Supreme Council in January 1992. I remember what organizational work Abdildin performed and how doggedly he fought, despite his rejection by the president, winning a convincing victory over the present speaker Kekilbayev and Takezhanov, head of the Committee for Economic Reforms at that time.

[Verk] For whom did you vote at that time, if it is no secret?

[Yertysbayev] Abdildin. First, he made a firm promise to support the formation of the Socialist Party (which he did not do), and, second, I was sincerely persuaded that in relations between the president and parliament, the central issue was the budget and that it was not all obligatory for the president to have his man in the post of speaker.

But having become speaker, Abdildin occupied a conservative position, on the whole. M. Ospanov was absolutely right, calling him a lobbyist for all three first government programs, which brought the country to the brink of the abyss. And whereas Abdildin is now declaring that the president was to blame for everything, the responsibility should be shared equally.

Saying this, nor do I absolve myself, as a deputy of the last parliament, of responsibility. And although I advocated official bilingualism back at the time the Declaration on Sovereignty was adopted, even, propagandized private ownership of the land, accelerated privatization, and a mobile market reform, and, as a whole, always occupied a democratic position, I blame myself for having done this insufficiently vigorously and intelligently. All people who are related to the state organism and that engage in politics should sense the measure of their responsibility. If, on the other hand, we declare that only the president is to blame for everything, we are thereby insulting and demeaning ourselves and the people. He is the sole intelligent one, apparently, and we are, perhaps, just a flock of sheep?

As speaker of the previous parliament, Abdildin could and should have promoted to the utmost extent market reforms and democratic transformations. Instead, he indulged the party-economic nomenklatura that had ensconced itself in the government (Nazarbayev has since 1990 constantly had to replace and remove avowed opponents of the reforms and persons who were incompetent or who had simply lagged behind the requirements of life).

I associated closely with both the president and Abdildin. So, then, Abdildin, as distinct from Nazarbayev, is wholly undemocratic, does not accept a different viewpoint, doggedly pursues only his own line, and does not tolerate objections. The president, on the other hand, if

he intuitively senses that a person is saying and proposing serviceable things, responds in lively fashion (if, on the other hand, this does not interest him, he indifferently and coolly brushes it aside). I have criticized the president repeatedly and harshly, even, but I have never seen on his part a malicious or malevolent attitude toward myself. Abdildin, however, utterly rejects criticism and takes any criticism of himself extremely hard.

But this is not the point. Abdildin frankly hopes for a mass social explosion, and this is a dangerous position, in which the well-known Bolshevik rule: "You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs," begins to operate. He has devised a program that calls, virtually, for the start of an open war with Nazarbayev and appeals to the paternalist and lumpenized strata of the populace. That is, he occupies the same position as Rutskey and Khasbulatov in relation to Yeltsin in October 1993.

As far as Olzhas Suleymenov is concerned, he is in terms of charisma Nazarbayev's equal. But it is hard for me to speak about Olzhas, for he is my favorite poet. But when a poet changes his muse and begins to engage in politics, I simply cannot accept or understand this. I do not believe that Olzhas would not cope with the office of head of state. But as far as I know, he is seldom present in parliament, yet this is his main occupation. This leads me to say that any presidential candidate should understand that, if victorious, he will come in primarily and mainly for exhausting and arduous work. No politician aspires to become the director of the Karmetkombinat, a major state farm, or the leader of the Nuclear Physics Institute. Why do many people believe that leading the state is considerably easier than the said facilities?

[Verk] Does this mean that there is no alternative to Nazarbayev and that at the future elections, whenever they are held, he will be the winner?

[Yertysbayev] Were I capable of making accurate forecasts, I would not be in politics. I would be from morning till night at the racetrack.

I can merely express an assumption. It seems to me that a little while longer, and Nazarbayev will seriously miss his opportunity to remain in the public memory truly as a reformer, truly as a leader. Remember the fall of 1991, the euphoria of the liberation from communism, and the colossal vote of confidence and love, even, that Kazakhstanis expressed at the presidential elections. People voted for Nazarbayev sincerely, consciously, and with hope.

With such credit, he should have acted decisively, boldly, and on a large scale. He should have ventured upon shock therapy at that time, in January 1992, in the wake of Gaydar's reforms, and such a person as Kazhegeldin should have been installed in the office of prime minister at that time. I am sure that the people would have endured the reforms (after all, we had strong potential then).

Second, official bilingualism should have been adopted at that time also. Nazarbayev had tremendous authority, and he alone could, had he so desired, have persuaded parliament, and if not, presented it for public discussion. His charm, oratorical characteristics, political and production experience combined with his experience of life, and his terrific popularity plus his unlimited authority afforded him (and Kazakhstan also) a unique opportunity to have avoided a lengthy therapeutic cure of the collapsed administrative-command economic and social monster and to have cut by surgical intervention the Gordian knot of accumulated problems and barriers in the way of reforms. But he did not do so. He is undertaking large-scale, historic initiatives in the spirit of Peter I (I refer to the transfer of the capital to Akmola), but, as distinct from the great Russian reformer, is failing to display an obsessive doggedness, energy, and firmness in execution of the adopted decision.

[Verk] But the transfer of the capital will really take billions of dollars. These amounts are clearly beyond the capacity of our budget.

[Yertysbayev] This is not, I repeat, the main thing. Peter I destroyed by savage and barbaric methods the savagery and barbarity in Rus, forcibly introducing Western civilization. Nazarbayev, naturally, cannot employ such methods. But he needs to be politically strong-willed in the accomplishment of the charted goal. It was the lack of such will that doomed Gorbachev and led to the disappearance of the USSR from the world's political map.

O. Suleymenov on 'Constructive Opposition'

954K0300A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 2

[Interview with Olzhas Suleymenov, leader of Kazakhstan's People's Congress, by an unidentified KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent; place and date not given: "The Sense of Political Competition Is in the Competition of Constructive Programs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A week ago, after a relatively long silence, the Kazakhstan People's Congress began to talk about itself. It held a plenum whose decree states that the NKK [Kazakhstan People's Congress] party "henceforth is in constructive opposition to President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev and the administration he heads," and it is ready for the creation of an opposition bloc "for radical changes in the policy of the reforms being conducted now in Kazakhstan by holding democratic elections and by renewing the higher organs of authority in the Republic of Kazakhstan. There have not yet been such sharp statements from a party, it would seem, that is loyal to the president.

The mass media of the republic did not ignore this political sensation. It either fully published the materials of the NKK plenum, or it commented on it in detail. Olzhas Suleymenov, the leader of this party, answers KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA's questions.

[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] In a democratic society, parties increase their activity on the eve of elections. Should we construe the results of the recent NKK plenum as the start of the preelection campaign?

[Suleymenov] Yes.

[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] The stability of the sociopolitical situation in the republic can without reservations be considered an achievement, which was also noted by you in a report to the plenum. The NKK transition to the status of an opposition party can exacerbate the situation in the country. This gives rise to anxiety.

[Suleymenov] We spoke critically of the administration today, because its economic and social policy is aggravating the situation by creating tension. The people's store of trust and patience is being exhausted, which can lead to rather predictable results. We do not want chaos.

[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] You said at the plenum that a nostalgia is growing among our people for the communist past, during which the people were not very surfeited, but also not hungry...

[Suleymenov] And it is necessary to consider this mood one of the main achievements of the current government, when totalitarianism is associated with tranquility and well-being, and "independence," "freedom," and "democracy"—with growing hunger, massive impoverishment, and a lack of confidence in tomorrow. We are right, while it is not late, to try to fill these words with real content.

[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] Your party supported the president's policy all three years of your existence...

[Suleymenov] In its political, but not its economic aspect. We are for peace and harmony; however, political stability can be destroyed by a rapidly falling standard of living.

To what kind of a market were we brought? A competitive market reduces prices, a monopolistic market increases them. A crude low production monopolistic market was formed in our country, because of the absence of conditions for competitive mass commodity production. For example, the recent freeing of prices for bread. It is useful only to the state joint-stock company Astyk, which has concentrated the entire wholesale purchase of grain in its hands. Do the peasant-producers of grain win out? Their share amounts to 18.9 percent of the price of bread, traders—10 percent, and the earnings of the Astyk joint-stock company—70 percent.

But the peasants are not receiving pay for last year's and this year's harvest. How are they to survive? And how are those to survive who buy bread in stores at American prices? This would be justified, if wages were also American. In the United States, the minimum comes close to \$1,000, and in our country—to \$2. Therefore, the slogan of the current government program of "Freedom for Prices!" would be correct, if we had supported the freedom of competition of commodity production at the beginning.

[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] Kazakhstan is being confidently "registered" in the world community, and its image is being formed—will the political competition not hurt it?

[Suleymenov] Well, the republic has been recognized by more than 100 states of the world. There is nothing unusual about this and to anyone's credit. Just as many states of the United Nations recognized Turkmenia, Georgia—all of the other former republics of the former USSR. This is an enthusiastic reaction of the world, which is tired of the cold war and the collapse of the "evil empire." Now, it is more important that the people of these new states recognize that they are independent and are pleased with this.

The world knows everything about us, and diplomatic courtesy should not deceive us. We are not a "banana country," but a once powerful industrial-agricultural republic. We are in a condition to distinguish a condescending pat on the back from real respect. We can revitalize ourselves and go further. The sense of political competition is in the competition of constructive programs. Our own program for developing Kazakhstan is being formed here, and its philosophy differs from the ideology of the government programs, which is very simple—"let the strongest survive." This is the philosophy of a wild nature that does not feel sorry for the sick and the weak. It suits the criminal world. Therefore, this category also received strong development in our country. But a human society that is brought up on different moral postulates is what distinguishes it from animals. A society that lacks culture and that rejects thousands of years of tradition of compassion and mutual support slides into a primitive state. We must resist this and create a life that is worthy of man.

Peregrin on Parliament, Opposition

954K0313A *Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian*
8 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Peregrin, deputy of the Supreme Council and leader of the Legal Development of Kazakhstan faction, by correspondent Aygul Omarova; place and date not given: "The One Whose Forecasts Prove the Soundest Is the One Who Is Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Omarova] Why is there such a difference in the evaluations of the situation in the republic that are made by the government and the opposition? One has the impression that these two categories of people live in entirely different states. Whereas some talk about the collapse of the economy and coming upheavals, others talk about their firm intention to stick to the chosen course and about the carte-blanche for 15 months. Who is right?

[Peregrin] The one whose forecasts prove the soundest is the one who is right, of course. And if the opposition was able at the start of summer to forecast the collapse of the government at the start of fall and the general economic

situation in the republic by this time, close attention should obviously be paid to the opposition's evaluations.

The parliamentary opposition in Kazakhstan has an indisputable advantage: We get information "first-hand"—from the electorate. We have no need to embellish reality, and reports are not made for us from "filtered" and carefully sifted information. Each of us knows well enough the situation in the constituency; together quite a full and objective picture for the whole republic is obtained.

[Omarova] The opposition is demonstratively detaching itself from the resignation of the cabinet, stressing that it is none of its business. There have been no attempts on your part to take advantage of the situation and seek the formation, say, of a coalition government and a public rejection of the policy that has been pursued. Does this testify to disarray?

[Peregrin] Of course not. Note that neither parliament nor the opposition has ever opposed personalities in the government—only the policy that has been pursued. When the question of the resignation of the cabinet and the confirmation of the new composition of the upper stratum of the new cabinet surfaced, we were faced with a choice: either to confirm what had been proposed, while continuing to reject the policy that was being pursued, or to enter into an argument over personalities. Had we entered into an argument and come to an arrangement on compromise figures, we would then (even in the event of continuation of the policy that had been pursued previously) have assumed moral obligations to support the agreed figures. Could we have agreed to this, having declared the policy that was being pursued antipopular? Of course not.

Having agreed to confirm the proposed cabinet, we once more gave the executive the choice: either a dialogue with the opposition, a course correction, and mutual concessions or hard-line confrontation.

It would seem that parliament's no-conflict choice was right: In the very first days the government declared a desire to work in contact both with parliament as a whole and with the opposition—both parliamentary and "external." The first contacts have been very promising.

As far as the possibility of the executive's disavowal of the former course is concerned, its actual correction is far more important for us than hollow statements. Of course, there is the moral aspect of this problem also: You will agree that when the head of the executive begins to talk about the economy in the words of the opposition and declares here that the "shadow cabinet will always be overshadowed," doubts as to the sincerity of the statements about a desire to conduct a constructive dialogue with the opposition arise.

[Omarova] Nonetheless, the dialogue has begun and has been, according to your own evaluations, highly constructive. But a really constructive dialogue implies an

adjustment of the positions of both parties. And if the new cabinet is prepared to adjust its positions, is the opposition prepared to do likewise? And if so, on which issues?

[Peregrin] We differed with the former cabinet on two most important positions: industrial policy and the policy of reform of property relationships, simply put, privatization. In the original version of the government program there was no section on industrial policy at all. The section that appeared later is simply impracticable with the monetary, customs, fiscal, and foreign policy that is being pursued. And we are perfectly prepared to adjust our approaches to the details of a stimulatory, protectionist industrial policy if the cabinet as a whole creates the conditions for its effective implementation, having changed primarily monetary and customs policy.

On questions of the implementation of privatization the opposition is far from united. We should be speaking about the achievement of a balance of different interests in privatization, therefore. I believe that if the dialogue with the government succeeds, there will be no losers. Both furious reformers and inveterate conservatives will benefit equally.

[Omarova] An idyllic picture! Could anything prevent a successful dialogue with the government?

[Peregrin] The authorities have thus far expressed the interests of a very limited group of people, being very closely interwoven with this group. The competition within the executive and the government's loss of its sole external pillar—the support of parliament—brought about the collapse of the former cabinet. I am inventing nothing in speaking about the competition for power within the executive. The words "Tereshchenko's team" and the "president's team" were merely a hackneyed newspaper cliché—there was no "team." The reading public was greatly astonished at the "self-cleansing" of the state authorities, which had "suddenly" discovered within themselves transgressors of "moral principles," which erupted. The analytical public was not astonished—it was obvious that a change in alignment of forces within the so-called "team" was behind the belated exposures. And the accession to power of the new cabinet, in which there are strikingly many old faces, makes it possible to determine quite accurately which of the old cabinet belonged to the competing group.

It is possible that the new cabinet, which came from that same "group," will continue to implement the "reforms" in its interests. In this case its speedy end—within no more than six months—is inevitable, for such a policy cannot in principle obtain the support of parliament. Consequently, the cabinet would not obtain external in this case. And the deteriorating socioeconomic situation would inevitably increase the chances of another "internal" competing grouping.

In this case the executive has to attempt to "include" parliament or weaken it as much as possible and make it

its own impotent appendage. There are many methods, and they could be successful: The "executive lobby" in parliament is too great and a significant part of the leadership of parliament tries all too assiduously to please the executive.

This is the worst version. In this case we would all—the whole republic—lose. After all, the agreement on "peace and friendship" of parliament, the government, and the president and the dialogue with the government—all this is exclusively thanks to the existence and activity of the parliamentary opposition and the strengthening of the positions of parliament. And is it a bad thing if, when strategic decisions are being made, account is taken of the maximum number of opinions and approaches?

Now about the best version.

The government, recognizing the inevitability of its own demise in the event of a continuation of the course chosen by the former government, agrees to adjust the program. In this case it makes a great deal of sense for the government to organize a full-fledged dialogue with parliament. Having achieved revisions to the program coordinated with parliament, the cabinet could boldly expect the support of the deputies. Not only legislative but also—most important!—political. And the political support would be the stronger, the firmer the positions of parliament. In this case the government would be assured a long and productive life, and the republic, successful reforms.

Recent events instill hope of the realization of this version and of the government in reality conceiving a desire to become an independent political (and long-lived!) entity.

True, such a "spread" clearly does not suit the above-mentioned "group." The "group's" need to control the actions of the cabinet determines also the need to isolate the cabinet from a parliament that is manifestly opposed to the interests of the "group" and also the need for a weakening of parliament as a body and the need to frustrate the "government-parliament" dialogue.

The start of a campaign aimed against parliament is inevitable in the very near future, therefore. This campaign will most likely be conducted in the guise of "constitutional reforms," "parliamentary reforms," or "improvement of parliamentary activity." In actual fact, the campaign has already begun. It is far from fortuitous that the chairman of the Supreme Council recently reproduced in a lengthy monologue almost verbatim several pages from a well-known book on the parliament and government of Germany. The essence of the monologue amounted to the need for the transition to the legislative procedure accepted in Germany. The main idea of this procedure is the very big role of the government in the legislative process.

Not a word was said here about the fact that in our UNITARY and PRESIDENTIAL republic it is proposed

adopting the procedures of a FEDERATIVE and PARLIAMENTARY country, in which the federal government is fully dependent on parliament.

References to world experience in these games are useless—there immediately follows an explanation of the need for a search for an "exclusively Kazakhstani" path of development (which in many instances is reminiscent, and increasingly strongly, what is more, of the worst Latin American path).

It is these "games" that I fear most. It is they that are the main danger for the dialogue between parliament and government that has begun.

[Omarova] But in advocating a strengthening of the positions of parliament you are "exposing" yourself—it is easy to reproach you with a desire for power without responsibility, with the fact that the opposition in parliament is "pulling the bedclothes onto its side," preventing the government from working and annoying the president....

[Peregrin] I want one thing—the constructive interaction of the authorities not to be impeded by "self-reform" fuss, transfers of the capital, or the personal ambitions and inconstancy of leaders from both sides. And the shocks from the unpopular measures to be cushioned to the extent that parliament deems sufficient and the corrected reform course to correspond not to the "fundamental" and "true" but to the vital interests of Kazakhstanis. I believe that the power accorded parliament by the constitution is perfectly sufficient for this—if only parliament RECOGNIZES, and the executive branch ACKNOWLEDGES, this power.

Kazhegeldin on Business Ties to Russia

954K0334A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Oct 94 p 2

["First Interview in the Russian Press" with Akezhan Kazhegeldin, prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by journalist Ivan Bogachev; place and date not given: "Kazakhstan's Economic Revival Program Puts the Emphasis on an Influx of Russian Capital"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the advent of the new premier, observers are forecasting a new era in the relations of Kazakhstan and Russia. Indirect confirmation that serious changes are planned in the republic was the recent unprecedented resignation of this country's entire cabinet.

The new premier, who a year ago swapped entrepreneurial activity for a job in the government, has the reputation among journalists of a "Kazakhstani Gaidar." He is described as being a supporter of a strict monetarist policy of reform of the economy and of integration with Russia.

The Kazhegeldin government intends to extricate Kazakhstan from the crisis within the next 15 months. This,

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in any event, is stated in the program of economic revival that was drafted under its leadership.

To the question: "Is it not offensive to you that in relation to the tenge the ruble is something of a hard currency?" the new premier confidently replies that within a year the situation on the market will have changed fundamentally.

Judging by Mr. Kazhegeldin's first interview, a big stake in the new reform program is placed on cooperation with Russia and spare Russian capital.

"Following the recent summit, I had a four-hour meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin. This meeting had been a dream of mine since the time of the collapse of the Union. We spoke, naturally, primarily about the mutual integration of Russian and Kazakh capital. I am profoundly convinced that the interests of the proprietors should be the basis of the rapprochement of our countries. And it is essential for this to coordinate the reforms lest subsequently one country develop by the path of Kuwait, another, of Malaysia, and yet another, of Singapore."

Of course, Kazakhstan has today lagged behind Russia in implementation of the reforms. "We are late primarily in the liberalization of prices, markets, and production relations."

When undertaking price liberalization, Russia was able to install a mechanism of growth in personal income. Kazakhstan was unable to do this inasmuch as it was in the ruble zone and could not influence inflation processes.

In addition, many impetuous steps were taken at the start of this year, mutual settlements were practiced, for example. This increased the money supply considerably and lowered the value of the national currency. And a severe lag in personal income compared with the income of Russians was revealed simultaneously.

But the free convertibility of the Kazakhstani currency in relation to the ruble has already been achieved. This is not the case in any other CIS country as yet, and for this reason other republics are viewing the Balance of Payments Agreement with tremendous concern. At the same time, on the other hand, businessmen have excellent experience of work according to the ruble-dollar model.

Kazakhstan is tied more than others to Russia, whence its aspiration to strengthen business ties. "If some people try to bar us from the 'Russian door,' we will get in through the 'Russian window.' This is inevitable."

"As premier I want to ensure that Russian capital, which is already walking on its own, be oriented increasingly toward Kazakhstan. The first banks are already arriving. Specifically, the Alfa-bank is operating, and the Tveruniversalbank is beginning to operate in note-circulation modes. On the doorstep we have Most, Menatep, Olbi.... And we will do everything to ensure normal conditions for them.

"We are awaiting Russian businessmen in absolutely all sectors. And we intend to create a good investment climate for Russian capital."

Journalists Comment on Caspian Oil Deal

954K0302A *Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 5 Nov 94 p 3

[Roundup of reports by AZIYA and KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents in Moscow, Baku, Ashgabat, and Aktau: "Big-Time Oil—A Big-Time Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first wave of controversy over the conclusion of the contract between Azerbaijan and the International Consortium on Joint Development of the Petroleum Deposits of the Caspian Shelf has died down. The abundance and intensiveness of these discussions, their contradictory and emotional nature, the mutually exclusive assessments and unwavering interest in these events in many countries of the world confirm once again the old truth: Where there is the scent of big-time oil there will inevitably be big-time games, including political ones. And none of the Caspian states (nor, incidentally, many of those that are located thousands of kilometers away from the Caspian but have a keen sense of smell for oil) want to be left on the sidelines. Therefore it is our conviction that the situation surrounding the Caspian oil, which developed after 20 September of this year—the day the aforementioned contract was concluded—is of obvious interest to the readers in Kazakhstan. In order to satisfy this interest the editors of the newspapers AZIYA and KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA turned to their correspondents in Moscow, Baku, Ashkhabad [Ashgabat], and Aktau and asked them to share their observations. Here is what they reported....

All Nalbov From Baku: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Is Hinting at the Possibility of Sanctions Against Azerbaijan

On 20 September of this year in the Gyulistan Palace a contract was signed between the state petroleum company of Azerbaijan and a consortium of foreign companies concerning joint development of the deposits of the Caspian shelf. The petroleum lake that is hidden under the bottom of the Caspian Sea, which contains more than 4 billion barrels of "black gold," has now come to be called the "contract territory." Located on it are three of the largest petroleum storehouses in the world—Azeri, Chirag, and also the deep water part of the fishing area Gyuneshli. Members of the consortium are investing \$7.4 billion in the project. The foreign partners, who are providing 80 percent of the capital investments, have distributed them and their profit as follows: B.P.—17.127, Amoco—17.01, LUKOyl—10, McDermott—2.45, Pennzoil and Remco—11.9, Statoil—8.583, Turkish Petroleum Company—1.75, and Unocal—11.2 percent. Over the course of 30 years it is intended to extract 511 million tonnes of oil, of which 253 million tonnes will be placed at Azerbaijan's disposal. Along with the oil,

casing head and free gas will be extracted from the bottom of the Caspian in amounts of 55 and 90 billion cubic meters, respectively. Azerbaijan has also been assigned ownership of this. The estimated profit from the implementation of the project is \$34 billion. Azerbaijan will receive its share from three sources: as rightful owner of the natural resources, for participation in investments in the project, and in the form of taxes into the budget in an amount of one-fourth of all the consortium's revenues.

Nowhere and at no time has big-time oil done without a big-time political gain. Azerbaijan is no exception. The conflicts involved with the Caspian oil and the 1994 Gyulistan Treaty have grown up under the influence of such realities as the Karabakh war, the economic crisis, and the conflict of geopolitical interests.

The negative reaction of certain circles in Russia was predicted before the contract was signed. What was unexpected was how overt it was. The explosion of the first "bomb" was the announcement of the director of the information department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Grigoriy Karasin, on nonrecognition of the "Gyulistan Treaty." The day the contract was signed, Karasin explained that Moscow considers the Caspian to be not a lake but a sea in which the water area located beyond the 12-mile coastal zone must have the status of neutral waters. Consequently, the Azeri, Chirag, and Gyuneshli fields, located 120 miles from shore, and also other oil bearing areas prospected by Azerbaijan petroleum workers but not yet mapped out, automatically fall into the disputed category. Two days later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia warned Baku that the legal conditions for the Caspian Sea were determined as far back as the time of the Soviet-Iranian treaties of 1921 and 1940, which prohibited participation in the assimilation of the Caspian's resources by states that are not located on its shores, and these shall remain in effect until such time as the Caspian countries have developed new legal conditions for this body of water.

The question of the status of the Caspian basin was first officially raised by Russia in October 1993 at a conference of heads of Caspian states in Astrakhan, when Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin suggested "cutting out" for each Caspian republic 12 miles of territorial waters and declaring the entire Caspian water area a neutral zone. Baku took the hint that the Russian company LUKOyl had been included in the consortium with a reserved 10 percent in the distribution of profit, which practically everyone regarded as Baku's payment for Moscow's obligingness.

Moscow became obliging soon after the visit to Azerbaijan on 19-20 November 1993 of Minister of Fuel and Energy of Russia Yuriy Shafranik and LUKOyl president Vakhid Alekperov. The result of the negotiations was the conclusion of a Russian-Azerbaijan agreement on cooperation in the area of energy engineering and also an agreement on reserving for LUKOyl a share in the

assimilation of the fields in the Caspian. "My trip was approved personally by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who ordered me to convey that this sphere of relations between our states is regarded as vitally important in Russia," Yu. Shafranik summed up the results of the trip.

By turning over the Gyuneshli field to LUKOyl (45 percent of the joint-stock capital in it belongs to the Government of the Russian Federation), which controls 15 percent of the Russian petroleum market, Geydar Aliyev actually shifted the Russian-Azerbaijan disagreements to a different plane—Russian-Russian, and the interests of the fuel and energy complex began to conflict with those of the foreign political establishment of the Russian Federation. In May of this year when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia sent a note to the Government of Great Britain protesting the use in the British-Azerbaijan memorandum "On Cooperation in the Area of Energy Engineering" of the term "Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian," the disturbed Aliyev telephoned Chernomyrdin and obtained his assurances that Russia did not intend to raise the question of the status of the Caspian and that Azerbaijan could disseminate his statement as an official viewpoint. Which was done.

But the champions of Russian state interests on Smolenskaya Square did not want to give in to the fuel and energy complex without a battle. A unique document found its way to the Azerbaijan press—a text of a letter from A. Kozyrev to V. Chernomyrdin under the title "On the Problem of the Caspian Sea."

"By a directive from the president of the Russian Federation, No. 396-rpo of 21 July 1994, Russia's position regarding questions of the legal conditions of the Caspian has been established," it says in the letter from the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation. "In compliance with the directive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, a statement has been sent to the Governments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan regarding their attempts at unilaterally changing the existing conditions for the Caspian Sea....

"But in spite of this, on 20 September of this year in Baku Azerbaijan signed a contract with Western companies for assimilation of the oil fields on the bottom of the Caspian Sea. This contract is based on a reference to the notion that Azerbaijan has its own 'sector' in the Caspian Sea where it has a right to dispose of the natural resources.

"One of the participants in the project was the Russian company LUKOyl, which owns about 10 percent of the shares. If one proceeds from the idea that Azerbaijan will continue its unilateral actions and the contract is carried out, one could get the impression that it is better to have something than nothing. But this would mean essentially recognizing the extension of Azerbaijan's jurisdiction to considerable regions of the Caspian Sea, which would ultimately lead to dividing this closed body of water, and

Russia would end up in the most disadvantageous position because it would receive the most insignificant and unpromising section of the Caspian. This would cause essential harm to Russia's economic interests....

"Therefore Russia cannot recognize the contract signed in Baku any more than it can other actions to the extent that they claim to assimilate individual sections of the Caspian Sea, taking into account the negative consequences for its interests.

"Azerbaijan's unilateral actions require the development and adoption of appropriate responsive measures of a trade-economic and financial nature which could motivate this country to respect Russia's interests and the norms of international law....

"As a first practical step the Government of Azerbaijan should be informed through diplomatic channels that these measures are being developed, including the question of the use of Russia's internal bodies of water by ships flying Azerbaijan's flag and also the right to ownership of stationary platforms and other petroleum equipment which was in the Caspian Sea at the time the USSR ceased to exist, taking into account the fact that this property is outside the territory of Azerbaijan."

And so Moscow has started to speak—true, as it were, "for official use" so far—about sanctions against Azerbaijan and the members of the CIS. Has it perhaps done more than simply bring the subject up? In the words of the deputy chief of the Caspian Maritime Shipping Line, Vagif Agazade, Russia has not allowed ships of Azerbaijan into its internal waters for shipping the grain that has been purchased—this is done only by ships of the Volga Shipping Line.

At the summit of the heads of the CIS states in Moscow on 22-23 October V. Chernomyrdin again assured G. Aliyev that the Russian Government would not act against the contract. Minister of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation Yuriy Shafranik seconded V. Chernomyrdin: The department in all ways supports the plan for the assimilation of the oil fields of the Caspian shelf and thinks that it would be a great mistake for Russia to withdraw from further participation in it.

The influential Azerbaijani newspaper AYNA (Mirror) made the suggestion that the leakage of information from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was organized especially so that the Azerbaijan leadership would know the possible consequences of their actions, which official Moscow considered it incorrect to announce openly. This suggestion is bolstered by the fact that A. Kozirev's letter "was leaked" to the press at the very time when the Russian capital was being visited by Iran's minister of foreign affairs, Mahmud Vayezi (name as published).

President of Turkey Suleyman Demirel, after learning of the sanctions against Azerbaijan that were being prepared, abandoned his traditional restraint. "What is

happening," the patriarch of Turkish diplomacy wondered at a news conference on the results of the Istanbul meeting of leaders of Turkic-speaking states on 19 October, "they are taking the land away from Azerbaijan and turning the population into refugees. There is so much injustice being done to this country. And economic sanctions on top of this? Imagine how difficult this would be. But if this were suddenly to happen, Turkey would come out against such injustice."

American President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister John Major tried to reason with B. Yeltsin during the September session of the UN General Assembly and promised G. Aliyev their support, while at the same time letting it be understood that Russia is not Iraq and nobody intends to fight with it over Azerbaijan oil.

At a meeting of the heads of Turkic-speaking states in Istanbul, Turkey in conjunction with Azerbaijan made an attempt to move their neighbors in the direction of a union between Ankara and Baku, including regarding the Caspian problem. But the leaders of the Turkic-speaking countries of the CIS were cautious. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, avoiding an assessment of the contract itself, spoke with alarm about the problem of determining the status of the Caspian. President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov said: "We object to the signing of the contract, all we want is to resolve the problem of the status of the Caspian as quickly as possible so that none of our neighbors will suspect one another and so that the Caspian will not become a bone of contention." Aliyev held the same position.

A group of experts from the independent Institute of Sociohistorical Problems at Moscow State University and the Foros Fund, analyzing possible ways of blocking the contract, writes: "It is becoming extremely important to provide for influence of one country or another on those states on whose territories the route of the new gas and oil pipelines will lie. In this connection it is extremely important for Russia to make arrangements with Armenia, through whose territory the oil line from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey could pass. It seems that it would also be appropriate to have a military base here, about which an agreement was signed during the course of the visit of the chairman of the Council of the Federation, Vladimir Shumeyko, to Yerevan."

Obviously the military base could "be suitable" for more than just that.

Viktor Yurgintsev from Moscow: "...And We Buy Sturgeon for Petrodollars?"

The zealous, even somewhat nervous attitude of Russian diplomacy toward the signing of the Azerbaijan agreement with the transnational oil consortium for the development of three of the largest fields in the Caspian shows that Moscow is perceiving a shift of geoeconomic interests in the former Union republics. In the legal department the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave me a quite convincing interpretation that the Caspian is a unique body of water where 90 percent of the world's sturgeon supply live, and to sacrifice its natural wealth for the sake of "contemptible" oil is simply irrational. One can hardly do both: have fish to eat and work the shelf.

But the reaction of the high Russian leadership by no means indicates that a wave has started. And although they say that Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin is finding mutual understanding with President G. Aliyev, all this is circulating at the level of certain "informed sources of information" but by no means official opinions. The situation is ticklish also because another state department, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy Resources, has given its blessing to the transaction, thinking that 10 percent of the share of the LUKOyl Company will be quite sufficient to maintain the state's prestige and assert its interests. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan G. Gasanov cleverly points out these differences between the two Russian ministries. And it does indeed turn out to be somehow awkward.

The more so since long before the solemn contract-signing ceremony in Baku's Gyulistan palace it became clear to foreign political observers that, having taken this contract under his personal protection, Geydar Aliyev, a one-time member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee who completed the "construction project of the century," the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], would not miss his chance this time. The more so since his future as a politician and the future of his clan and his country are ultimately directly related to the transformation of Caspian oil into petrodollars.

To the insightful observers, of course, the journey of representatives of the Azerbaijani delegation to Saudi Arabia in the middle of July was no secret. It was not simply a religious pilgrimage but a real business visit during which Aliyev conducted several important rounds of negotiations. Soon it was announced that the petroleum and gas complex of Azerbaijan was being granted a loan of \$2 billion, and the first \$550 million would be received that same year.

Further, as early as the end of July in the American city of Houston there was another round of negotiations, and Aliyev was kept abreast of the course of these by television. Taking into account the fact that his son Ilham is the vice president of the state petroleum company, some of this attention from the state could be regarded as simply paternal. "Nothing and nobody can keep us from signing this contract," Aliyev announced. And that is the way it was. All that is left is once again to certify the extent to which economic interests dictate the contours of political strategy.

It is clear that the example of the rapid prosperity on the basis of oil of the Muslim Persian Gulf countries inspires hope in both Azerbaijani and other leaders of the new-fledged states. The three years spent under conditions of closed developing sovereignty, essentially, brought

nobody either well-being, or many billions in Western credit, or even the prospect of a rapid economic upsurge.

Moreover, rich investors are not hurrying to the expenses of the former USSR. And since Baku has managed to attract eight of the largest oil companies, allowing them to receive 80 (!) percent of the revenues from the sale of oil and all the gas condensate, this would have been welcomed in the CIS as the betrothal of one of the unmarried sisters to a rich merchant. But the reaction in the post-Soviet family turned out to be more than restrained and even negative. Why?

All one can do is guess, the more so since among the multitude of commentaries on this subject there is so much that is contradictory, contrived, and speculative that it is better not even to give any quotations: It is all a jumble.

It is another matter to predict the situation in the region, taking into account the historical facts and the far-reaching interests. There is no doubt that Azerbaijan has been drawn and will be drawn even more to Turkey, without, of course, compromising its statehood. It is understandable that the sudden appearance of six states, both the secular ones and those that have historically confessed Islam, changes the alignment of forces on the Eurasian continent a very great deal. Moreover, as the war in Tajikistan showed, Russia intends to continue in the future to conduct a fairly active policy on the outskirts of the former empire, giving no thought to victims or costs. Speaking at the UN, President B. Yeltsin expressed himself fairly strongly on this account.

Taking into account the by no means uniform development of the post-Soviet Asiatic republics, the mentalities of their population, and their economic potential, the most fantastic predictions can be made, the more so since many processes are just developing and the euphoric ideas from the first years of sovereignty are being revised. Serious adjustments are inevitable. And the fact that Azerbaijan has found its "Archimedes Lever" for emerging from the crisis is quite justified and predictable.

The diplomatic demarches, it seems, will not stop Aliyev's cabinet from going through with what they had planned, which promises no more or less than \$34 billion. And if the power changes, the priority will remain the same—to extract oil. There is no other way.

Azerbaijan's trading diaspora is extremely impressive in Moscow, but big-time politics is still going on for the sale of talent or illegally caught sturgeon. Perhaps the unforgettable Leonid Ilich Brezhnev was right when in his declining years he proclaimed: "Azerbaijan is striding boldly forward" (!). But the whole problem is that there are four masters of the Caspian. And they should be walking in step. Incidentally, we are speaking about a sea-lake and thus about the ability to swim, which so far each is trying to do alone.

Marat Gurt from Ashgabat: "The Policy of 'Flexible Reaction'"

The recently concluded contract between Azerbaijan and the petroleum companies of the West did not go unnoticed by the Turkmen public. But, in keeping with developing tradition, Ashgabat is keeping its own "special" opinion to itself. At least in the corresponding ministries everyone is being given to understand that it is exclusively the president who forms the state view and he is the one who expresses it.

In the opinion of the head of Turkmenistan, S. Niyazov, "The Caspian is the common property of all five states touched by its waters and each of them has every right to its desired interest in the idea of rationally utilizing and multiplying its wealth." The Caspian Sea, thinks the Turkmen president, should be transformed into a zone of political stability and peace, good-neighbor relations, and close economic cooperation.

Turkmenistan's position regarding the Caspian Sea and questions pertaining to the utilization and exploitation of its water basin and water resources follows from the general concept of the country's foreign political and foreign economic course—respect for the borders and territorial integrity of all states, the point of departure for which is the so-called "positive neutrality" policy.

From the last steps that were taken it is obvious that the Caspian is of special interest to Ashgabat as it is to Almaty and Baku, above all from the standpoint of petroleum extraction. And the water area of the central Caspian, one of the promising petroleum and gas sites, according to a report from TURKMENPRESS, is already being considered as a testing ground for study by the Oman petroleum company, Oman Company, Ltd. The potential investor intends to drill an evaluation well here and conduct exploration work.

On the eve of the third anniversary of Turkmenistan's independence (among the high-level guests participating in the festivities, in addition to Suleyman Demirel and Benazir Bhutto, was the "disturber of the peace" Geydar Aliyev), in Ashgabat a trilateral agreement was signed for the creation of a consortium for developing the Turkmen zone of the Caspian. Oil partners from Russia and Iran will be working on this both on the shore and on the shelf. In the words of Turkmen Vice President Boris Shikhmuradov, this certainly does not mean that the consortium's doors are closed to other Caspian states. According to the deputy prime minister's assurances, the path is open to anyone wishing to invest money and technology here. At the same time he emphasized Russia's role as a key economic and geopolitical partner of Turkmenistan.

Olga Kovalenko from Aktau: "A Storm on Land, a Breeze on the Shelf"

The production association Mangistaumunaygaz was designated as No. 1 in a recently published list of Kazakhstan's candidates for bankruptcy. When the report of

this reached Aktau, it had the effect of a bomb going off. The first reaction from the petroleum workers was biting, "We are hearing of bankruptcy," they said, meaning the Cabinet of Ministers at the time. One can understand this bitterness if one looks at the figures: 3,353 billion tenges are owed by this association to its associates and the budget, and others owe it 9 billion tenges. And the lion's share of the association's debtors are state structures.

Since April of this year, by a directive of the government at that time, the people in Mangistau have been sending oil to the refineries without payment. Actually it was largely because of the oil workers that the planting and harvesting campaigns were completed. Near the end of its term the previous Cabinet of Ministers issued two decrees which threw the already impoverished oil workers. Decree No. 841 made it incumbent on the oil workers to provide for regular operation of the refineries with deferment of payment until 1 November. The other, No. 1013, generally calls for payment for oil products from the republic budget only as money is accumulated.

By that time the situation in the Mangistaumunaygaz production association was critical. The workers had not been paid for several months. Certain brigades were refusing to work without pay. There were even hunger strikes on the job. Because of the lack of financing, repair and preventive work went poorly in the oil fields and no new equipment or chemical reagents were purchased. The result was that this year alone about 1 million tonnes of oil which could have been extracted was left in the ground. In recent years a total of almost 6 million tonnes of "black gold" has not been extracted.

Recently the collegium of the Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry headed by the new minister, Nurlan Balgimbayev, especially considered the question of the so-called "bankruptcy" of the Mangistaumunaygaz association. In the words of the association's general director, Nasipkali Marabayev, they managed to solve a number of specific problems: The oil workers were permitted to sell 200,000 tonnes of oil abroad and half of the revenues were to be turned over to the budget, while the rest could be used to pay wages to the workers. An agreement was also reached to conduct a mutual settlement between the oil workers and the companies engaged in delivering grain and fuel and lubricants. Additionally, permission was granted for credit against future exports of "black gold" and a quota was set for the sale of 600,000 tonnes of oil abroad. All this, in the opinion of the general director, makes it possible to hope that in November the financial situation of the largest oil and gas extraction association in the republic will improve.

As for the "swan song" of the outgoing cabinet—the list of candidates for bankruptcy—it was clearly sung on a false note. Mangistaumunaygaz thinks that this statement about bankruptcy caused it significant moral and material harm. A couple of days ago the oil workers sent

a telegram to the corresponding departments demanding an official denial of the conclusions about their financial position.

Photographs from space and ground investigations make it possible to assume that the major operational Kazakhstan oil fields now—Tengiz Prorva, Kalamkas, and Karazhanbas—are only the "outskirts" of a large petroleum deposit, the center of which is in the northern part of the Caspian Sea. Supplies of hydrocarbon raw material concealed here under the water are estimated at roughly 3 billion tonnes. But until full-scale geophysical studies are done and exploratory drilling is completed, it would be premature to make a simple judgment about the capacities of the underwater petroleum beds.

As the general director of the Mangistau territorial directorate of the company Kazakhstankaspiyshelf, Koyshibay Usenov, announced, recently the cargo aircraft Russian delivered to the Aktau airport 27 unique ships from the American firm Western Atlas which were intended for maritime geophysical studies. The ships are designed to work under the special conditions of shallow water with strong gusty winds and high frothy waves, all that is typical of the Atyrau section of the shelf. Therefore the geophysical flotilla left the seaport of Aktau for the north to Atyrau.

The bid for conducting the geophysical studies on the southern 140 kilometer deep-water Mangistaunaygaz section of the shelf was won this year by the D.J. Size firm of the United States. Now, according to the schedule, specialized equipment will be shipped to Aktau in May of next year and in the summer they will begin large-scale geophysical studies of the Caspian shelf in the region of Mangistau. This work is to be finished in a year-and-a-half to two years. These deadlines were possible because of the fact that the Caspian does not freeze in these places and the studies will be conducted year-round.

For the year of work in Mangistau Oblast, Kazakhstankaspiyshelf and its partners invested money in the development of the region's infrastructure. A million dollars were allotted for expanding the take-off and landing strip and reconstruction of the Aktau airport as a whole. They invested \$350,000 for the acquisition and assembly of a technological line for bottling therapeutic local mineral water. Bidding was announced for the purchase of a line for producing sprats and firms from Italy, Norway, and Germany participated in it. In 1996 in the city of Fort-Shevchenko an installation for desalinizing sea water will be installed at the expense of the consortium. Bidding has already been opened for this project.

In spite of all the obvious advantages Mangistau has already obtained and will obtain in the future when the international consortium under the patronage of Kazakhstankaspiyshelf comes here, the main concern of the population is still ecology. This is how K. Usenov

answered a question about the safety of the research and development of the sea deposits that are being conducted here:

"The firms that are cooperating with us have behind them a rich experience in the development of oil fields on the sea shelf. And they are just as interested as we are in preserving the region's ecology—any false step, even the slightest, could cost them their good name. With the competition that exists in the world this is tantamount to bankruptcy...."

This is precisely why Kazakhstankaspiyshelf is now especially concerned about being blamed for others' mistakes. The continuously rising level of the Caspian threatens to cover with water the mothballed wells which at one time were drilled in large quantities at the very edge of the sea. Nobody can say with confidence today how the cement and metal of these wells will act under the conditions of aggressive sea water. But Kazakhstankaspiyshelf and its companions in the consortium guarantee the safety of their equipment. And the consortium is prepared to compensate for the problems that could be caused to the ecology of the water area by allotting foreign currency for the development of fishing in the region.

In Lieu of an Afterword

Exhaustive information about the position of the Kazakhstan side was provided by the president of the state company Kazakhstankaspiyshelf, Baltabek Kuandykov. Kazakhstan has entered into the harsh realities of the 20th century, the entire history of which convincingly tells us that big-time oil is a weighty argument in any dispute. And the amount of oil in the northern Caspian is indeed impressive—about 3.5 billion tonnes, plus 2-2.5 trillion cubic meters of gas. According to the most cautious estimates, Kazakhstan's annual extraction taking into account that which is extracted from the shelf could amount to 70 million tonnes, while Kazakhstan is now extracting 22 million tonnes from all of its fields and the republic's own need is at the level of 18-20 million tonnes.

Kazakhstankaspiyshelf, and later the consortium as well with the participation of Egypt, British Gas and British Petroleum, Shell, Total, and Mobil Oil, which are paying all the costs in the initial stage of the project, have been created for detailed prospecting and subsequent assimilation of the North Caspian shelf. It is Kuandykov's conviction that the project could become the locomotive for the republic's entire economy, a source of strengthening and modernizing existing and new branches. According to the estimates of Western experts, a plan is developing which could become investment project No. 1 in the world at the beginning of the 21st century.

Commenting on Azerbaijan's contract and the polemics surrounding it, the chief of Kazakhstankaspiyshelf expressed restrained confusion about the differences in approaches between the Russian foreign political and

fuel-energy departments. From Kuandykov's standpoint this disagreement has purely political underpinnings which can hardly be deciphered without access to the corridors of Russian power. Kuandykov said that we have no principle differences with our Russian and Azerbaijani colleagues at the level of enterprises and departments and we certainly have no objection to Russia's presence in the northern Caspian and we are prepared to cooperate with them on a mutually advantageous basis. But Kuandykov too noted his disagreement with Russia's proposal to establish a twelve-mile zone on the Caspian, emphasizing that this objection was expressed by Kazakhstan back last autumn at a meeting of heads of governments of the Caspian states in Astrakhan.

The confident position of Kazakhstankaspiyshelf, which, however, is just preparing for oil developments, stands out in contrast to the alarm of Kazakhstan's enterprises that have been extracting oil for many years. It is certainly no accident that we included with today's article a picture in Mangistaumunaygaz, the largest petroleum extraction association in the republic although, as we know, it is operating on dry land. The absence of a connection with the shelf here is only apparent. The scandal resulting from the declaration of Mangistaumunaygaz as a candidate for bankruptcy, to put it mildly, certainly does not strengthen the reputation of domestic oil workers and the republic government, whose signature also has been placed on the agreement to create the consortium in the Caspian. Judging from the figures the association is operating with, the corresponding commission of the last Cabinet of Ministers indeed was too hasty with such a stern sentence. As a result, the Kazakhstan side is in a tragicomic position with respect to potential foreign partners: How can they explain to foreigners why our state is ready to declare bankruptcy for a state enterprise to which it is mainly state enterprises that are indebted?... Big-time oil does not deal with such paradoxes.

Summing up the results, one can assume that the debates on the problem of the petroleum and gas deposits of the Caspian will be prolonged and difficult. The leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose reputation was again brought into view for a short period of time, will hardly give up without a fight. But if Kozyrev's position prevails, Russia could end up alone on the Caspian.

We repeat: In the 20th century big-time oil and big-time money have already won too many battles. Things are not likely to be different at the beginning of the next century, toward which the projects for assimilating the Caspian Sea that have been originated and are being originated in Baku, Ashgabat, Almaty, Moscow, and the staff headquarters of the petroleum magnates of the world are aimed.

In any case, it is better to get something than nothing from big-time oil—the rules are very strict in this big-time game.

Tokayev on SVMDA, Eurasian Union

954K0304A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian
No 43, 5 Nov 94 p 6

[Interview with Kasymzhomart Tokayev, minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan, by K.Ye.; place and date not given: "Copying the Experience of the CSCE Is Imprudent and Irrational"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [K.Ye] How do you evaluate the results of the recent meeting of experts on the SVMDA [Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia]? Do you not think that the efforts in respect to the SVMDA are being supported artificially?

[Tokayev] There is every reason to express satisfaction at the results of the third conference of senior officials. The decision to create a working group, which will undertake the specific embodiment of fundamental aspects of President Nazarbayev's initiative, was adopted. In addition, considering the difficulties attending the realization of all ideas concerning to this extent or the other security on such an enormous and contradictory continent as Asia, the recent Almaty forum may be deemed a success. Agreeing with our proposal for the creation of a working group, the interested countries thereby expressed respect for the president's well-known initiative and voiced an understanding of its significance and prospects. I have emphasized repeatedly that the path toward realization of the idea of the creation of a mechanism of security on the Asian continent is tortuous and complex. Asia is an enormous conglomerate of traditions, principles, cultures, and languages. The 40-plus states located on the Asian continent differ from one another in terms of level of economic development and political orientation. In addition, it is essential to bear in mind the existence of major problems in the mutual relations of a number of Asian states, of a territorial and border nature particularly. Nonetheless, the aspiration to the creation of structures of security and cooperation in Asia is perceived increasingly manifestly. I refer primarily to the idea of the ASEAN states concerning the creation of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia. An understanding was reached at the time of the recent contacts with the heads of the foreign policy departments of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia that the said initiative of ASEAN and the ideas of the SVMDA are in harmony.

What is the attraction of President Nazarbayev's initiative? It is seen in international political circles as a substantial claim for affiliation to the global process of the search for effective measures aimed at the assurance of security and stability. Influential politicians make no secret of the fact that the idea of the SVMDA is valuable primarily in that it proceeds from the leader, authoritative in the world community, of an important Central Asian state. Bearing in mind that the Central Asia region is assigned a pronounced role in future geostrategy, the fundamental points of Nazarbayev's initiative, experts

believe, will become irreversible and be of practical significance in global politics.

[K.Ye.] You stated in your speech that the principles of the CSCE and the SVMDA are incompatible. Why? After all, the SVMDA has always been mentioned as being analogous to the CSCE.

[Tokayev] It is rather a question of the unacceptability of a copying of the experience and practice of the CSCE. It has to be said that any copying is imprudent and irrational. This applies particularly to such a sensitive matter as politics. In fact, the CSCE has negotiated a complex and unique path. The first CSCE summit in 1975 was preceded by 20 years of diplomatic work. As a result a fundamental agreement on the permanency of borders in postwar Europe was achieved, the status of West Berlin was determined, and the relations of the FRG and Czechoslovakia and Poland were regulated in treaty fashion. The mutual understanding of the two great powers—the USSR and the United States—on the need for the creation of an all-European forum was achieved also. What copying of the experience of the CSCE could there be here?

It should be mentioned that the CSCE is not the sole forum in Europe ensuring security and cooperation. There are also NATO, the NACC, the European Union, the Western European Union, and the Council of Europe. The CSCE, of course, performs a lead role in this complex. It is also a regional organization of the United Nations. The CSCE forum for cooperation in the field of security monitors compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe and the Vienna document on confidence-building measures and security.

It is hard to speak of a copying of experience in this respect also. The borrowing of individual aspects of practical activity and also fundamental ideas of the CSCE is another matter. Speaking at the Almaty meetings of experts, incidentally, representatives of the CSCE Secretariat warned of the pointlessness of a blind copying of the CSCE, pointing to the specifics of the political processes in Asia.

[K.Ye.] Kazakhstan is known as the sponsor of the unifying Eurasian Union and SVMDA initiatives. These ideas are easily finding their supporters in general, but no one in particular. Has Kazakhstan's persistence not been caused by fears that it might have compromised itself?

[Tokayev] As far as the Eurasian Union is concerned, I have insisted and continue to insist that this idea has immense future-oriented potential. This is its strength. You need to have perspicacity and courage in order, under conditions where the "sovereignty repletion" stage is not yet passed and where centrifugal trends still have force of inertia, to have declared the need for unification in a qualitatively new union in the name of the interests of the peoples suffering deprivation in the vast post-Soviet space. I am impressed by Nursultan

Nazarbayev's concept of integration as the dominant of political and economic processes in the next century. It is truly hard to imagine the future of civilization in a state of profound disconnection. But by integration we should by no means understand the surrender of sovereignty. No one would consent to this, voluntarily in any event. We are talking about the possible delegation (that is, recall is not excluded) of a number of components of sovereign rights for the purpose of the building of a harmonious and flourishing community. Of course, a new level of political mentality, which is generated over a particular period of time, is needed for this.

I witnessed the discussion of the Eurasian Union idea at the last summit of CIS leaders in Moscow. With certain exceptions, the actual leaders of actual states spoke positively about Nazarbayev's proposal and about their respectful approach to the Eurasian Union concept. In addition, a decision which pointed to the need for practical application of the ideas of the Eurasian Union for development of the potential of the CIS was adopted at this forum.

As far as the SVMDA is concerned, I shall permit myself to disagree with you. The results of the recent meeting of senior officials in Almaty testify that this initiative enjoys support not in general but on the part of actual states.

It makes no sense, I believe, to cover ourselves with sackcloth and ashes. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan is a young state, it has shown itself, thanks to the efforts of President Nazarbayev, to be a responsible and capable subject of international law and international relations. Not every country is succeeding fully here. Internal difficulties sometimes screen off the geopolitics and correspondingly the future of sovereign Kazakhstan. It is true. But this is not so much a specific as a general phenomenon characteristic of many countries.

[K.Ye.] Our foreign policy department needs to strengthen its positions both within the republic and outside. What form do you see this process taking?

[Tokayev] If we are speaking of independence in earnest, mention needs to be made of the role of the Foreign Ministry in support for the latter by foreign policy means. It is axiomatic that without a foreign policy department and its structures abroad, the existence of a state is impossible. Stalin, as we know, even during the war did not downsize a single embassy and merely recalled representatives from the countries with which the USSR was at war.

I cannot complain about a lack of attention to the Foreign Ministry on the part of the top leadership. The president is well aware of the significance of the foreign policy department, which was confirmed yet again by his speech at the ceremonial session on the third anniversary of Kazakhstan's independence.

The Foreign Ministry is largely a generating and executive structure. It is in our department, ideally, that many foreign policy actions, which should subsequently be subject to implementation, should be born. The Foreign Ministry is the executant of presidential strategy overseas and the instrument of the safeguarding of foreign policy interests. A great deal of interest is being displayed in the republic on the part of the world community, and it is important, therefore, to commission diplomatic levers in good time for the efficient use of interaction in the name of the interests of Kazakhstan.

[K.Ye.] Do you not think that you should be borrowing the aggressiveness and omnivorousness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia? What, in your view, is the secret of the influence of Russian diplomats?

[Tokayev] In answering this question I would like to distinguish two features. First, Russia, as the successor of the USSR on the UN Security Council and as a great country, has strategic interests different from those of Kazakhstan. It is very important to make specific foreign policy actions precisely and appropriately commensurate with the actual place and role of the state in modern geopolitics. This explains the omnivorousness, as you put it, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Second, I have always thought that the deputy ministers, ambassadors, and department chiefs are not only the executants of the instructions of the head of the foreign policy department but are themselves also significant diplomatic figures. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia is evidently of the same opinion. Whence the world renown of a number of Russian diplomats.

Oblast Administration Head Interviewed

954K0312A *Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 8 Nov 94 p 2

[Interview with B. Tursumbayev, head of the Kostanay Oblast administration, by Bulat Yerezhepov, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Strong Oblasts—Strong State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yerezhepov] Baltash Moldabayevich, despite the numerous problems, the oblast has successfully concluded the main agricultural campaign of the year—the harvest. Moreover, it did so for the first time with its own resources. How do you yourself assess the results of this hard harvesting work?

[Tursumbayev] It is said that Kostanay residents were lucky with the weather. I want to say: Things go well for those who make them go well. Not everyone knows, apparently, what damage was done to grain crops by the current July drought. It affected not only the southern but also the northern rayons of the oblast. The heavy July rains arrived after a long delay, and in some places their lateness brought not only benefits but also damage. Because of overwetting and insufficient air in the soil, the flowing water seeped through the soil poorly, there was poor formation of protein, diseases appeared, and

ripening was delayed. All of the troubles cannot even be enumerated. It is important to note something else. The farmers of the oblast did not flinch under the very difficult conditions of economic crisis and administrative dislocation, they did not falter in the direction of reducing sown areas and oversimplifying technology. In a word, they did not get discouraged, but worked persistently in order to grow a substantial crop. They could have acted in a much simpler way, according to recent traditions. There is no money for spare parts—well, let the equipment stand, there is no fuel—we will not sow. It was necessary, as the saying goes, to hustle a little in order to be able to acquire, mainly owing to barter operations, the full requirement for fuel, spare parts, and other material resources in exchange for grain, meat, and butter.

This is a simple example. When the time came for the chemical spraying of crops, neither aircraft nor fuel were available in the republic. It became necessary to employ urgent measures for the delivery of herbicides and the enlistment of foreign aviation, and we ourselves had to resolve the question of fuel supplies. Some rayons conducted chemical treatment with their own ground equipment. Thus, grain does not grow by itself, and the weather does not decide everything.

Today farms are conducting the sale of grain owing to the state order, and are encountering certain difficulties. In past years the oblast never sold so much class grain. It gave a huge amount—including owing to barley, which grows well in this zone, other Russian bread cereals, and durum wheat. To date the farms have not been able to rebuild themselves and change the structure of crops. Therefore today we have a lot of barley that the state does not need and relatively little of the soft wheat that it needs. But, of course, next year reliance will be placed on a maximum expansion of the spring wheat area and a reduction of the others that do not enjoy a market demand for grain crops.

But the government policy on state grain procurements should also be changed. The previous staff of the Cabinet of Ministers committed a serious error in not having immediately determined the volume and structure of state orders. At first, the government planned to buy from the commodity producers not only soft wheat but also durum wheat, and barley, rye, and other crops. Later, when the fields were already sown, basically soft wheat was left in the state order structure. To say nothing of the fact that the volume of the state order was changed twice in the direction of an increase. But, of course, such wavering, first of all, does not work on the authority of the government at all and, second, it does not give the farms an opportunity for normal planning of production and tactics for selling excess grain. We must know the state order by 1 January; moreover, one that clearly describes what kinds of crops, what the price will be, etc., in order to plan the structure of the grain field and, naturally, to receive phased advances for the performance of field work. For example, 30 percent in the first

quarter of the year, 30 percent in the second, and just as much in the third. In the fourth quarter, the final settlement.

[Yerezhepov] After delivery of the state order and the settlement of all debts, it is very likely that some grain will still be left. How does the oblast plan to sell it?

[Tursumbayev] We do not plan to initiate a big sale—there is nothing to do it with. Farms have reserves of grain for their own urgent needs and, to the extent necessary, they will exchange grain for what they need. Many today are running processing mini-shops, mills, bakeries, etc. We support this policy. It is necessary to trade not only in grain and meat but also in products processed from them. This especially concerns meat and milk production. Unfortunately, the cattle-breeding branch in our country is unprofitable, and its products are not competitive on the foreign market. At the same time, we are compelled to engage in cattle breeding, inasmuch as, first, people need its products and second, cattle breeding means many, many jobs, and the fate of entire settlements and villages. Therefore, no matter how difficult it is, we will develop the branch. Last year farms of the oblast permitted a reduction in the number of cattle, because they were forced to slaughter them and exchange them for necessary material resources. I think that we will correct the situation for winter. The oblast has a large interesting program for the development of a thorough reprocessing of agricultural products. It is part of the general state program, and is being financed by the republic fund of support for reorganization of the economy. We originally included 23 priority enterprises in this program, whose construction would make it possible to improve the oblast economy significantly. But, alas. The Kostanay enterprises transferred more than 260 million tenge to the republic reorganization fund, and we had less than 40 million returned to us. We reduced the number of priority facilities, leaving those that are the most needed and that are quickly reimbursed—Dzhetygarinskiy meat combine, the Amankaragayskiy refrigerated slaughter house, and others, but their financing is not being successful. Our builders worked as long as they could in debt, nevertheless, many facilities had to be closed down temporarily.

[Yerezhepov] But what are the prospects for the development of the operational industrial enterprises of the oblast?

[Tursumbayev] We moved ahead recently on the matter of stabilizing the work of the mining giants. There have been numerous negotiations with the leadership of the metallurgical combine, the Karmetkombinat, and others. Our ore enjoys demand, and if consumers paid for it on time, there would be no problems in the branch. Magnitogorsk is making efforts to settle indebtedness. Karaganda is still not, but I think that when the question of payments is resolved, our mining enterprises have promise. As for the work of other enterprises, their future will depend on the possibility of attracting investments. The government, judging by everything, will not

be able to invest in even quickly reimbursable projects and production. Of course, all that remains is to hope for foreign capital, and foreign investors need firm guarantees, and not a state partner but a private trader. In other words, it is necessary to change the structure of the property of our enterprises, and this problem once again depends on the government. Take, for example, the Kostanay alcohol plant. Putting it into operation will produce enormous profits for the enterprise and substantial tax payments for the budget. The government cannot find the necessary resources for the completion of construction, but it also does not allow changing the form of property of enterprises, thereby scaring away potential investors.

[Yerezhepov] In your opinion, how stable is the socio-political situation in the oblast?

[Tursumbayev] I think that there are no reasons now for anxiety. Naturally, economic difficulties are affecting the general mood of the people and their desire to work and create. Some families are leaving, mainly for Russia. According to our observations, the reasons for this insignificant migration are economic. People are going where they can earn more and live more easily. Naturally we are making every effort to improve living conditions, but still, we cannot do everything. Remember the story of the pension fund. As soon as the government took it into the budget, delays in the payment of pensions began. The other day a rally was held at the Kostanay chemical fiber plant, the collective demanded the immediate payment of wages. But the root of the problem is that the plant now has a new boss—the KRAMDS [not further identified] corporation, which is not only not doing anything for the development of the enterprise, but not even for support at least to keep it afloat. The Kostanay city administration and the territorial committee for state property are being forced in this connection to take the KRAMDS corporation to court. But, after all, the creation and activity of KRAMDS is part of the government's policy.

The style that was generally characteristic of the old staff of the government was to start resolving the problems of the regions and even of individual enterprises at the capital level. It is necessary to give more real freedom to the territories and to enterprises. After all, it is more apparent in the localities how to dispose of tax revenues and the resources of specialized funds. After putting all the problems and financial resources under itself, the government simply got enmeshed in their stratagems. A powerful state is powerful oblasts. Powerful oblasts result from powerful enterprises.

[Yerezhepov] Baltash Moldabayevich, you criticize the actions of the government in our interview. Do you on the whole share its policy and program? And, in passing, this question: Many foreign analysts assess the political regime in Kazakhstan as one that is leading to a dictatorial regime. What do you think about this?

[Tursumbayev] By virtue of my position, I am a member of the president's team. But the government and the

head of administration are one team. Therefore I cannot help but share our common policy for market reforms and democracy. The government does not always find the correct solutions—this is natural. Our task—the task of the heads of administration in the localities, where everything is seen in a somewhat different light—is to prompt the government and help it make decisions. This is our common concern. As for the possibility of the emergence of a dictatorship in Kazakhstan, there is such a danger in any republic of the former Union—by virtue of specific historical and political conditions. As a citizen and a person I naturally will fight against any dictatorship, no matter what form it may take.

[Yerezhepov] Some mass media, particularly in Moscow, call you one of the aspirants for the presidential elections of 1996. Are you really preparing for these elections?

[Tursumbayev] Of course not. I repeat, I am on the president's team, I am carrying out his policy within the bounds of those powers that he has entrusted to me. Newspapers exist in order to construct various forecasts and reflections. I am simply amazed by the attitude of some of our politicians toward some newspaper articles. Politicians, or more accurately, intriguers, brandishing such articles, are trying to cause a split in the presidential team. Today the oblast heads have too many problems and unresolved questions to have any time left for political games. All of us have to work—more and better.

Khrapunov on Almaty Ecological Situation

954K0324A Almaty VECHERNIY ALMATY
in Russian 21 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Viktor Khrapunov: "The Ecological Program—Path to Citizens' Health"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The natural-climatic peculiarities of Almaty and the city's continuing growth are causing an excessively increased burden on its ecosystem.

The main sources of pollution are automotive transportation, which discharges into the atmosphere carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, nitrogen dioxide, lead, formaldehyde, and other harmful substances. The level of air pollution exceeds permissible norms and the city is among the most polluted in the republic. The average annual concentration of formaldehyde exceeds the MPC [maximum permissible concentration] by a factor of six, and dust, nitrogen dioxide, and phenol—by a factor of two. The air is polluted most near the main highways with their heavy traffic (Dzhandosov Street, Abay Avenue, Ryskulov Avenue, Rayymbek Avenue). High dust content in the air is also observed in the region of TETs [heating and electric power plant]-1 and of nitrogen dioxide—in the northern part of the city near the XX Let Oktyabrya plant. Maximum one-time concentrations of carbon monoxide in these areas reach seven times the MPC, nitrogen dioxide and dust—five

times the MPC, phenol—four times the MPC, and formaldehyde—two times the MPC.

The condition and quality of water resources occupy an important place in the city's ecological balance. Waste water from the radio center, the fur combine, the production acclimatization station, the fruit canning plant, the cotton combine, and a number of other enterprises are discharged into the Bolshaya and Malaya Almatinka rivers and their tributaries.

The soil in the city is polluted with discharges from fuel-burning installations, industry, and automotive transportation. Lead appears in the greatest concentrations. A background concentration exceeding the MPC many times over is found in the southern and eastern sectors. According to existing norms (200 sq m per person) out-of-town recreation zones should cover an area of 240 sq km. The actual area of these zones does not even come to one-fifth of the norm. The level of improvement of recreational areas is very low. The state of the population's health and the sanitary-hygienic situation remain extremely unfavorable. The birth rate in the city has dropped by 30 percent and the overall death rate has increased. As a result of this ratio, natural population growth has decreased a great deal—0.7 per 10,000 population. The prognosis of the demographic situation is not favorable. The city population is aging, since children comprise only 23 percent of it, individuals over 50—30 percent, and among them individuals over 60—12 percent. The capital has taken over first place among the republic oblasts in terms of disease of organs of the respiratory, cardiovascular, and urogenital systems, birth defects, and psychological disorders; second place—in diseases of the nervous system and sense organs; and third place—in oncologic pathology.

The water supply causes serious concern. During the past three years there has been intensive viral contamination of the water sources because of surface and accidental discharges of water from the sewerage systems into them. Another alarming factor that affects the level of infectious diseases (especially in children) is the condition of the rivers and bodies of water that serve as a recreation zone for the city's residents. The rivers inside the city are being polluted by private home owners, and outside it—by agro-industrial complexes, dacha areas, etc. Up to this point our rivers and bodies of water have "common" ownership and do not belong to anybody in particular. Nor can one help but be alarmed by such a thing as the lack of an area for burying toxic industrial wastes, which leads to their accumulation on the territories of industrial enterprises and on the banks of rivers. There is no doubt that there is a direct link between the level of environmental pollution and the state of health both of the city's population as a whole and individual contingents, above all children, adolescents, and industrial enterprise workers. The health situation at enterprises is improving slowly; at this point 42,450 people, 25 percent of whom are women, are working in hazardous conditions.

Analyzing the sanitary-epidemiologic situation and the state of affairs with respect to ecological problems and the health of the population, one comes to the conclusion that the existing situation can be changed only through the implementation of long-term state socioeconomic programs aimed at prevention, and improvement of the environment and production and social surroundings.

What is the reason the ecological situation is deteriorating? From the standpoint of adopting decrees, we have had no shortage. Special attention has been devoted to introducing environmental protection measures and reducing hazardous waste at industrial enterprises. As a result of implementing measures, discharges from automotive transportation into the city's air basin during the period 1989 through 1992 decreased from 169,000 tonnes per year to 149,000 tonnes. And still, automotive transportation was and is now to an even greater degree the main polluter in the city. According to rough figures, it accounts for 70-80 percent of gross discharges in Almaty. The impact of this ecological risk factor is increasing since during the past two or three years (with more active commerce and the beginning of the formation of market structures) the annual increase in these mobile sources of pollution has grown by 25-30 percent (overall quantity for the city), and those that are privately owned—by 40 percent. On the ecological plane this fact must be considered extremely unfavorable since control over the quantity and quality of consumed fuel has deteriorated drastically. Moreover, transportation is used practically without any ecological restrictions in recreation and even preserve zones.

The increase in motor vehicle traffic causes serious concern among the population; parking is haphazard; inner-yard space is filled with passenger cars. The problem is exacerbated by the low quality of motor fuel. In June-July the city administration's inspectorate of ecology and biological resources checked 45 gas stations, 40 of which sold ethylated gasoline, which in keeping with the government decree had been banned for use in the city since 1987. Measures were taken against the violators, and damage suits filed against them. To put more pressure on the violators of environmental legislation, a decree of the city council's 12th session, dated 25 February 1993, "On Introducing Changes in Normatives of Payments for Environmental Pollution," increased payments for environmental pollution beginning 1 March 1993.

Ecological checkpoints are beginning to operate at the entries to city's major highways. A city administration decision (No. 362 dated 17 September 1993) imposed a toll to enter the city in a motor vehicle. Concrete measures have been taken to improve the ecological situation in Dorozhnik and Aynabulak microrayons and adjacent territories. The output of asphalt and petroleum bitumen was reduced by 30 percent in the Asfaltobeton association; at KSMK-3 production of asphalt and mastic was closed down. We are looking at the possibility of changing the specialization of the garbage-processing

plant and moving the garbage loading station. At the city administration's initiative, the Baum Grove was assigned the special status of an ecological object; work is being done on its cleanup. Dacha construction has been suspended in the Institute of Nuclear Physics reactor's sanitary-protection zone. Tighter regulations were imposed at the ecologically strained 70th double-track section: Emergency discharge of sewage into the Karasa river is no longer permitted, and its floodlands have been cleared of debris. In order to reduce water usage and discharge of waste into the city sewage system, enterprises are installing purification systems and introducing closed-loop water systems. Purification systems are operating at 74 enterprises in the city, 29 of which were installed in 1992-1993.

To improve water quality we are shifting to deeper wells. Over the past two years the city water authority has drilled 10 wells to a depth of 300-500 meters. Five deep wells were drilled in the water-intake cluster near Sayran Lake, where contamination of ground water with phenols had been detected. Enterprises and organizations now treat ecological problems more responsibly: setting up relevant services and searching for improved technologies.

Nevertheless, overall the situation today has changed not in favor of ecology. The transition to a market is pushing the resolution of ecological problems to the back burner, since the current situation requires a new legal basis, changing the very structure of environmental protection organs and their approach to dealing with problems reflected in the republic president's decree dated 30 April 1993 and the Cabinet of Ministers decree dated 25 November 1993.

The city administration head's decree, dated 14 February of this year, outlines the main directions of implementing these decisions. However, not all economic managers, heads of rayon administrations, ministries, and agencies have taken the necessary steps to change the situation for the better. For instance, the Ministry of Power Generation and Fuel was supposed to begin phased moving of Almaty Oblast petroleum storage facilities outside city limits and recultivating vacated land in the second quarter of this year. This has not been done, however.

The current program takes into account public and city assembly proposals on the need to draft, and for the Supreme Council to adopt, a law on the status of Almaty, which will set up a special environmental regime for it—the economic mechanism and legal tools for overcoming the ecological crisis, improving the health situation, and ensuring stable development of the largest metropolitan area in the country. The program's socioeconomic significance and specificity lie in the fact that it was drafted in conditions of far-reaching changes in the structure of production forces and system of production relations in the city as a very complex, multicomponent natural-economic, ecologic-economic organism.

Law on Transportation

Text of Law

954K0311A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA
in Russian 8 Nov 94 p 2

[Law: "Republic of Kazakhstan Law 'Transportation in the Republic of Kazakhstan'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of a decision by the Supreme Soviet, dated 13 June 1994, the publication [passage illegible] in the SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA newspaper is official.

This Law defines the principles of the legal, economic, and organizational activity of the transportation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Section I. General Principles.

Article 1. Basic Concepts Accepted in the Law

The transportation of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the total system of transportation registered on its territory—rail, motor, maritime, domestic water, air, urban electrical, including subway, as well as mainline pipeline transportation situated on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A transportation enterprise is a legal entity that is engaged in economic-commercial activity in hauling freight, passengers, and baggage or in the storage, technical servicing, and repair of transportation means and that operates in conformity with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A carrier [*perevozchik*] is an individual or a legal entity that possesses the means of transportation with the right of ownership or on other legal grounds, and that provides services in the transporting of passengers, baggage, freight, and mail in exchange for payment or on a leased basis, having for this purpose the corresponding authorization or license issued in the established procedure.

The customer (freight shipper, freight recipient, passenger, charter leaseholder, charter lessee) is a legal entity, individual, or state that is using the transportation in conformity with a contract concluded with the carrier.

Article 2. Legislation on Transportation

The relations linked with the activity of transportation in the Republic of Kazakhstan are regulated by this Law, transportation codes, and other legislative and normative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Relations linked with the activity of pipeline transportation are regulated by the corresponding legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The haulage terms and the procedure for using the means of transportation, guaranteeing traffic safety, and observing the rules governing the protection of labor,

firefighting procedures, and technical-technological and sanitation norms are defined by the normative acts that are in effect on the corresponding types of transportation, that are approved in the established procedure and that are mandatory for all participants in the transportation relations.

Article 3. Ownership of the Means of Transportation

Transportation in the Republic of Kazakhstan is based on various forms of ownership.

All owners of transportation are equal and enjoy the identical protection of the law.

General-use railroads and motor roads, including the engineer structures on them; water routes on land, beacons, devices, and navigational markers that regulate and guarantee the safety of navigation; air-navigational devices in the air-traffic control system; telecommunications networks; engineer networks connected with guaranteeing the safety of flights by aircraft; as well as the subway, are state property.

Article 4. Land Use By Transportation. Procedure for Granting Land and Water For Needs of Transportation

The land recognized as that which is used by transportation in the republic is:

- the land assigned to land users for the construction of transportation facilities;
- land for transportation roads and routes assigned to transportation, road-building, and other organizations carrying out their construction and operation.

The land and water relations that arise when assigning land to transportation or granting water to water transportation, and the procedure for using them, are regulated by the Land and Water codes of the Republic of Kazakhstan and other legislative and normative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan that are issued in conformity with them.

For purposes of guaranteeing the reliable operation of structures and other facilities of transportation in areas that have been subjected to landslides, washouts, torrential rainfall, or other dangerous natural phenomena, protection zones can be established.

The use of land offered for the needs of transportation is carried out in the procedure and on the terms established by the Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and by the transportation codes, in conformity with the norms and the technical-design documentation.

Transportation enterprises and carriers are required to use the land offered to them in conformity with the specified purpose and the terms for offering that land, to employ production technologies that protect the environment, and to prevent the worsening of the ecological situation on that territory as a result of their activity.

Section II. System of State Regulation and Administration of the Activities of Transportation

Article 5. State Regulation of the Activities of Transportation

State regulation of the activities of transportation is carried out by means of the legal support, licensing, taxation, granting of credit, financing and pricing, the carrying out of investment policy and a uniform social and scientific-technical policy, and monitoring of the use by transportation enterprises of the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

State agencies do not have the right to interfere in the economic activity of transportation enterprises, or to reassign the operational personnel of transportation enterprises to other operations, other than the instances that have been stipulated by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 6. State Administration of Transportation

The administration of transportation is carried out by an agency of state administration that is formed on the basis of a decision by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and that operates in conformity with a Statute approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The basic tasks of the agency of state administration are:

- the protection of the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the area of transportation;
- the carrying out of intergovernmental and international cooperation in the area of transportation;
- the development of drafts of legislative and other acts, standards, and norms that define the legal and normative procedure for the functioning of all types of transportation, irrespective of the forms of ownership;
- the development of concepts and state national programs for the development of all types of transportation; the formation and carrying out of an investment policy, scientific-technical and social policy, as well as instruction and training of personnel;
- the creation of conditions for meeting the needs of the republic's economy and population for hauls and the services connected with them;
- the monitoring of the observance of the rights of the consumers of transportation services;
- the development of forecasts and the timely and efficient meeting of the republic's state needs and the population's needs for hauls;
- the coordination of the work and carrying out of the function of state regulation of the activity of the transportation complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 7. Licensing of Transportation Activity

Commercial-entrepreneurial activity linked with the carrying out of the transportation process is carried out on the basis of special authorizing (licensing).

The list of types of transportation activities that are subject to licensing is established by legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The procedure for receiving and revoking a license is defined by the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 8. Powers Exercised by Local Representative and Executive Agencies in the Transportation Sphere

The powers exercised by local representative and executive agencies in the transportation sphere are carried out in conformity with Republic of Kazakhstan Law entitled "Local Representative and Executive Agencies of the Republic of Kazakhstan) and other legislative and normative acts.

Section II. Basic Principles of Transportation Activity

Article 9. Principles of Economic and Economic Activity

The basis of the economic relations in transportation is formed by the market for supply and demand of transportation services.

Transportation enterprises and carriers carry out their activity on a commercial basis.

Transportation enterprises and carriers independently develop plans and conclude contracts for the execution of operations and services in conformity with the customer's needs.

Passenger hauls whose profitability is not guaranteed by the existing regulated tariffs are subsidized appropriately from the republic budget and the local budget.

The construction of terminals, stations, subways, ports, wharves, airports, pedestrian bridges and tunnels, passenger platforms, and other facilities to provide transportation services to the population is carried out at the expense of the funds of the republic and local budgets, the transportation and other enterprises, as well as voluntary payments made by legal entities and individuals.

The maintenance of navigable routes, sluices, and an inspection service to assure the safety of navigation is carried out at the expense of the republic budget.

For use of state ports and water routes, as well as flight control and air-navigation services in the air space of the Republic of Kazakhstan, legal entities and individuals, including foreign ones, make payments in the procedure and amounts defined by the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers and by intergovernmental agreements.

Article 10. Tariffs

For the hauling of freight, passengers, and baggage, and the services that are linked with haulages, free (contractual) tariffs are established (other than the instances stipulated by Part 4 of Article 9 of this law), which guarantee the activities of the economic subjects engaging in transportation activities.

For individual types of transportation services, as a means of carrying out the state's social policy or as a means of overcoming monopolistic activity in the transportation sphere, regulated tariffs may be established (which are uniform within the confines of the state) in the procedure defined by the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 11. Hauling of Freight, Passengers, Baggage, and Mail, and the Carrying Out of Transportation-Forwarding Services

When hauling freight, passengers, baggage, and the mail and when carrying out transportation-forwarding services, the carrier is required:

- to have a license guaranteeing his right to carry out shipment;
- to present means of transportation that have a certificate;
- to compensate for the damage incurred by the customer or a third person, including losses of time in monetary equivalent;
- to guarantee the passenger's safety, and to create for him the necessary conveniences and conditions for being provided with services, and in the event that the passenger has turned over baggage, also the prompt transporting and intactness of his baggage;
- to guarantee traffic safety;
- to guarantee to the customer the freedom of choosing transportation in the transportation services market;
- to obtain documents confirming the fact that the freight being shipped corresponds to its certificate;
- to execute the requirements of state and local representative and executive agencies for carrying out socially important and defense shipments (in the event that the costs of these shipments are not covered by the transportation expenses, an appropriate compensatory subsidy must be carried out).

The carrier has the right freely to designate the shipping costs in conformity with the pricing rules, with the exception of regulated shipments.

The carrier does not have the right to refuse shipment to legal entities or individuals, other than the instances stipulated by the transportation codes of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

When hauling freight, passengers, baggage, or mail, and when carrying out transportation-forwarding services, the customer has the right:

- to require the fulfillment of the contract concluded between him and the carrier;
- to challenge in the established procedure the conformity of the level of quality of the shipment to its certificate;
- to require the compensation of any damage incurred, including the losses of time in monetary equivalent.

The customer is required:

- to observe the terms of the contract concluded with the carrier;
- to issue to the carrier a document confirming the correspondence of the freight to its certificate;
- to carry out the shipment rules;
- to present freight and baggage in a form prepared for transportation.

The conditions for the hauling of freight, passengers, baggage, and mail, and for the carrying out of transportation-forwarding, and the responsibility borne by the two sides involved in the shipments and transportation-forwarding operations, are defined by the Kazakh SSR Civil Code, this Law, the transportation codes and other legislative acts promulgated in the established procedure, and by shipment contracts.

Article 12. Direct Mixed Communication With the Participation of Different Types of Transportation

Rail, maritime, domestic water, air, and motor transportation organizes a system of direct mixed communication.

The procedure for organizing shipments of freight in direct mixed communication is established by the agency of state administration in transportation.

Article 13. Passenger Rights, Benefits in Paying For Travel By Individual Categories of Passengers

The passenger has the right:

- to purchase a ticket for any type of transportation and for any itinerary that is open for passenger shipments;
- to get a seat in accordance with the purchased ticket;
- to take with him, free of charge, one child up to 7 years of age, or in international hauls, up to 5 years of age, without the right of assigning to that child a separate seat in air, rail, maritime, or domestic water transportation, on long-distance buses, or in urban or suburban transportation, other than taxis;
- to purchase tickets for children between the age of 5 and 12 years on international hauls, with a payment of 50 percent of the complete cost of the ticket;

—to purchase tickets for children between the age of 7 and 15 years, with a payment of 50 percent of the complete cost of the ticket for a haul being carried out by a Republic of Kazakhstan carrier.

If the haul is carried out by several carriers from different states with the participation of a Republic of Kazakhstan carrier, this right is granted to passengers during their haul by the Republic of Kazakhstan carrier;

—to extend the action of the ticket in the event of a stopover en route for a period of no more than ten days on all types of transportation other than urban and suburban transportation. The carrier has the right to extend the effective period of the ticket in the event of a stopover en route;

—to surrender the ticket prior to the beginning of the haul and to receive in exchange the amount paid for the haul, at any establishment of the carrier offering the transportation services. The amount of the refund to be returned by the carrier and the refund procedure are defined by the transportation codes.

In air transportation and in city and suburban bus hauls, the passenger is allowed to take with him free of charge hand luggage and baggage weighing no more than 20 kilograms.

In rail, maritime, and domestic water transportation, and also in long-distance buses, the passenger is allowed to take with him free of charge hand luggage and baggage weighing no more than 35 kilograms.

Carriers have the right to increase the weight for baggage to be carried free of charge on all types of transportation.

A carrier who has refused to extend the haul is required, at his own expense, to deliver the passenger to his point of destination or to compensate the passenger for all the losses incurred by him as a result of the breaking of the contract.

In instances of benefits established by Republic of Kazakhstan laws, by decisions of the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers, and by decisions of the local representative and executive agencies, the carriers are required to provide transportation free of charge to an individual category of passengers or to offer them different benefits in paying for their travel.

The Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers, and the local representative and executive agencies, when establishing for individual categories of persons benefits for transportation services, including the right to travel free of charge, define the source of financing.

Article 14. Through Shipments of Freight and Passengers

Through shipments of freight and passengers across the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan are carried out:

—by rail, air, motor, maritime, and domestic water transportation along roads, routes, and water routes that are open for international communications in conformity with the Republic of Kazakhstan legislation that is in effect, and with international agreements and treaties.

Section IV. Safety and Responsibility in Transportation

Article 15. Requirements Made of the Means of Transportation

Means of transportation must have a certificate that defines the conformity to the safety requirements, medical-sanitation norms, norms for protection of labor and the ecology, international and state standards and specifications, and must also be registered in the procedure that has been established by legislation.

Means of transportation that have not undergone certification and that have not been registered in the established procedure are not allowed to operate.

The certification procedure is defined by Republic of Kazakhstan legislation.

Article 16. Right to Drive or Fly Means of Transportation

The right to drive or fly a means of transportation is granted to a person who has the corresponding proficiency level and who has undergone medical certification of the state of his health, with the issuance of documents of the established kind.

Proficiency requirements dealing with the driving or flying of a means of transportation are defined in the procedure established by Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers.

The criteria for evaluating the person's suitability on the basis of health for driving or flying a means of transportation are evaluated by medical workers in the procedure established by Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Health.

Article 17. Carrier's Responsibility

Agreements between the carrier, on the one hand, and passengers and freight owners, on the other, concerning the limitation or elimination of the responsibility established by legislation are invalid, with the exception of instances when the possibility of such agreements during freight shipments has been stipulated by transportation codes and rules.

The carrier guarantees the intactness of the freight, baggage, and mail from the moment of acceptance for shipment until the issuance to the recipient.

The carrier bears the full responsibility for loss, shortage, or damage of the freight that has been accepted for shipment, which has occurred at his fault, unless the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan has established otherwise.

If, as a result of the damage for which the carrier is responsible, the quality of the freight or baggage has changed to the extent that it cannot be used for the specific purpose for which it is intended, the recipient of the freight or the baggage has the right to refuse it and to demand compensation for its loss.

In the event of loss or shortage of freight or baggage, the carrier, in addition to paying compensation, returns the payment for shipping the lost freight or baggage.

Registered baggage or freight is considered to be lost if that has been recognized by the carrier or if that baggage or freight has not arrived at the point of destination of the shipment within seven days after the expiration of the delivery period.

However, if the freight has arrived after the expiration of that period, the recipient has the right to accept the freight and to return the amount paid by the carrier for loss of the baggage or freight.

The transportation codes and other legislative acts can also stipulate other types of responsibility.

Article 18. Period for Delivery of the Passenger, Freight, and Baggage, and Responsibility For Exceeding That Period

The carrier is required to deliver the freight or baggage to the point of destination within the period established by the transportation codes or the rules that have been promulgated in the established procedure. If no delivery deadline has been established in this procedure, the two sides have the right to establish that deadline in the contact.

In the event of a delay in the hauling of a passenger at the fault of the carrier, the latter pays the passenger a fine in the amount of 3 percent of the cost of the ticket for every hour of delay, in addition to compensating for any losses that may be incurred by the passenger.

The total amount of the fine paid to the passenger cannot exceed the cost of the purchased ticket.

For failure to deliver baggage by the deadline, the carrier pays the baggage recipient a fine in the amount of 10 percent of the payment for shipment for every day after the deadline, but no more than 50 percent of the payment for shipment.

For failure to deliver freight by the deadline, the carrier pays the recipient a fine in the amount of 5 percent of the payment for shipment for every day after the deadline, but no more than 50 percent of the payment for shipment.

The carrier is freed of the responsibility for failure to deliver the freight or baggage by the deadline if that failure occurred not at his fault.

The carrier bears the responsibility for any losses that the sender or recipient of the baggage or freight may have incurred as a result of the delay in the shipment.

The transportation codes and the rules that have been promulgated in the established procedures, and the contracts, may also establish other deadlines for failure to meet the delivery deadline and responsibility.

The carrier is required, in the event that trips are delayed by 10 hours or more, to offer the passengers, at his expense, a room in a hotel and meals.

At the passenger's request, he is issued an official document or a notation is made in his ticket concerning the reason for the delay in shipment.

The amount of losses stipulated by this article and the procedure for determining them are established by the transportation codes and the rules that have been promulgated in the established procedure.

Article 19. Responsibility of the Passenger and the Sender and Recipient of the Freight or Baggage

Passengers and the sender and recipient of the freight or baggage bear the responsibility for damage inflicted at their fault on other persons, the property of the carrier, or the property of other persons for which the carrier bears the responsibility.

The sender bears the responsibility for damage inflicted on the carrier or other person to whom the carrier bears responsibility as a result of the incorrectness, imprecision, or incompleteness of the information indicated in the transportation documents.

The sender bears the responsibility to the carrier for all the damages that may arise as a result of the imprecision, incompleteness, or inaccuracy of the information indicated in the transportation documents.

Article 20. Carrier's Responsibility for Causing the Death or Injuring the Health of the Passenger

The carrier bears the property responsibility for any damage that has arisen as a consequence of causing the death or injuring the health of a passenger during shipment if he does not prove that the damage arose as a consequence of a deliberate act by the person who suffered the damage or of an insurmountable force.

The carrier's responsibility with regard to obligations that arise as a consequence of causing the death or injuring the health of an individual is defined in accordance with the rules stipulated by the Kazakh SSR Civil Code.

Article 21. Protection of Freight and Facilities in Transportation

The protection of freight and transportation facilities, as well as the carrying out of fire-prevention measures and the elimination of the consequences of fires in rail and air transportation, are carried out by special militarized-guard services in the procedure established by the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers.

The subdivisions of the militarized-guard service are provided with firearms and special equipment.

The procedure for employing the weapons and special equipment is carried out in conformity with the existing legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The guarding of the most important transportation facilities and special freight shipments is carried out by subdivisions of the internal forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Internal Affairs, by special subdivisions of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense, and the Republic of Kazakhstan State Security Committee, as well as the specialized militarized-guard services. The lists of these facilities and special freight shipments are established by the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 22. Organizing the Work of Transportation in Emergency Situations

In the event that emergency situations arise (earthquakes, floods, fires, avalanches, epidemics, or other natural disasters), the contractual relations of the transportation enterprises can be suspended for that period of time by decision of the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers or the local executive agencies for the purpose of taking steps to eliminate the disasters and their consequences.

The expenses incurred by the transportation enterprises in instances of emergency situations to carry out shipments linked with guaranteeing mobilizational readiness and the carrying out of civil-defense measures and emergency-rescue operations in the republic are compensated from the budget.

The transportation enterprises are required to take immediate steps to eliminate the consequences of natural disasters and accidents, as well as other circumstances of an emergency nature.

Article 23. Guaranteeing Safety and the Ecological Norms in Transportation

Carriers are required to guarantee the safety of the citizens' life and health and the safety of transportation traffic, navigation, and flights, as well as the protection of the environment.

The territories of stations, ports, wharves, airports, motor-transportation enterprises, and railroad lines, as well as the water routes, on which the traffic of means of transportation and loading-and-unloading operations are occurring, are zones of increased danger. The rules for being in a zone of increased danger for conducting operations there are established by the Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers. Violation of these rules results in responsibility in the procedure stipulated by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The guarding and accompaniment of dangerous freight shipments in accordance with the list approved by the

Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers are guaranteed by the senders or recipients of the freight on the entire trip.

Customers who send or receive explosives, flammable, radioactive, poisonous, or other dangerous freight shipments are required to guarantee the safety of those shipments, and to have equipment and mobile subdivisions that are necessary for preventing accident situations during the shipment of those items of freight, and for eliminating the consequences of any accidents. In the process of transportation activity, it is necessary to observe the normatives governing the quality of the environment, which guarantee the ecological safety of the population, the protection of the atmospheric air, the ground, and the vegetable and animal kingdoms against pollution, and which guarantee the efficient use and reproduction of natural resources.

It is prohibited to design or construct transportation enterprises on areas where deposits of mineral resources are present, or to locate underground structures in those places. In exceptional situations they are allowed on the basis of authorizations by specially empowered agencies responsible for geology and the protection of natural resources.

Transportation enterprises and carriers are required to plan and carry out the organizing and financing of environmental-protection measures, and to carry out production and departmental monitoring in the area of the protection of the environment and natural resources.

Carriers are required to carry out all the necessary steps to protect the environment, the atmosphere, bodies of water, and land, and to assure the efficient use of natural resources. For any damages inflicted on the environment, the carriers bear responsibility in the procedure established by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 24. Insuring of Passengers and Baggage

When using transportation, passengers are subject to mandatory insurance in the procedure established by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The operation of means of transportation is allowed, provided there is mandatory insurance [passage illegible] owners, legal entities.

Voluntary insurance of the life and health of passengers, as well as the insurance of baggage and freight, is carried out on the basis of the corresponding insurance contracts.

Section V. Concluding Principles

Article 25. Monitoring the Work of Transportation

Monitoring of the fulfillment by enterprises—irrespective of the organizations to which they belong or the forms of ownership—of the transportation legislation and the requirements with regard to the safety of

traffic and the ecology when operating means of transportation is carried out by the agency of state administration in transportation and by other agencies of state administration that are stipulated by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Inspection of means of transportation is carried out only in the instance established by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 26. International Relations in the Area of Transportation

The agency of state administration in transportation represents the interests of the republic in international relations in the area of transportation, with the right to conclude agreements and treaties in the procedure established by legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Carriers may, in conformity with the existing legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, develop foreign economic cooperation with legal entities or individuals of other countries and carry out the export (import) of output (operations, services).

If an international treaty that has been concluded by the Republic of Kazakhstan has established other rules than those contained in this Law, the rules in the corresponding treaty are applied.

[Signed] N. Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Almaty, Parliament House
21 September 1994
No. 156-XIII

Decree on Enactment of Law

954K0311B Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA
in Russian 8 Nov 94 p 2

Decree: "Decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, 'Implementation of Republic of Kazakhstan Law "Transportation in the Republic of Kazakhstan"'"

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To implement Republic of Kazakhstan Law "Transportation in the Republic of Kazakhstan," as of the day of promulgation.

2. Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers is to:

—submit to Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet recommendations for putting the legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan into conformity with Republic of Kazakhstan Law "Transportation in the Republic of Kazakhstan";

—develop and submit for review by the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet the transportation codes of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

—put the decisions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan into conformity with this Law.

[Signed] A. Kekilbayev, chairman of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet
Almaty, Parliament House
21 September 1994
No. 157-XIII

KYRGYZSTAN

Osmonov 'Realistic' Presidential Candidate

954K0294A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 52, 30 Oct-6 Nov 94 p 11

[Article by Kamil Bayalinov: "The Fergana Valley Is Waiting for Its Escobar: Which Forces Want South Kyrgyz Separatism? Who Can Claim the Role of South Kyrgyz Leader?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] OSH—DZHALAL-ABAD—BISHKEK—By expert estimates, Afghanistan, which is the hub of one of three traditional drug-producing centers—the famous "Golden Crescent" (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran), this year for the first time became the leading supplier of opium to the world market. Also, in their opinion, an important role in this was played by political events that had unfolded to the north of this country: the disintegration of the USSR, the emergence of new independent countries in Central Asia, and, most importantly, the civil war in Tajikistan, as a result of which the drug flow turned toward the Pamirs.

The Background

A few days ago Dzhumabek Asankulov, chief of the information directorate (military intelligence) of the Kirgiz [Kyrgyz] Ministry of Defense, told the INTERFAX agency that, according to their sources, drug smuggling from Gornyy Badakhshan to Kirgizia [Kyrgyzstan] via the Osh-Khorog route had considerably increased. The bulk of the drugs, he said, goes from Kirgizia to Russia and the Baltic countries, and from there to the far abroad.

Drugs in Central Asia regions already are becoming not just a widespread criminal business but also a political factor capable of influencing the future of new independent countries. Feeding the conflicts, the drug dollars foment regional separatism, carrying into power appanage fortune-seekers, and spread to increasing numbers of new oblasts like an epidemic.

Judging by all the signs, the south of Kirgizia may follow in Badakhshan's footsteps as the next victim of the drug offensive. Separated by mountain ridges from the republic's north, where the state capital, Bishkek, also is located, over the past few years the south has seen itself as deprived. The greater part of Kirgiz industry is in the north, and this is where the bulk of investment goes. The

Kirgiz south, which comprises the eastern part of one of the most densely populated regions on the planet—the Fergana Valley, which under the Soviet power was divided between Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—experiences the same problems as their neighbors in the valley: not enough land; high unemployment; social and ethnic tension. It is not accidental that the bloodiest cataclysms in perestroika-era Central Asia happened precisely here: the pogroms of the Meskhet Turks in Fergana in the spring of 1989 and the Kirgiz-Uzbek clashes in Osh Oblast of Kirgizia in the summer of 1990. The situation is even more complicated by the power struggle between various clans that is taking place against all this difficult socioeconomic background. In 1990 southern clans that used to rule Kirgizia were replaced by the northern ones, whose representative, Askar Akayev, was elected national president. The vote was held in the parliament, and the victory was narrow.

There is no doubt that this could not fail to evoke revanchist moods among the southerners. Especially considering that all southerners who were part of the Kirgiz establishment since 1990 were far from the best recognized representatives of the local elite and did not enjoy particular popularity in their homeland minor. To win a revanche, the southern clans needed a charismatic and strong leader.

Now there is such a leader in the south of Kirgizia.

Bekmamat Osmonov is one of the omnipotent masters of the south, the most realistic candidate for the future president of the country. In the event that he does not make it there, Bekmamat Osmonov is resolved to set up his own khanate in the south. Which he has privately told his subordinates more than once.

The Career

Since childhood, Bekmamat Osmonov was distinguished by a violent temper; neither did his years of study in institutions of higher learning proceed smoothly. In the end of 1960's, in connection with the accusation of raping a Korean girl, he was expelled from the institute of agriculture. After a year of working as a groom at the institute's auxiliary farm, Bekmamat continued his studies. Before he graduated, criminal proceedings were twice initiated against him on charges of assault, but every time, the victims filed a counter-motion and criminal proceedings were suspended.

Ten years passed, and the young degreed animal-breeder moved into party work.

In the fall of 1990, Osmonov staked a serious claim for himself in the elections of the first Kirgiz president. At the time he was supported in the parliament by an insignificant group of deputies from his native parts. But it was not the result that was important. The important part was to indicate the level of his claims. Sensing the imminent fall of the communists, Osmonov (first secretary of a rayon party committee) had defected to the

democratic camp and denounced the party leadership that "lost touch with the needs of the people." Two years later, the democrats returned the favor: Bekmamat Osmonov was nominated a candidate for the post of prime minister "from the people of Kyrgyzstan" by the most radical wing of the national-democrats, with whom President Akayev's internationalist policy did not sit particularly well. He did not make it. He was successful in Dzhahal-Abad Oblast, however—Osmonov did manage to get appointed its administration head.

Within a short period of time, Osmonov surrounded himself with in-laws, relatives, and friends, placing them in key positions. All in all, more than 30 relatives and in-laws of the thriving leader were working in the system of oblast's top administrative leadership. His people headed the oblast and city militia, comprised the leadership of the oblast administration apparat and health care system. His natural brother Aytmamat (there are a total of eight brothers in the clan) held the position of rayon agricultural administration chief; another brother, Shermamat, was first deputy chief of the oblast agricultural administration. Another Osmonov headed a kolkhoz. Osmonov's relatives ran the oblast television and print media. The administration head—the hakim—generously exempted all oblast journalists from paying fares in public transportation, and they paid back in kind. To each criticism of the hakim in the republic press, local television held "roundtables," and the oblast newspaper published refutations. Thus, the oblast mass media was pitched against the republic media.

Osmonov frequently mounted a horse and, accompanied by horsemen, rode around his domain, demanding that everyone call him a "khan." In front of a specially erected yurt, the somewhat intoxicated hakim was met by musicians who, to the accompaniment of an unsophisticated three-stringed instrument, sang improvised odes in honor of the wise ruler.

On the eve of a trip to China as part of President Akayev's entourage, Osmonov collected a large amount in dollars, hinting vaguely that the money will be spent on the needs of the "big boss." Rayon and city hakims and oblast economic managers were tasked with finding a thousand or two in dollars (depending on "abilities"). By the way, subordinates were also compelled to contribute money to the Osmon-Ata Foundation, named by Bekmamat Osmonov in honor of his father. The foundation had been set up ostensibly with the mission of providing support for talented and low-income citizens. What happened to the foundation's account afterwards is not known.

President Akayev's first attempt to remove the hakim in October 1991 was unsuccessful. Supporters of the oblast "commander," through their television and newspapers, called for mass disobedience to President Akayev, Vice President Kulov, and Prime Minister Chyngyshev. The vocabulary increasingly often included the word "arkalyk," which translated into Russian means "those who

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are behind the mountains." This is the way republic northerners are called in the south. It was then that for the first time the idea of "southern autonomy" was voiced.

Dzhalal-Abad's central square was blocked by enraged citizens specially brought to the oblast center from the hakim's native parts. In this situation Askar Akayev used a different tactic. Accompanied by a planeload of security people (who left earlier since the UGKNB [State Committee for National Security's administration] was not able to provide proper protection for the first person in the state), the president personally arrived in Dzhalal-Abad. He was able to convince Osmonov not to raise a mutiny and to resign. It is not known what the president promised in exchange, but several days later Bekmamat Osmonov voluntarily resigned. Privately, however, he declared that he would soon return....

Disfavor

Some time after the resignation, Bekmamat Osmonov founded a commercial structure Agroimpeks within the system of the republic Ministry of Agriculture. Officially the company engaged in sales of agricultural commodities.

The new oblast head, Abdyzhapar Tagayev, did not shun his compatriot for long. With his permission, the Tashkumyr tobacco plant issued to Bekmamat Osmonov 210 tonnes of fermented tobacco worth more than 2 million soms (about \$200,000). A year and a half has passed since then—the plant has still not gotten paid. Nevertheless, Osmonov again was issued 200 tonnes of tobacco. And again the money bypassed the treasury. At the Mayli-Say meat-packing plant the beginning businessman took a large consignment of hides, and in exchange delivered vegetable oil at 14 soms per measure—with a market value of seven to eight. A few times the untiring Osmonov was seen at the Kirgiz-Chinese border, where he escorted the most valuable consignments of cargo.

Over the year and a half of his disgrace, Osmonov turned into a major proprietor. His immense wealth enabled him to buy up prestigious stores in Dzhalal-Abad, Osh, and Bishkek.

The Prospects

In the middle of this summer, Bekmamat Osmonov happened to be in Bishkek. During this steamy season Askar Akayev was absent from the capital, spending time with his Kazakh colleague Nursultan Nazarbayev on the shores of Issyk-Kul. Bekmamat's Bishkek voyage was not related to commerce.

Three days later, Bekmamat Osmonov was appointed first deputy head of the largest oblast in Kirgizia—Osh. Not long before this, his brother Abdulla was appointed chief of the oblast tax police. This meant the end of disgrace for the omnipotent clan.

President Akayev learned of Osmonov's appointment on the day the latter was confirmed in his job. (In keeping with the Kirgiz law, the hakim's deputies are appointed by hakims, who subsequently notify the Cabinet of Ministers).

Who had lobbied Osmonov into the position of first deputy? Today it is easier to tell who did not. The alignment of political forces gives reason to believe that only two persons did not lobby for him: President Akayev and Prime Minister Dzhumagulov.

New mobile shops have recently appeared in Osh. Muscular lads keep the gawkers and the militia away by just four words: "These are Osmonov's goods." Neither could Osmonov resist buying another store.

Osmonov came to the leadership of Osh Oblast at the time when South Kirgizia became one of the main transit points for Afghan-Tajik opium en route to the CIS and Europe. According to competent organs, the opium market here is divided between several groups controlled by the top officials of the Osh militia. Sometimes the guardians of law and order themselves engage in transporting the valuable "commodity." Actually, the drug mafia's strings stretch further and higher—to Bishkek state structures. The law enforcement organs recently came across new proof of links between the militia and the drug mafia. Meanwhile, the oblast leadership had not mounted even once any reasonably serious operation to uncover corrupt servants of law enforcement and Themis.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

The South Kirgiz separatism, which objectively is in the interests of the drug mafia, plus an obviously weakened political influence of the north on the personnel policy in the south of Kirgizia may result in that in the not too distant future their own "medellins" may appear on the geographic map of Central Asia. Especially considering that, according to Western experts, the emissaries of the Colombian Medellin cartel are successfully conquering the expanses of post-Soviet Asia.

[Begin box]

A Letter: "The Traffic Cops"

There were reports in newspapers and on the radio that this summer Afghan refugees were sent from Kuban back home. Concerns for their fate were voiced: Some of them had sought refuge in Russia because they were in opposition to those who hold power in Afghanistan today. How could something like this happen? The answer was provided in a letter from Krasnodar University teacher Vsevolod Tikhomirov (IZVESTIYA, 25 August of this year): "This tragedy was made possible by a particular moral and spiritual atmosphere reigning in Kuban. The tone is set by openly brown publications, which purposefully incite chauvinism, aimed here first and foremost against Armenians, then other 'persons of Caucasus

origin,' and finally, any non-Russian dark-haired persons." The letter's author criticized Krasnodar lawmakers for decrees on foreigners, which conflict with Russian and international legal norms. And noted that patriotism means concern for the good name of Russia rather than observing, as the Kuban authorities like to put it, "ethnic balance."

So where did the concept of "ethnic balance" come from?

This question was answered by the former head of Krasnodar Kray administration Nikolay Yegorov: "Here (in Krasnodar Kray—E.Kh.) we have the strictest migration law in Russia... Sociologists and scholars believe that if the share of non-native population approaches 15 percent, we should expect a conflict. Today this figure is approaching 13 percent. This is dangerous." (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No. 49, 1993).

Please note that the point is not the kray's economic capacity, but the numeric ratio of native and nonnative population.

Thirteen percent.... What is then the government of Latvia to do, where nonnative population comprises 40 percent? Or the government of Estonia, where this population comprises one-third? The government of Chuvashia, where such population accounts for 32 percent? Introduce percentage ratios? And when it is dangerously close, deport the excess nonnative population? And how will the native population feel about this percentage-mania? Are not the terms "ethnic balance" and "ethnic cleansing" becoming synonymous?

And one more question. How will the now-Minister for Nationality Affairs Nikolay Yegorov implement the ethnic policy on the scale of Russia? By taking the "ethnic balance" into account?

[Signed] Er. Khan-Pira

[End box]

TAJIKISTAN

Eurasian Highway 'Historic Chance' for Tajikistan

954F0288A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Abdugani Mamadazimov, sector head, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RT [Republic of Tajikistan] Academy of Sciences, under rubric: "Project": "Construction of a Eurasian Highway Will Consolidate Tajiks: The State Will Have Yet Another Opportunity To Move Ahead in Conducting Reforms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The strategic location of Tajikistan, which is situated in the center of Asia, at the crossroads where the basic world types of cultures and civilizations come into contact, should not convert

Tajikistan into a "front line" or "buffer" of one civilization (for example, post-Soviet civilization) with respect to the others. On the contrary, Tajikistan, taking the entire real-life situation into consideration, should play a substantial role both in the West-East (Europe-Asia) dialogue and in intercivilizational interactions of the Western and east Asian cultures.

I might recall that Tajikistan, which, like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, is part of the CIS, borders on one of the Asian giants—China—and on the south with Afghanistan. In addition, the republic has rather good opportunities for gaining access to influential Asian countries—India, Pakistan, and Iran.

The eastern countries, which have been on the periphery of historical development for several centuries, are gradually coming into the forefront. One hears expressed with increasing conviction the assertion that "the twenty-first century is Asia's century." Even now the eastern part of Asia is contending with the West for economic supremacy over the rest of the world. It is precisely here that one observes the fusion of the eastern and western cultures, a fusion that is yielding staggering results and prospects for progress in this region of the world. If one recalls that after the great geographic discoveries Asia gradually yielded its positions to Europe, when the world's trade paths shifted from the "silk routes" on land to maritime, Atlantic paths, then the rebirth of the "Great Silk Route" would symbolize the restoration of Asia's lost positions. The construction of a Eurasian transcontinental highway is the command of the time. Without even mentioning the global nature of this project, but considering its completely economic side, one can assert that, according to computations made by specialists, the transporting of freight from China's eastern shores to Europe over the existing railroads of the Russian Federation alone will be 20-30 percent less than the cost of shipment by sea through the Suez Canal, and the transportation time will be cut in half. But the project for the transcontinental highway in the Central Asian sector must be distinguished from a railroad that encompasses chiefly the northern part of the Central Asian states as it runs across the great steppe of this continent. These adjustments are of cultural-historical and geostrategic nature.

First, despite the tremendous scope of Central Asia, it is precisely in its central part that one finds the most fertile land, almost all the old cities, the basic architectural and historical monuments, and the bulk of the region's population, and therefore the construction of a highway across that sector will lead to a rapid flareup of business activity on the part of the local population, simultaneously resolving acute problems of a socioeconomic nature.

Secondly, if one recalls that the entire length of the "Great Silk Route" from China to Europe used to be controlled by the Sogdiytsy-Rakhdonites—ancestors of the Tajiks—then we have the historic right to be a direct

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participant in this project. (Rakhdonite is the Tajik word *rokh*, "road", and *don*, "knowing," that is, "knowing the caravan road.") We are convinced that the Tajiks, who currently are living in an isolated position, have not lost their historic experience or their ethnic proclivities for establishing economic-trade and cultural contacts with the outside world.

Thirdly, the construction of the road across Tajikistan will lead to joining Iran—by way of the shortest highways and railroads Dushanbe-Tedzhent-Meshkhed-Teheran—to the Persian Gulf ports or, by way of Turkey, to Europe. Then the transcontinental road through Tajikistan's Badakhshan to the east—across Kulma Pass (Murgabskiy Rayon)—reaches the Karakumskoye Highway. This motor route provides a unique choice: one direction is China, and by way of it to the countries in the Asia-Pacific region; and the other is to Pakistan and an exit to the Indian Ocean. The dreams that Europeans have had for many centuries will come true—there will be an exit by land to the "warm seas." In the future the IGA [Islamic State of Afghanistan] has a good opportunity for annexing itself to that highway by constructing a bridge on the Nizhniy Pyandzh-Shcherkhan sector and across Ishkashimskiy Rayon. The inclusion of a greater and greater number of Asian states in the use of the Eurasian highway completely justifies its name and purpose.

Fourthly, the functioning of Russian rubles on the territory of Tajikistan. For the time being, the Russian ruble is demonstrating its greatest stability as compared with other new national monetary units with respect to the American dollar and other first-category currencies. This circumstance is encouraging the establishment of the most effective operations during the through shipment and the buying-selling transaction, and the rendering of all types of services on the republic's territory. Although Tajikistan is experiencing an acute need for rubles in cash form, the implementation of our project will fundamentally change the situation. With the breakthrough to the east, to the Karakumskoye Highway, Tajikistan will become the connecting link between the countries in the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia, on the one hand, and the CIS and the Middle and Near East, on the other, and through them to Europe.

Fifthly, the most important thing, in our view, is that this sector of the transcontinental road across the territory of all of Tajikistan will act as a Tajikistan-wide road of consolidation. Of the three highways linking the capital with the regions, two have a seasonal nature: the passes through the Turkestan, Zeravshan, Gissary, and Darvaz

ranges continue to serve as something like demarcation lines between the basic regions of our mountainous republic, reducing to a minimum the contacts among the people inhabiting them. The construction of a Tajikistan-wide road as an inseparable part of the transcontinental one will link all the regions, drawing them into a single economic system.

Since the current level of the republic's financial-economic, material-technical, and intellectual power does not make it possible to implement the entire volume of operations simultaneously, we shall take on as standard equipment the local explosive model of the development of the economy. This model has demonstrated its effectiveness in many countries of the world, but it is especially typical of the rapidly developing countries of the Far East. Therefore we propose implementing our project in two phases:

—at the first phase it is necessary to construct a total of 40 kilometers of road through Kulma Pass (which is characterized by calm relief), and connecting with the Karakumskoye Highway. This 40-kilometer sector connects with the Toktamyshe-Murgab highway, and in Murgab we connect with the Osh-Khorog-Dushanbe highway. The rapid growth of that region as a result of the border trade and the through shipments to Dushanbe and farther destinations will promote the gradual weakening of the role played by the state, which, by encouraging the private sector and small- and medium-scale business with the participation of foreign capital, is directing its attention to the second stage in the construction of the road;

—at the second stage—the rebuilding of the Dushanbe-Khudzhand road, the basic obstacle of which is Anzob Pass. By constructing a tunnel under the pass we will link the capital with Zeravshan Valley, and this will provide a powerful stimulus to the sharp improvement of the road through Shakhristan Pass, with an exit to Leninabad Oblast.

As a result we shall emerge from isolation immediately in several directions. On the north, the road connects with the transcontinental railroad; on the west, it will be possible in the future to connect with Iran; on the east, an exit to the Karakumskoye Highway; and on the south, in the future we shall connect with Afghanistan.

Thus, Tajikistan, by standing up for an international cause—the cause of constructing the Eurasian transcontinental highway—has a historic chance of consolidating the entire nation, since a section of this road will unite all its regions.

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